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The doctrine of man's salvation " sola fide"/--by
■a'-
grace through faith alone— has since the sixteenth ® ® a;v
century Reformation received strong affirmation in large , / . 5.'
sections of Protestantism as the articùius stantis et /
cadentis ecclesiae. This doctrine has, no doubt, a ./I— —  — —   ^ '
played a very significant role both historically and- ’ i ,a f-.a:theologically. , iJ 1 fr­
it may, however, also have been misunderstood as' a ' 'involving a certain tendency to neglect man's act, ' :
being open to the danger of libertinism and anti- %
nomianism on the one hand and ethical legalism on the , • '-à
.. ........other. , ,, V
' - ; : - a'A careful investigation is in order, as an attempt  ^;
► ... -
to throw some light on these problems . This is always - > 'i
of great importance to the church everywhere, but seems
to me to be especially relevant in view of the situation ’ ^
of the church in Japan
From this angle, I have already undertaken inves- : ^/' ' . ' ' : ' ' '  ^tigations into the theology of the New Testament and of ■
the Reformers, . The results of that study were published
■ ■ ' ' 'as articles in "Shingaku Kenkyu" (Theological Studies;. . : ® fm: -  —
-  ^■ ■ ' - 'T.'" y-  ^ ÿ:Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan) under the titles of -\ ;v
' ' ^
"A Study of Faith and Act--with special reference to the 
relation between Romans 4 and James 2--" 1962 and "A 
Study of Justification and Sanctification in Luther's 
Lectures on Romans" 1965.
----- :.;#M
Since that time I have felt keenly the necessity 
of an investigation of contemporary theologians on 
this point.
-■:ïl 
% i
' ■ . ■
It seems to me that Dietrich Bonhoeffer is one of V ■
’ . . . • • ■  - f ' ‘É-,
the most notable theologians in this context. / As : -^/S
Eberhard Bethge used the sub-title, "Theologians Chris- . "% , '
- ' 'tians Contemporary", to his monumental work on Bonhoeffer ’
- ' . . ' - ' f ^biography, so Bonhoeffer may be regarded as one who lived
‘ i.as a contemporary man with Christian faith. . î:' ®
' " . ' .. . - / . ^It may be said that Bonhoeffer's thought can be - ": . ' \ -/ . ' . understood only in thé light of his own remarkable , t^f c^f '-
persdnal/life and the background of the times in.which
he lived. Though he grew up in the relative stability
and security of a German bourgeois home with a fine
family.and cultural background that he greatly treasured^
his writings spring from the period of the growing crisis
of the 1930's in Germany with the rise of Hitler to power .. / '
He was very much aware of the world revolutionary change
of life taking place in his generation of which, the f
/. . ' -t-' - . 'situation in Germany was but one dramatic, example.  ^ '.\v
in the letter to his parents of 20th February, 1944
he says
Our generation cannot how lay claim to shch a- • life as was possible in yours- a life that can find ... 'its full scope in professional and personal activ- itles/ and achieve balance and fulfilment. That's perhaps the greatest sacrifice that we younger people, :/ with the : example of your life still before our eyes, are called oh and compelled to make, and it makes : [us particularly aware of the fragmentary and
. .  ' /!/#&
-A":
incomplete nature of our own. (1)
Perhaps this personal experience led him to his 
acute and realistic analysis of the modern non-religious, 
self-sufficient world. It was an analysis which,is 
particularly relevant to our times and is one of his 
major contributions to the contemporary theological 
thought.
The clue to Bonhoeffer is the Christocentric focus 
of his thought, that is, his constant reference to 
Jesus Christ who is at once the Incarnate, the Crucified, 
and the Risen One, Furthermore, Bonhoeffer quite simply 
and Clearly called the church to new obedience to the 
commandment of Jesus Christ. He was not afraid to speak 
of good works and was much concerned with thé problem Of 
worldly responsibility, but he did so on the basis Of a 
sound evangelical theology.
Bonhoeffer's conception of worldly Christianity is 
helping the church to gain a new understanding on the 
relation between God and the world.
The name of Dietrich Bonhoeffer has been famous 
in Japan since the beginning of the 19 60 ' s . Shinkyo 
Shuppansha (Protestant Publishing Company), the largést 
Christian Publishing Company in Japan, has published 
Japanese translations of almost all of his main Works.
; ?.
' ni--
-, 1) .^Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Letters and Papers from Prison,
'".: "■ ■ ■ .» ! - ' . .' ' i ' -TE#
They consist of nine volumes and have been read widely " 1
among ministers, theologians and Christian students.
It seems to me that there are two reasons why 
Bonhoeffer's name has become famous in Japan, , Firstly., 
his own life as a martyr against the Nazis has been 
seriously received by many Japanese Christians, because 
during the Second World War the greater part of the 
Christians in Japan, with a few exceptions, took an 
equivocal attitude towards the militaristic government.
It may be said, therefore, that a deep feeling of re­
pentance of Japanese Christians lies at the heart of 
this lionizing of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, In connection 
with this tendency, Bonhoeffer's famous words that were 
written in his letter to Reinhold Niebuhrs "I have come 
to the conclusion that I have made a mistake in coming 
to America. I must live through this difficult period 
of our national history with the Christian people of 
Germany. I will have no right to participate in the 
reconstruction of Christian life in Germany after the
war if I do not share the trials of this time with my 
2people..." are very often quoted by many preachers
and theologians. :
Secondly, even though this aspect lags far behind f- - . , ' ' the first, his theological and ethical insight is
2) Quoted by R. Niebuhr in "The Death of a Martyr" è|Christiahity and Crisis vol. V, no.II, p .  6 , . ^
'f;#
' . . . - .. . - .. r :
gradually being paid attention to by Christian leaders. 
They have found here one of the clues in solving some 
of the problems of the Church in Japan. I agree that 
Bonhoeffer must be taken seiously, not only as a martyr, 
but also as a theologian of consequence.
Many books and articles on Bonhoeffer have been 
published already, and it may be true to say that "the 
interesting thing about studying Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
is that it is impossible to follow him, to become his 
disciple."^
Though Bonhoeffer was Germany's most promising 
young theologian, his life was too short. At the age 
of thirty, he was barred from his academic post; when 
he was thirty-four, the pulpit was closed to him; at 
thirty-five, written publication was forbidden; by his 
imprisonment at thirty-seven, even conversation with 
his friends or colleagues was denied him; and at thirty- 
nine, he was executed by Hitler.
In spite of his short life and the incompleteness 
of his works, his influence has spread throughout the 
Christian world, largely due to the impact of his post­
humously published letters and papers from prison.
It is not easy to understand the thought of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer. This is because of two factors: First,
3) W. Hamilton: "Bonhoeffer; Christology and EthicsUnited," ChriStianity and Crisis, vol. XXIV, p. 195.
his thinking was largely of an exploratory nature, 
unfinished and unsystematized and cannot be easily 
classified or categorized into one theological school 
or position. Second, there is little permanent 
record of his thought. Even his major book which he 
considered his chief lifetime work. Ethics, is in­
complete and in fragmentary form.
Therefore, unfortunately it cannot be denied 
that there are many misunderstandings or distortions 
about his thinking. His ideas have been made into 
theological catch-phrases and have been used apart 
from his original intention. It seems that there 
has been a certain tendency to pay too much attention 
to his letters from prison, to understand him only from 
them, and not from the whole context of his works.
A careful research into Bonhoeffer's ethics is 
still of value, and such an investigation will give 
some light on our difficult but important contemporary 
problems.
There is firm continuity in his thought, but one 
must trace the development in Bonhoeffer's theological 
thinking. This has to be kept in mind in considering 
his works. Consequently, this study will be confined 
to Bonhoeffer's Ethics. Because the kernel of his 
thought is to be found here, it is a good and sufficient 
source for an investigation. -
This study will be divided into five parts.
In the first part, an introductory survey of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer will be attempted.
In the second part, the significance and themes 
of his Ethics will be discussed.
The third part, the centre of this thesis, will 
survey the fundamental motifs of Bonhoeffer's Ethics
The fourth part, will try to evaluate and give 
a critique of his Ethics.
The final part, will make special reference to 
his importance to the church in Japan.
CHAPTER ONE
A BRIEF SURVEY OF DIETRICH BONHOEFFER’S 
CAREER AND THOUGHT
10
As has been mentioned in the Introduction, 
Bonhoeffer's thought can be properly understood only 
in the light of the events of his own life and the 
background of the times in which he lived. Therefore, 
to begin an investigation with a brief sketch of his 
life may be helpful for an understanding of the devel­
opment of his theological and ethical thinking.
It is fortunate that there is a remarkable 
biography of Dietrich Bonhoeffer written by his close 
friend Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich BonhoefferTheolo­
gian, Christian, Contemporary, pulished in 1967 in 
German and in 1970 in the English translation. In 
this book Bethge divided Bonhoeffer's life into.three 
periods.
First period: "The Lure of Theology" (1906 —
1931)
Second period: "The Cost of Being a Christian"
(1931— 1940)
Third period: "Sharing Germany's Destiny"
(1940— 1945)
The first period covers the time from Bonhoeffer's 
birth to his return from study abroad at Union Theologi­
cal Seminary in New York, during which he had been 
engaged in studying and in teaching theology.
The next period extends to the outbreak of the 
Second World War. During this time he served as a 
minister of the Confessing Church and also as a leader
11
of ecumenical movement.
This was followed by active political years when 
Bonhoeffer joined positively in the movement of 
resistance to Hitler.
It is also interesting to divide his work theologi­
cally. These periods might be called the dogmatic, 
the exegetical and the ethical; or periods of foundation, 
concentration, and liberation.
And each period has two main works.
The first period; Sanctorum Communio and Act and 
Being.
The second period: The Cost of Discipleship and 
Life Together.
The third period: Ethics and Letters and Papers 
from Prison.
During the first period his thought centered on
"Jesus Christ as the revelational reality of the
Church," During the second period his emphasis was
upon "Jesus Christ as the Lord over the Church."
In the third period Bonhoeffer concentrated his atten-
2tion upon "Jesus Christ as the Lord over the world."
This difference can be seen as an expansion or
1) E. Bethge: "The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and Theology" in World Come of Age, ed. by RjG. Smith, p. 25.
2) J.D, Godsey: The Theoiogy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,p. 266.
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development of Bonhoeffer’s Christological under­
standing, Therefore the striking contrast between his 
original emphasis on the church and his final emphasis 
on the world is not to be regarded as a break in his 
theology, but as the two poles of the development of 
his Christocentric thinking.
The first period (1906-1931)
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a German, born in Breslau 
(now Wroclaw in Poland, but formerly the Schlesien 
Province of Germany) on the 4th of February, 1906.
He and his twin sister, Sabina, were the sixth and 
seventh children in a family of eight. His family was a 
cultured, upper-middle-class family with a Lutheran 
heritage.
His father, Karl Ludwig Bonhoeffer, was a well known 
physician and authority on psychiatry and neurology who 
became a professor at the University of Berlin in 1912.
His mother, the former Paula von Hase, was the 
daughter of a chaplain to the emperor and her grand­
father was the distinguished nineteenth-century eccle­
siastical historian, Karl von Hase.
Of his three elder brothers, Karl Friedrich was a 
brilliant physicist, Walter an expert on the forest and 
its creatures, and Klaus became a lawyer.
In 1912 the family moved to Berlin, where the father 
occupied the chair of psychiatry, and went to live in
13
the attractive residential district of Grünewald,
Adolf von Harnack and Hans Delbrueck were close
neighbours and great friends of the Bonhoeffer family.
Bonhoeffer enjoyed the advantages of Germany's
finest cultural and liberal tradition. "Bonhoeffer
appreciated all that his family provided in the way
of balance, self-control, and respect for truth —  a
family that emphasized hard work and respect for each
member’s personality, but also a family that made
music together, entered enthusiastically into sports
and organized lively festivals among the neighbours.'"^
According to Godsey, the characteristics of
Bonhoeffer as a boy, which played a perceptible role
at every point in his career, were: a remarkable vitality,
an unusually sensitive nature, and a capacity for
4turning thought into action.
At the age of fourteen Bonhoeffer decided to study 
theology. It seems that this decision surprised his 
family and those who knew him. Later, his father con­
fided his thoughts about Bonhoeffer’s decision saying:
"At the time when you decided to devote yourself to 
theology I sometimes thought to myself that a quiet, 
uneventful minister's life, as I knew it from that of
3) A . Dumas; Dietrich Bonhoeffer; Thoologian of Reality, p. 39,
4) J.D. Godsey; The Theoiogy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,p. 20.
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my Swabian uncles and as Moerike describes it, would
5really almost be a pity for you."
Bonhoeffer entered Tuebingen University to begin 
his theological studies in the autumn of 1923. Here 
he was influenced by Adolf Schlatter, Wilhelm Heitmueller, 
Karl Heim, Karl Groos and others.
The following year, however, after three months of 
travel in Rome and North Africa, Bonhoeffer matriculated 
at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Berlin, 
and completed his theological education there. In those 
days the Faculty of Theology of Berlin had the world's 
foremost scholars: Adolf von Harnack, Adolf Deissmann, 
Ernst Sellin, Hans Lietzmann, and two exponents of what 
was then called the "Luther renaissance," with whom 
Bonhoeffer worked most closely, Karl Holl and Reinhold 
Seeberg.
Adolf von Harnack estimated Bonhoeffer's ability 
highly and tried to persuade him to specialize in 
church history. Bonhoeffer also retained a lifelong 
respect for Harnack and it was one of his books that he 
was reading in the prison at the end of his life.
But Bonhoeffer's interest gradually turned towards 
systematic theology and for this he worked under the 
guidance of Reinhold Seeberg. He wrote for him such
5) Letter of 2nd February, 1934, quoted by E. Bethge: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, pp. 22f.
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essays as "Laesst slch eine hlstorlsche und pneumat1sche 
Auslequnq der Schrift unter sc he i d e n , und wle stellt sich 
die Dogmatik hierzu?" (Can a. historical and pneumatological 
interpretation of Scripture be differentiated, and how 
does this relate to dogmatics?), "Vernunft und Offenbarung 
in der alt-lutherischen Dogmatik" (Reason and revelation 
in early Lutheran dogmatics), "Kirche und Eschatologie" 
(Church and eschatology), "Die Lehre der aitproteStantischen 
Dogmatik vom Leben nach dem Tode und letzten Dingen"(The 
teaching of early Protestant dogmatics on life after death 
and last things), "Franks Anschauungen vom Geist und von 
der Gnade dargesteilt nach dem System der christiichen 
Gewissheit und dem System der Christiichen Wahrheit" 
(Frank's view of the spirit and of grace according to the 
system of Christian certainty and system of Christian 
truth).
In 1927, at the age of only twenty-one, Bonhoeffer 
submitted to the faculty of theology his dissertation, 
entitled "Sanctorum Communio: Eine dogmatische Untersuchung 
zur Sozioiogie der Kirche" (The Communion of Saints:
dogmatic inquiry into the sociology of the Church) . ^
Bonhoeffer was influenced much by Adolf Schlatter
6) The first of the six books that constitute Bonhoeffer's life work, originally published in 1930, as number twenty- six of the series Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche, edited by R. Seeberg, In 1954 it was re­published as vol. 3 in the Theologische BueCherei series published by Kaiser Verlag.
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at Tuebingen and Adolf von Harnack and Reinhold 
Seeberg at Berlin. But the greatest influence upon 
him was some one he had never heard lecture and had 
no direct acquaintance with until June, 1931—  Karl 
Barth, Barth's influence upon Bonhoeffer can be 
detected in the fact that Bonhoeffer put Christology 
at the heart of the entire theological enterprise, 
and this was the decisive emphasis in which the liberal 
tradition that trained him was defective.
"Sanctorum Communio" was a notable work which
dealt with the structure of the Church. The influence
of Barth can be traced in it. Barth also recognised
his disciple in this work. It is said that he described
7it as "a theological miracle". He wrote in his Church 
Dogmatics as follows: "... this dissertation which gains 
our deepest respect in the breadth and depth of its 
vision: not only for its relation to the time when it 
was written but also because even now it can instruct, 
stimulate, illuminate and edify, far more than many 
more famous works about the problem of the church which 
have come out since... I admit that I myself have diffi­
culty in keeping up the standard which Bonhoeffer set 
in those days...
7) J. D. Godsey: The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,p. 21.
8) K. Barth: Church Dogmatics, IV/2, p. 7 25.
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Ernst Wolf comments on this book in the preface 
to the second edition, as "probably the most discern­
ing and perhaps the most profound handling of the 
question about the real structure of the church."
The doctrine of the church was the starting 
point of Bonhoeffer's theological thinking and it is
the main interest through-out his life. His theme
9was the church in which Christ works.
Bonhoeffer's thinking about the church starts with
the real presence of Christ. The Church is the place
where Jesus Christ is present. Therefore those who are
in the Church are in Christ. "A man who is not in the
church does not live in communion with Christ; but a
man who is in Christ is in both the perfected and the
10actualised Church."
He then attempts an investigation of the social 
structure of the "Sanctorum Communio," in which the 
insights of social philosophy, with its fundamental 
interest in human sociality, and sociology, with its 
systematic interest in the structure of empirical com­
munities, are made fruitful for Christian dogmatic
11thinking about the concept of the Church. This
9) See Christoph von Hase: "Begriff und Wirklichkeit der Theologie Bonhoeffers", Die Muendige Welt, I, s. 26.
10) D. Bonhoeffer: Sanctorum Communio, p.116.
11) J. D, Godsey; The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 27.
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attitude towards aligning the concepts of sociology 
and social philosophy with the revelation of Christ 
shows us the direction of the development of his 
theology.
In 1928, Bonhoeffer became vicar of a German­
speaking church in Barcelona, Spain. Returning to 
Berlin in February 1929, he became assistant to Pro­
fessor Wilhelm Lutgert in systematic theology, and 
worked on his Habilitationsschrift, which is required 
before one can be admitted to teach in a theological 
faculty in Germany. This work, the second book in 
his first period, entitled Akt und Sein: Transzendental- 
philosophie und Ontologie in der systematischen Theologie 
(Act and Being: transcendental philosophy and ontology 
in systematic theology), was accepted by the University 
of Berlin in 1930 and won for him a position as Privat- 
dozent in systematic theology. On 31st July, 1930 
Bonhoeffer gave an inaugural lecture on the topic 
"Die Frage nach dem Menschen in der gegenwaertigen 
Philosophie und Theologie" ("Man in contemporary phi­
losophy and theology").
Before taking up teaching duties, however, he spent 
the academic year 1930— -1931 as a student at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York. His stay in America 
was a stimulating one, due to many discussions and dis­
coveries. He was passionately interested in becoming
19
acquainted with and understanding this new world and 
its religious life. He tried eagerly to get in touch 
with the Black church and community. He also made 
the acquaintance of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Lehmann.
After his second trip to the United States in the 
summer of 1999, he wrote an essay entitled "Protes­
tant! smus ohne Reformation” (Protestantism without 
1 2Reformation). Here we can see his reflections on 
America, In his essay he offered an evaluation of 
the secularity of the state and its clear separation 
from the church, the vitality of the denominations, 
the church's sense of social responsibility, the open­
ness of everyone to personal questions, the practical 
ecumenism on the American scene, and the agreements 
that were possible on many issues without pompousness 
or bathos. At the same time, however, he feared for 
the truth when it became so vague and sentimental, and 
for a church that could so easily be transformed into 
a social club without theological vigour or even the 
need for any commitment of faith. For him American 
Christianity is quite different from German or European 
Christianity, where doctrinal precision was all-important, 
but where the experience of the communion of saints
12) UNTERWEGS, Heft I, 1949, pp. 3-17, reprinted inGesammelte Schriften I, 1958, Munich, pp. 323-354.
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1 3was losing ground.
The second period (1931-1940) began with his return 
to Germany.
On 1st August, 1931 Bonhoeffer commenced teaching 
in the theological faculty of the University of Berlin. 
But his work was not limited to academic circles. He 
became chaplain at the Technical College in the Charlot- 
tenburg district of Berlin, where his preaching services 
were crowded. He also took charge of a confirmation 
class of fifty boys in a slum area in the North Berlin 
district Of Wedding using a new catechism which was 
written by him in co-operation with Franz Hildebrandt 
—  Glaubst Du, so hast du. Versuch eines Lutherischen 
Katechismus. (If you believe, you have. An experiment 
of Lutheran Catechism), On 11th November 1931, he was 
ordained a pastor.
In addition to these pastoral duties he accepted 
the post of youth secretary to an ecumenical organiza­
tion, "The World Alliance for Promoting International 
Friendship Through the Churches". He took responsibility 
for Germany and central Europe as one of three youth 
secretaries, and became a regular participant in its 
conferences, at Cambridge in 1931, in Czechoslovakia 
in July 1932, in Geneva and Gland in August 1932.
13) A. Dumas : Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian ofReality, pp. 46-47.
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and Sofia in September 1933, He engaged energetically 
in the ecumenical —  interconfessional and international—  
movements and this dimension became increasingly 
important from the moment that Nazism began to isolate 
Germany and the German Church from the rest of the world..
All this time he was teaching in the theological 
faculty and his lectures and seminars covered a wide 
range of topics, including: "The History of Systematic 
Theology in the Twentieth century", "The Concept of Phi­
losophy and Protestant Theology", "The Nature of the 
Church, "Is There a Christian Ethic?", "Creation and 
Sin; A Theological Exegesis of Genesis 1--3", and "Modern 
Theological Literature". Of These, "Creation and Sin" 
was later published, at the request of his students, 
in book form as Creation and Fall.
In those days, that is, the beginning of the 1930*s,
Germany was going through its fateful turning from the
Weimar Republic to the National Socialist’s seizure of
power, and German Protestantism was entering the crisis
of totalitarian conformity and the whole struggle of the
, 14Confessing Church.
In the election of 14th September 1930, the Nazis 
increased the number of their deputies in the Reichstag 
from 12 to 107. In the 1932 election (July 31) the Nazis
14) A. Dumas: Dietrich Bonhoeffer; Theologian ofReality, p. 50,
22
captured 230 seats and became the strongest party in 
the Government. On 30th January 1933, Adolf Hitler 
was installed as Chancellor of the Third German Reich, 
and on 27th February the Reichstag was burned.
In the church as well, event followed event with 
increasing speed. The "German Christians", who supported 
the "positive Christianity" and the anti-Jewish efforts 
recommended by Hitler, almost gained a majority of seats 
in the November 1932 regional elections of the church 
to which Bonhoeffer belonged. They triumphed in the 
General Church Election of 23rd July 1933, getting 70 
per cent of the vote. The "Fuehrer-principle" was 
applied to the church in the person of the military 
chaplain Ludwig Mueller who was named Bishop of Prussia 
on 13th July, and was elected Reichbishef at the National 
Synod of Wittenberg on 27th September.
At the same time, however, an opposition movement 
began to grow within the church. Dumas notes several 
movements: the pastors's confessional statement at 
Altona (inspired by Hans Asmussen) dates from 11th 
January 1933? the letter of warning from Bishop 
Dibelius to his pastors from 8th March? the publication 
of Karl Barth's Theologische Existenz Heute from 25th 
June? the clear condemnation of the "Aryan clause" by 
the Faculty of Theology at Marburg from 20th September? 
and the formation of the Pastors' Emergency League under
23
Niemoeller from 21st September, with the convening of
1 5its Council of Brethren on 20th October.
Bonhoeffer aligned himself solidly with this 
evangelical opposition. Two days after Hitler became 
Chancellor, Bonhoeffer gave a lecture on the radio 
entitled "WahdTunqen des Fuehrerbegriffes in der jungen 
Generation" (Changes in the conception of the leader in 
the younger generation), in which he pointed out the 
dangers of idolization of a human leader. But the 
broadcast was cut off the air by the authorities before 
its conclusion. He developed the theme even more fully 
in a lecture given at the German High School for Politics 
in March 1933, and in it we can see the idea of "mandate" 
that was later developed in Ethics.
In October 1 933 he went to London to work as a 
pastor of two German parishes. Bonhoeffer had several 
reasons for leaving Germany and in effect he was far 
more useful to the Confessing Church in London, where 
he was free to speak and see people, than he could 
possibly have been in Berlin. As it is widely known, 
however, Barth opposed his move and accused him of 
running away into the backwater of German church life.
He wrote: "... I can honestly not tell you anything but
15) A. Dumas: Dietrich Bonhoeffer? Theologian ofReality, p. 51.
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'hurry back to your post in Berlin!'.., No, to all the 
reasons or excuses which you might perhaps still be 
able to put in front me, I will give only one answer: 
'and the German c h u r c h ? " B o n h o e f f e r  did not reply, 
and he did not return to Germany although he might have 
had inner conflicts about doing so.
He was intent on doing pastoral work. During this 
time he made up his mind to go forwards as a minister 
rather than as a theologian. His concerns had shifted 
gradually from systematic theology to theological exe­
gesis of the Bible and Christian ethics.
In 1934, the Confessing Church was first clearly 
organised taking its name from a Declaration or Confes­
sion written in May of that year in Barmen. Bonhoeffer 
played a major role in the Barmen Conference and in the 
writing of the Barmen Declaration, which became the 
theological sheet anchor of the resistance.
Through his acquaintance with C. F. Andrews, 
Gandhi's friend and biographer, Bonhoeffer became 
interested in Gandhi ' s non-violent method of pacifism.
He envisaged a trip to India and even got an introduc­
tion from the bishop of Chichester, G.K.A,..'Bell with 
whom he kept firm contacts throughout the remainder of 
his life.
16) See No Rusty Swords, pp. 237-240.
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But meanwhile a call came from the Confessing 
Church to return and take over the leadership of an 
illegal seminary for training vicars of. the Confessing 
Church in Pomerania. On 26th April, 1935, he met 
twenty-five young ministers, all of whom intended to 
serve parishes in the Confessing Church, at Zingst on 
the Baltic Sea. Soon thereafter, however, he moved 
the seminary to Finkenwalde near Stettin.
One of his students was Eberhard Bethge, who 
became his assistant and, after his death, was to 
become his biographer and editor of his writings.
In 1936 Bonhoeffer's authority to teach was withdrawn 
by German officials, and the seminary was closed by 
order of Himmler in 1937; but it continued underground 
until 1940. Bonhoeffer called this community the 
"Bruderhaus" (House of Brothers), where he experimented 
with a form of Protestant monasticism. Their life was 
divided between theological work, spiritual discipline, 
enjoyment of nature, friendship, and service to nearby 
parishes. His experience during this period is contained 
in the two books: Nachfolge (The Cost of Discipleship) 
and Gemeinsames Leben (Life Together) which made his 
name and his thoughts widely known,
Nachfoldge appeared in November 1937, a month after 
Finkenwalde had been closed in the year in which twenty- 
seven young ministers were arrested.
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Bonhoeffer pursued his way of life as a disciple of 
Jesus Christ, according to the Word of God under the 
control of Nazism. "What it means to follow Jesus" 
was the burning question for Bonhoeffer, He insisted: 
the church is poisoning itself by its use of cheap grace. 
Cheap grace means grace as a doctrine, a principle, a 
system. It means forgiveness of sins proclaimed as a 
general truth, the love of God taught as the Christian 
'conception' of God. Cheap grace means the justification 
of sin without the justification of the sinner. Cheap 
grace is grace without discipleship, grace without the 
cross, grace without Jesus Christ, living and incarnate.
On the contrary, costly grace accompanies a life
of discipleship. "Such grace is costly," says Bonhoeffer,
"because it calls us to follow, and it is grace because
it calls us to follow Jesus Christ. It is costly because
it costs a man his life, and it is grace because it
17gives a man the only true life."
In this book we can read Bonhoeffer's critique 
against the German church which easily compromised 
with the authorities of the state and parted with its 
conscience of faith. And he strongly insisted that 
there is only one answer to Jesus's call —  single-minded 
obedience; and that it is only to this obedience that
17) D. Bonhoeffer: The Cost of Discipleship, pp. 3 5-37.
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the promise of fellowship with Jesus is given. We can
find nothing except this book which investigates plainly
1 8and deeply the relation between grace and obedience.
Life Together is a small work which grew out of
his two-year experience of living communally with his
vicar-students in the Bruderhaus at Finkenwalde. He
begins this simple but powerful book with these points;
Life in visible community with Christian brethren is
not something that can be taken for granted. Like Jesus,
who lived in the midst of enemies, Christians live in the
midst of the world, dispersed among unbelievers and
united only in Christ. When they are permitted to live
in visible fellowship with other Christians and to
gather visibly to share God's word and sacrament, it
must be recognized as the pure grace of God, who allows
them the extraordinary, the "rose and lilies" of the 
1 9Christian life.
18) In Church Dogmatics, K. Barth evaluated Bonhoeffer's work highly. "Easily the best that has been written on this subject is to be found in The Cost of Discipleship, by Dietrich Bonhoeffer. We do not refer to all the parts, which were obviously compiled from different sources, but to the opening sections, "The Call to Discipleship","Simple Obedience" and "Discipleship and the Individual."In these the matter is handled with such depth and pre­cision that I am almost tempted simply to reproduce them in an extended quotation. For I cannot hope to say any­thing better on the subject than what is said here by a man who, having written on discipleship, was ready to achieve it in his own life, and did in his own way achieve it even to the point of death. In following my own course, I am happy that on this occasion I can lean as heavily asI do upon another." (IV/2, pp. 533-534)
19) cf. J.D. Godsey; The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,p. 180.
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It seems to me that Bonhoeffer found the weak point 
of the Protestant church in the lack of discipline of 
faith in the communal life and also the lack of Bible 
study in the fellowship. So his ambition was to over­
come such weak points through the life in Finkenwalde. 
Life Together is the beautiful fruit of his conviction. 
After the time of the crisis brought about by 
General Fritsch in February 1939, Bonhoeffer, thanks to 
his brother-in-law Hans von Dohnanyi, entered into close 
contact with the centre of the resistance movement to 
which he belonged during the war, and particularly with 
Admiral Canaris and General Oster.
In March 1939 Bonhoeffer returned to London to 
visit his former parish. There he renewed connections 
with several people in the ecumenical world, notably 
Bishop Bell, Leonard Hodgson of "Faith and Order", and 
Visser't Hooft,
It was at this time that Bonhoeffer's friends. 
Reinhold Niebuhr in particular, undertook to arrange a 
way out for him that would save him much difficulty.
They sent an invitation for a two-yéar visit to the 
United States of America and offered him an opportunity 
to undertake pastoral work, preaching and teaching. He 
gained permission from the Council of the Confessing 
Church, acquired the task of maintaining its ecumenical 
work outside Germany, and set sail for New York on 7th 
June, 1939.
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However, he took one of the last ships and returned 
to Germany on 7th July, in spite of his close friend Paul 
Lehmann's persuasion, leaving a famous letter of expla­
nation for Reinhold Niebuhr (quoted in the Introduction, 
above, page 5). He felt the need for identification 
with his suffering countrymen.
This was the big turning point of his life. Now
his life was divided into two directions (as Bethge
20puts it "double life") : One is the task of the Confes­
sing Church, visiting, working on his Ethics ; and the 
other is the task of the resistance movement.
As he had been invited by Dr John Baillie to give 
the Croall Lectures in Edinburgh in October, he wanted 
to use this opportunity as the first step for his Ethics. 
However, the Second World War which began in September 
with the invasion of Poland obstructed this plan.
The third period (1940— 1945) was the time of 
sharing Germany's destiny.
Bonhoeffer joined the political underground resist­
ance at the highest level, even obtaining a passport from 
the Intelligence Corps of the Army through his brother- 
in-law Hans von Dohnanyi. By this means, Bonhoeffer, 
who was forbidden to speak or publish in Germany, was
20) E. Bethge;' Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 765.
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able to travel throughout Germany and maintain his 
contacts abroad. His task was now clearly political, 
even though his essential concern was still theo­
logical, He visited Switzerland in 1941 making contact 
with W. A. Visser't Hooft. In 1942 he met Dr Bell 
in Sweden and communicated to him the resistance's 
terms for a German surrender. The rejection by the 
British Government of this overture meant that there 
was no alternative for the underground except the . 
assassination of Hitler—  a course Bonhoeffer himself 
had urged —  and the result was the unsuccessful bomb 
plot of July 20, 1944.
A work on ethics was a project Bonhoeffer had 
envisaged since 1937. He worked on it piecemeal 
between 1940 and 1943, sometimes in Berlin, sometimes 
on the estate of Frau von Kleist in Pomerania, and 
sometimes in the Benedictine abbey at Ettal in Upper 
Bavaria. The unfinished fragments appeared posthu­
mously as the Ethics in 1949 by the effort of Bethge.
We can see his intention in one of his prison letters.
He wrote: "I sometimes feel as if my life were more or
less over, and as if all I had to do now were to finish 
21my Ethics."
Bonhoeffer was arrested on 5th April 1943. He spent
21) Bonhoeffer's letter of 15th December, 1943.
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1. World Come of Age. It is Bonhoeffer's conviction 
that our world has ."come of age", by which he means 
that the time of "religion" is over. Bonhoeffer writes 
in his letter of 30th April 1944 that:
The thing that keeps coming back to me is, what is Christianity, and indeed what is Christ, for us today? The time when men could be told everything by means of words, whether theological or simply pious, is over, and so is the time of inwardness and conscience, which is to say the time of religion as such. We are proceeding towards a time of no religion at all; men as they are now simply cannot be religious any more. (22)
Increasingly since the thirteenth century the
world has become secular and through the development
of science more and more autonomous from religion and
the need for God. In art, philosophy, physics, even
ethics, God is no longer required as an idea to explain
things. "For the last hundred years or so it has been
increasingly true of religious questions also? it is
becoming evident that everything gets along without
23God, and just as well as before."
The world has become "mature", is aware of the laws 
that govern its existence, and is confident as it sets 
about solving concrete daily problems that it has no 
need for God. This new mature world is not stable, but
22) D. Bonhoeffer; . Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 279.
23) op. cit., pp. 325-326.
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the first eight months, until 8th October 1944, in the 
Tegel military prison. During this time he was allowed 
to write and all the letters to his parents and his 
friends (chiefly to Bethge), both censored and un­
censored, make up the book published under the title 
"Widerstand und Ergebung" (Letters and Papers from 
Prison)4 These letters cover the period from 14th 
April 1943 to 23rd August 1944. Several other items 
have been included in addition to the letters. TheSe 
letters made him famous after the war, particularly 
those written from 30th April 1944 onwards, in which 
Bonhoeffer began to speculate about the future of 
the Lordship of Jesus Christ in a non-religious world 
come of age.
At this point it is appropriate to attempt a 
preliminary survey of his fundamental motifs in Letters 
and Papers from Prison. It seems to me that we can find 
here important thoughts which are closely connected with 
the motifs of the Ethics. In Bonhoeffer's thought, the 
concepts 'Christ— world come of age— religion' form a 
triangle, in which the definition of each concept is 
dependent on the definition of the other two. This 
triangle is strongly related to his primary question—  
Who is Jesus Christ for us today? It is this context 
that his observations find their true proportion. 
Therefore I shall aproach his main motifs through the 
investigation of these characteristic terms.
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rather instability and revolution mark its character.
Nor does the continual shift to different relative
human truths that takes place mean that these principles
necessarily become good themselves. This new mature
world more and more accepts the relativity of its
status though it is true that there is also, especially
among intellectuals, a seeking after some new total
ideology or religion. On the whole, however, the
autonomous development is progressing and even the
sphere of the inner and personal life is beginning to
show this. For a long time this has been falsely
regarded as the sphere of religion: "When God was
driven out of the world, and from the public side of
human life, an attempt was made to retain him at least
24in the sphere of the 'personal'".
Bonhoeffer is convinced that modern man cannot be 
religious even if he thinks he is and wants to be. If 
he describes himself as religious, it is obvious that 
he does not live up to it, or that he means something 
quite different by it. If religion was no more than 
a "garment of Christianity," it must now be cast aside 
because it has lost its meaning in a world which has 
come of age.
According to Bonhoeffer, most theologians and
24) D. Bonhoeffer: Letters' and Papers' from Prison,p. 344.
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historians (both Roman Catholic and Protestant) recog­
nize this trend to secular self-autonomy in the world, 
where God is being slowly squeezed out to spheres of 
borderline concern, but they react to it in different 
ways. For Bonhoeffer their answers are not adequate.
He criticizes them because their attack upon the 
matured world is pointless, ignoble, and un-Christian. 
Pointless, because it looks to him like an attempt to 
put a grown-up man back into adolescence, i.e., to 
make him dependent on things on which he is not in fact 
dependent any more, thrusting him back into the midst 
of problems which are in fact not problems for him any 
more. Ignoble, because this amounts to an effort to 
exploit the weakness of man for purposes alien to 
him and not freely subscribed to by him. Un-Christian, 
because Christ himself is being substituted for one 
particular stage in the religiousness of man, i.e., 
a human law.^^
Next, Bonhoeffer criticizes and rejects several 
main theological approaches to this problem. At the 
same time, he makes clear his understanding of the 
main streams in theology, which he divides into four 
groups.
25) D, Bonhoeffer; Letters and Papers from Prison,.p. 327 .
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First, there is the attempt by some to return to 
the church heteronomy of the Middle Ages where all 
spheres of life were dependent upon a tightly knit 
system that was based on the hypothesis of God. 
Bonhoeffer's criticism is that this is a counsel of 
despair, which can be purchased only at the cost of 
intellectual honesty. We must recognize "that we 
have to live in the world etsi deus non daretur.
2) Christian pietism, which Bonhoeffer terms
"methodism",offers another approach to the increasingly
secularized world. These pietists attempt to clear a
place in the world for God by persuading the world
that it still needs God to answer its problems and
solve its distress and conflicts. This is done by
convincing people of their sin and miserable state,
showing them their needs and conflicts until they are
ready to be sold the goods we have to offer.' But,
asks Bonhoeffer, "are we to fall upon one or two
unhappy people in their weakest moment and force
27upon them a sort of religious coercion?" And what 
about those who insist that they are not unhappy or 
miserable, that they can meet their own conflict?
26) D. Bonhoeffer; Letters and Papers from Prison, P. 360. '
27) op. cit., p. 280.
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"If a man won't see that his happiness is really 
damnation, his health, sickness, his vigour and
vitality despair; if we won't call them what they
28really are, the theologian is at his wits' end."
Such a person must be a hopelessly^hardened sinner
or a complacent bourgeois and impossible to save.
Existential philosophy and psychotherapy have
both been active in this type of work, says Bonhoeffer.
29He calls them "secularized methodists" and writes 
"wherever there is health, strength, security, sim­
plicity, they scent luscious fruit to gnaw at or lay 
their pernicious eggs i n . S u c h  an approach is 
foreign to Jesus' teaching and practice. He does 
not begin by impressing upon men their sinfulness or 
calling them into sin; he calls them out of their sin. 
"Never did Jesus question a man's health, vigour or
happiness, regarded in themselves, or regard them as 
31evil fruits,"
In any case Bonhoeffer feels that this pietist 
approach with its secular companions really reaches 
only a few intellectuals who enjoy contemplating their 
self-estrangement and conflicts. The ordinary working
28) D. Bonhoeffer : Lettersp. 341 .
29) op. cit. , p. 326.
30) op. cit. , p. 326 .
31) op. cit.. p. 341 .
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man with a family has litt|èj(. time or interest "to con­
cern himself with his. existential despair, or to regard
his perhaps modest share of happiness as a trial, a
32trouble, or a calamity."
Bonhoeffer believes there is a twofold theological 
error here: first, the idea that man can be addressed 
as a sinner only on the basis of his weaknesses; 
secondly, the notion that man's essential nature consists 
of his inner life. Jesus did not make every man a 
sinner first; he called men out of their sin, not into 
it.
Thus Bonhoeffer insists on taking an entirely dif­
ferent approach to a world come of age, saying: I should 
like to speak of God not on the borders of life but at 
its centre, not in man's suffering and death but in his 
life and prosperity. The church stands not where human 
powers give out, on the borders, but in the centre of 
the village. Here we can see Bonhoeffer's positive 
attitude of faith. He intended to preach Christ in the 
centre of the society where people are living really 
and concretely.
3) A third type of Christian apologetic approach 
to this growing religious autonomy of the world ideas 
is what Bonhoeffer believes to be really an extension
32) D. Bonhoeffer: Letters and Papers from Prisoii,p. 327.
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of. "liberal pietism". . Bonhoeffer puts many famous 
theologians' names in this group, including Karl Heim, 
Paul Althaus, Paul Tillich, and Rudolf Bultmann. 
Bonhoeffer presents an amazingly concise and penetrat­
ing sketch of these scholars in the letter of 8th June, 
331944.
Heim sought, along pietist and methodist lines, 
to convince individual man that he was faced with the 
alternative "either despair or Jesus."
Althaus endeavoured to write from the world of 
Lutheran teaching and Lutheran worship, and otherwise 
left the world to its own devices.
Tillich set out to interpret the evolution of the 
world—  against its will—  in a religious sense, to 
give it its whole shape through religion. That was 
very courageous of him, but the world unseated him 
and went on by itself; he too sought to understand 
the world better than it understood itself, but it 
felt entirely misunderstood, and rejected the imputation 
Bultmann's demythologizing, Bonhoeffer thinks, 
is also at heart a liberal attempt to reduce the Gospel 
to its "essence" and it fails to interpret the Bible 
and the New Testament faith in a "non-religious", that 
is, a non-metaphysical or non-individualistic sense.
33) cf. D. Bonhoeffer: Letters' and Papers from Prison, pp. 324-329.
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For Bonhoeffer it is not the mythological concepts that 
are problematic, but the. "religious" ones, so that in 
one sense Bultmann did not go far enough.
4) Barth's theology is, according to Bonhoeffer, 
the most helpful sign of a break away from this "re­
ligious" interpretation of the world and the Christian
faith. The world is not understood in this theology 
from the point of view of its own needs and wants but 
solely from the viewpoint of God's revelation. He calls 
the God of Jesus Christ into the lists against religion, 
pneuma against sarx.
But Bonhoeffer criticized Barth in that he was 
too dominated in a negative way by liberal theology 
and perhaps as a reaction against it slipped into a 
"positivism of revelation." His emphasis on dogma 
and revelation almost made of them a new law for the 
believer which remained irrelevant for the secular 
man in everyday situations. Bonhoeffer writes; "he 
gave no concrete guidance, either in dogmatics or in 
ethics, on the non-religious interpretation of theo­
logical c o n c e p t s . F u r t h e r ,  Bonhoeffer criticizes 
Barth's approach as tending to encourage "us to en­
trench ourselves persistently behind the 'faith of the 
Church', and evade the honest question, what is our '
34) D. Bonhoeffer: Letter s' and Paper s from Prison,p. 328.
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35real and personal belief?"
Now we must move forwards to Bonhoeffer's own 
opinion. Bonhoeffer attempts to avoid the religious 
interpretation of both the pietists and apologists 
while at the same time avoiding Barthian theology.
However, he begins like Barth by directing us to 
Christ. He starts not with ourselves, or the world 
with its increasing autonomy and decreasing need for 
religious answers, but with the divine reality of God 
who came into the world and reconciled it in Christ.
We must not attempt to undermine the maturity of the 
world and force it to return to a dependence upon 
religion. It is this actual, mature, non-religious 
world that God has accepted in Jesus Christ. Indeed 
in some respects this mature world that rejects God 
is really closer to Him than the old world which looked 
in its distress to God and used Him as a deus ex machina :
To that extent we may say that the develop­ment towards the world ' s come of age outlined above, which has done away with a false conception of God, opens up a way of seeing the God of the Bible, who wins power and space in the world by his weakness. (36)
Except for a few years, in the time of the New 
Testament and in the Reformation, Christians have 
always understood Christ in a religious sense. Today
35) D. Bonhoeffer: Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 382.
36) op. cit., p. 361 .
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we must once again realize that Christ stands in a 
different relation to the world. Christ for us today, 
like the Christ of the New Testament, must be under­
stood in a relation of service and of suffering love.
Ecce hokio—  Behold the Man! In Him the world was reconciled with God. 'It is not by its overthrowing but by its reconciliation that the world is subdued. (37)
Only in the perfect love of God seen in the life, 
suffering, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ can 
reality be confronted and overcome. We are called to 
confront the autonomous world by participating in this 
divine reality. Bonhoeffer claims that faith is partic­
ipation in the Being of Jesus (incarnation, cross and 
resurrection). Our relation to God is not an absolute 
religious relationship to a supreme Being, but a new 
life for others, through participation in the Being 
of God.
It would be, however, a great mistake to understand 
Bonhoeffer as abolishing the worshipping church and 
replacing its service and sacraments with charitable 
acts. The religionless world in itself is not Christi­
anity. The church must not throw away its great terms 
such as "creation", "fall", "atonement", "repentance", 
"last things" and so on. But if she cannot relate them 
to the secularized world in such a way that their
37) D. Bonhoeffer: Ethics, pp. 51-52
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essence in worldly life can immediately be seen, then 
the church had better keep silent. Bonhoeffer is not 
at all reducing the contents of faith, but they become 
only religious objects if presented without motivation. 
The adult in faith in a world come of age knows and 
keeps the living contact with the foundation of his life, 
he knows and keeps the traditional creeds, he knows 
and judges the priorities of his own involvement, he 
faces the claim of the next to him. The adult in faith 
is he who answers the questions, "Who is Jesus Christ 
for us today?" in personal, responsible participation 
in the present life. The mature church in a world come 
of age is not the church which expresses its secrets of 
faith cheaply but that which express itself in its very 
existence. Living for others is its raison d 'être.
On these thoughts, Bonhoeffer concludes that
When we speak of God in a 'non-religious* way, we must speak of him in such a way that the godlessness of the world is not in some way con­cealed, but rather revealed, and thus exposed to an unexpected light. The world that has come of age is more godless, and perhaps for that very reason nearer to God, than the world before its coming of age, (3 8)
This is no sanctioning of the world's godlessness, 
but rather a recognition that it is a hopeful god­
lessness. And Bonhoeffer lived for and served this
38) D. Bonhoeffer: Letters and Papers from Prison,p. 362. (18th July, 1944)
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world, this godless world and this world come of age.
2, ■ Religion. Now we must turn our survey to Bonhoeffer's
concept of "religion".
Bonhoeffer uses the term "religion" about an
activity distinct from "faith", as Barth defined it.
In this sense religion means human attempts to reach
the beyond, the postulating of a deity in order to
get help and protection as required. Bonhoeffer praises
Barth in the highest terms for the rejection of religion.
Bonhoeffer himself gives in his letters some incidental
but guiding definitions of religion. First, religion
39is "individualism" It cultivates individualistic forms 
of inwardness. It takes the form of asceticism or con- ' 
cepts of conversion which all abandon the world to itself. 
One cannot force back the world come of age into such 
individualistic inwardness.
40Second, religion is metaphysics. Its trans­
cendence provides the completion which is felt necessary 
for this world, God or the godly is the superstructure 
for being. Thus it secures the escape the religious 
desire wants to have. Religion inescapably leads into 
thinking in two realms: reality must be completed by the 
supernatural. It emphasizes Christianity as the
39) D. Bonhoeffer; Letters and Papers from Prison,p. 286.
40) op. cit., p. 286.
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religion of salvation.
Third, religion is the deus ex machina concept.
Here is the decisive difference between Christianity and all religions. Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress to the power of God in the world: God is the dens ex machina.The Bible directs man to God's powerlessness and suffering; only the suffering God can help.(41)
Fourth, religion is admittedly a province of life,
a sector of the whole, more or less interesting, socially
and psychologically valuable—  a relic of the past, but
still to be looked after by the governmental department
42for cultural affairs.
Bonhoeffer now holds that the time for this religion 
is essentially over. He would not argue that human needs 
and the skilful handling of them again and again produce 
successful mass meetings and even enlarge the share of 
religion in private and public life. But it does not 
matter, and people who matter do not come into it. The 
main point Bonhoeffer would make is that Christians them­
selves give proof every day of this analysis because 
they are not able to make more out of their religion 
than a neat little province of their real life.
Bonhoeffer said all this just when one would have 
thought religion as the other realm could have been the
41) D. BohhQeffer; Letters and Papaers from Prison, p. 361.
42) op. cit., p. 282.
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one great help and answer where no human hope was left. 
But he passed over to those who were too honest to 
escape in their weakness into a pious corner where 
mean provinciality of worship insults God's majesty.
But who is Jesus? How is he real for us? Bonhoeffer 
wants to recheck the doctrinal shape of the churches 
in order to prove that Christ is precisely not all that. 
He is the man for others against individualistic inward­
ness. He is lonely and forsaken without transcendent 
escape. The time for religion might have gone, but 
not the time for Jesus Christ.
3. Christ. Now we shall move to his thinking about 
Christ.
The cohesive and elucidative element in the theology 
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is his steadfast concentration 
upon the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. For him 
theology is essentially Christology.
Bonhoeffer declares that there is only one ultimate 
reality, and that is the reality in Jesus Christ. In 
the person of Christ the reality of God and the reality 
of the world are united and held together in a "polemical 
unity," so that in him there is no possibility of 
partaking in one without the other,
Because both divine and cosmic reality are in 
Christ, Bonhoeffer called upon the church to cease 
thinking in terms of two static spheres, e.g., the
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"Christian" and the. "worldly", the "sacred" and the
"secular", the "revelational" and the "rational".
On the other had, the spheres are not to be identified,
but their unity in Christ means that the "Christian"
is to be found only in the "worldly", the "sacred" only
in the "secular". The Christian is not a man of
eternal conflict, but sharing in the unity of the
spheres in Jesus Christ, he himself becomes an undivided
whole. "His worldliness does not divide him from Christ,
and his Christianity does not divide him from the world.
Belonging wholly to Christ, he stands at the same time
43wholly in the world."
It is from this perspective that Bonhoeffer develops 
his thoughts about the "worldliness" of Christianity.
The "worldliness" on which he speaks is not the world's 
understanding of worldliness, not the "shallow and banal 
this-worldliness of the enlightened, the busy, the com­
fortable, or the l a s c i v i o u s , b u t  a worldliness deriving 
from the knowledge of Christ, knowledge in which death 
and resurrection is ever present. Bonhoeffer's desire
is not to "conceal the godlessness of the world in some
45way," but to "expose it to an unexpected light."
43) D. Bonhoeffer: Ethics, p. 201.
44) D, Bonhoeffer: Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 369.
45) op. cit., p. 362.
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Bonhoeffer's polemic against "religious" inter­
pretations of the faith arises precisely, because they 
either diminish God’s concern for the world or refuse 
to recognize Christ's Lordship over the world. That is, 
religious interpretations, which for Bonhoeffer mean 
"metaphysical" or "individualistic" interpretations, 
separate the reality of God from the reality of the 
world, continue to think in terms of two spheres, 
and thus deny their unity in Christ.
Now it can be seen why Bonhoeffer could take a 
positive attitude towards the modern secularized age, 
which no longer looks to "God" for its answers and 
therefore is not "religious". By the use of his 
reason man has gradually discovered the laws by which 
the world lives. He manages not only science, but 
also social and political affairs, ethics, and religion; 
and in the name of intellectual honesty, he no longer 
uses God as a working hypothesis. Since he has ceased 
to be religious and since the laws which he has discovered 
have their origin, goal, and essence in Jesus Christ, 
today's godless, secular man is ripe for the Christian 
message that Jesus Christ is the Lord of the world, that 
the world stands ever before God, the One God who is 
Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer and who refuses to 
be a Deus ex machina. This is what Bonhoeffer means 
when he asserts that the world come of age is nearer
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to God than ever before. "So our coming of age" says
Bonhoeffer, "leads us to a true recognition or our
4:6situation before God."
Von Stauffenberg's attempt on Hitler's life failed 
on 20th July, 1944. As a result, the Gestapo discovered 
the filed at Zossen on 22nd September, which contained 
documents on the relationship between the Abwehr and 
the Allies, On 8th October, Bonhoeffer was transfered 
to the Gestapo prison on Prinz Albrecht Strasse in Berlin 
Following the bombing of the prison during an air raid, 
he was sent to the concentration camp of Buechenwald, 
then to Schoenberg, and finally to Flossenburg. He 
was hanged early on the morning of 9th April, only a 
few days before the arrival of the Allies. His brother 
and his two brothers-in-law were executed around the 
same time.
To the last he exhibited a marvelous courage and
compassion. At Schoenberg his final act was to conduct
a service, preaching on the texts of the day, Isaiah
53:5 and I Peter 1:3. As he was led away to Flossenburg
and execution, he left the words‘"'This is the end — : for
47me the beginning of life."
46) D. Bonhoeffer: Letters and Papers' from Prison, p. 360.
47) E. Bethge: "Editor's Preface", Letters and Papersfrom Prison, p. 24.
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As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
there are "two turning points along Bonhoeffer's way".
"The first turning point may have occurred about 1931 —
1932 and might be formulated thus: Dietrich Bonhoeffer
the theologian became a Christian. The second began in
1939; Dietrich Bonhoeffer the Christian became a contem-
48porary, a man of his own particular time and place..."
Theologian—  Christian—  Contemporary—  in that 
order, and in a progression that did not exclude the 
prior phase in each stage, but rather transmuted it into 
a more profound, more drastic, more far-reaching import 
—  this is the structure of the development of Bonhoeffer*s 
life,
Perhaps the most impressive thing about Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer is the way in which his own life provides 
the commentary on his theology. Bonhoeffer's theology, 
therefore, will always be of cardinal significance for 
those who must live through revolutionary times, not 
because he was a radical revolutionary, but because 
he could not stand aside while a world was facing crisis.
We must now turn to his Ethics itself and seek 
to discern the overall significance and the main themes 
in this work.
48) E. Bethge: "Turning Points in Bonhoeffer's Life and Thought" Union Seminary Quarterly Review, vol. 23 no. 1, p. 7.
CHAPTER TWO
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND THE MAIN THEMES 
OF BONHOEFFER'S ETHICS
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1As I have already mentioned, Bonhoeffer*s Ethics
appeared posthumously as a collection of articles,
which were written in different times and different
places, due mainly to Eberhard Bethge, the editor, in
1949. We can read the circumstances of its formation
in the Editor's Preface.
Bethge explains as follows: "Already at the time
of completing his Nachfolge (published in 1937)
Bonhoeffer was planning a new approach to the problems
of Christian ethics. He thought of this as the begin-
2ning of his actual life work."
Starting his study from the field of systematic 
theology, Bonhoeffer gradually moves his concern 
towards the exegetical work of the Bible and to the 
ethical problems. For him the question of "what is 
the life of Christians who follow the commandments of 
God?" became the final one.
From 1937 it was Bonhoeffer's earnest desire to 
write his Ethics, but in fact he could not start it 
until 1940.
In June 19 39 he was invited by Professor John Baillie, on behalf of Croall Lectureship Trust, to lecture at Edinburgh, and he hoped to make his lectures the basis for his book.
1) See Chapter One pp. 30ff.
2) D. Bonhoeffer: Ethics, p. ix. Hereafter referred to as Ethics, except where the context would demand clarification.
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The war put an end to his preparations, and he did not take up this work again until 1940, when he was compelled to give up his clergy training duties and forbidden to speak in public anywhere in the Reich. (3)
These articles were written piece by piece in the 
midst of the Second World War while he was engaged in 
a resistance movement against Nazism. Therefore 
Bonhoeffer's Ethics consists of fragmentary and unfin­
ished drafts, some of them complete and others not, and 
it is right to say that "this book is not the Ethics
4which Dietrich Bonhoeffer intended to have published."
Nevertheless it is the Ethics that presents us 
with many significant and essential problems, and
also illustrates Bonhoeffer's central and late theolog­
ical thinking.^ The Ethics may be regarded as 
Bonhoeffer's most important work from the point of
3) Ethics, p. ix.
4) op. cit., p. ix.
5) According to Bethge, Bonhoeffer had been amassing many books on ethics since 1939. They are as follows: "the four volumes of the History of Ethics by 0. Dittrich (1926), five volumes of the Theological Ethics by Richard Rothe (2nd ed., 1867), Hofmann's Ethics of1872, the works of Oettingen, Harless, and Otto Piper, as well as Roman Catholic moral theologies and the Ethics of Scheler and Nikolai Hartmann. Other authors whom he consulted were Hermann Nohl with his Die sittlichen Grunderfahrungen (1939), Karl Jaspers with Die qeistige Situation der Zeit and Nietzsche, Bauch, Wittmann, Noack, and Prell; in 1940 he read Kamlah's Christentum und Selbstbehauptung. He also went to the historians. He was stimulated by the idea of 'historical cicatrization' in Reinhold Schneider's books, and was impressed by F. W. von Oertzen's Die Junker (1939), Heuss's Friedrich Naumann,
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view of its size and contents. And this is a 
challenging book not only to the Christians, but 
also to the modern world.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ETHICS 
IN BONHOEFFER'S THINKING
We shall begin our survey by making clear the 
place of Ethics in Bonhoeffer*s thinking.
Attention must be paid to the fact that there has 
been a strong tradition of ethical dualism in Germany.
It would seem to be a distorted interpretation of 
Luther, since it is said that this tendency originated 
in Luther's "two-kingdom" doctrine. It is common to 
think of church and state as being separate. The king­
dom of God takes part in the sphere of the inner man? 
the kingdom of the state rules in the outer sphere.
As the result. Gospel and law are considered as opposing 
each other.
The so-called German Christians justified themselves
Trevelyan's History of England, Alfred von Martin's Nietzsche und Burckhardt and Die Religion in Jakob Burckhardts Leben und Denken. He thought he learnt more from Don Quixote than from many books on ethics. He took up Balzac and Simplizissimus again, and began to read the German-speaking writers of the nineteenth century: Gottfried Keller, Stifter,Fontane, all of whom enriched him so much in prison. Whereas he had been taken by Montaigne's wisdom, Bernanos went somewhat into the background? to make up for that, Ernest Hello was his discovery of1938-9." E. Bethges Dietrich Bonhoeffer, pp. 619-620.
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in obeying the trend of the times by abusing such 
dualistic ideas. They emphasized the importance of 
the orders of creation. But Bonhoeffer raised a 
question against such a thinking. In 1932 he read 
a paper entitled "Zur theoTogischen Begruendung der . 
WeTtbundarbeit" (Concerning the Theological Foundation 
of the World Alliance), and criticized the German
Christian's use of the orders of creation and developed 
his alternative of "orders of preservation." For 
Bonhoeffer, the world redeemed in Christ preserved by 
God in concrete ways until its end, and Christian
ethics has its foundation on Christ.
In that paper he asks the question, "Whence does 
the Church know God's commandment for the moment?"
He says "German Christians" will answer from the stand 
point of "orders of creation" as follows:
Because certain orders are evident in creation, one should not rebel against them, but simply accept them. One can then argue: Because the nations have been created different,each one is obliged to preserve and developits characteristics. That is obedience towards the Creator. And if this obedience leads one to struggles and to war, these too must be regarded as belonging to the order of creation.(6)
But he goes on to criticize it thus;
The danger of the argument lies in the fact that just about everything can be defended by it. One need only hold out something to be God- willed and God-created for it to be vindicated
6) No Rusty SWords, ed. by E. H. Robertson, p. 165
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for ever, the division of man into nations, national struggles, war, class struggle, the exploitation of the weak by the strong, the cut-throat competition of economics. (7)
Then he insists that our answer must come from
Jesus Christ only:
The commandment cannot stem from anywhere but the origin of promise and fulfilment, from Christ. From Christ alone must we know what we should do. But not from him as the preachingprophet of the Sermon on the Mount, but from himas the one who gives us life and forgiveness,as the who has fulfilled the commandment of Godin our place, as the one who brings and promises the new world. We can only perceive the command­ment where the law is fulfilled, where the new world of the new order of God is established.Thus we are completely directed towards Christ.(8)
Bonhoeffer's doctrine of the orders of preser­
vation became one of the fundamental stand points of 
the Confessing Church in resisting the Third Reich.
His position appeared in Article Two of the Barmen
Declaration of 1934. As I mentioned already he played
9a major role in the writing of it.
Just as Jesus Christ is the pledge of the forgiveness of sins, just so— and with the same earnestness— is he also God's mighty claim on our whole life; in him we encounter a joyous liberation from the godless claims of this world to free and thankful service to his creatures.We repudiate the false teaching that there are areas of our life in which we do not belong to Jesus Christ but to another lord, areas in which we do not need justification and sanctifi-
7) Rusty Swords, p. 165.
8) op. cit., p. 166.
9) See Chapter One, p.24.
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cation through him. (10)
It would seem then that in the midst of the time 
when the demonic character of the Nazi state became 
apparent, Bonhoeffer began to lay much emphasis on 
eschatological ethics or ultimate ethics rather than 
penultimate ethics.
The Cost of Discipleship, published in 1937, 
shows his concerns of that day. He insists that 
single-minded obedience is the only way to respond to 
Jesus' call. He treats the Sermon on the Mount as 
concrete demands of the crucified and risen Lord 
upon the disciple. And he recalls the church from 
cheap grace to costly grace. It is the ethics of 
the crisis and of the last days. His ethical thinking 
is moving to meet the difficult conditions of the 
late 1930's.
However,,after Bonhoeffer took part in the 
German resistance movement, his mood began to drift 
away from the radically eschatological approach.
Some Christians in Germany put a question mark to 
Bonhoeffer's action of his last years from this angle, 
but he did not hesitate to work with non-Christians in 
the political field, and through the close contacts 
with those who were willing to risk their lives simply
10) Printed in Robertsons Christians Against Hitler, p. 50. — ---------- --------------
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for the freedom and dignity of man and love for the
world, Bonhoeffer had to take up the penultimate
problems of Christian ethics again.
It cannot be denied that there is a continuity
between The Cost of Discipleship and Ethics, however
we also find new ethical ideas at various stages in
terms of Christology, anthropology, and concrete
11social arid personal issues. His point of view ex­
tends to the horizontal plane and he evaluates the 
secular positively. He does not see this world only 
as the wicked one. The essence of Bonhoeffer's
ethics has been aptly phrased by N.H.(3. Robinson as
1 2"ethics of a world already redeemed." Bonhoeffer
can say plainly "the reality of God discloses itself
only be setting me entirely in the reality of the
world, and when I encounter the reality of the world
it is always already sustained, accepted and reconciled
13in the reality of God." He starts along the same 
lines as Barth, but carries this idea forwards to 
concrete fulfilment. The world or all creation has 
already been redeemed to God through Jesus Christ, 
so for him the world is not the profane but the one
11) cf. Woelfel: Bonhoeffer's Theology, p. 245.
12) N.H.G.Robinson: The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, p. 191.
13) Ethics, p. 167.
58
which is reconciled or redeemed to God in Christ.
The originality and peculiarity of his.Ethics 
can be seen in his turning from a pure transcendental 
and eschatological ethics to an ethics of the ulti­
mate and the penultimate. His thinking takes up the 
penultimate, the things before the last on the basis 
of the ultimate, the last thing. Men are living 
zwischen den Zeiten, namely between Christ’s first 
and second comings. And this is Bonhoeffer*s con­
viction that the penultimate ethics is Christian 
ethics for the concrete situations of here and now 
in a world which has been reconciled in Christ, but
1 4which must exist until the fulfilment of all things. 
Several phrases in the Ethics show his contention.
For example;
It is quite certain that the preparation of the way is a matter of concrete interven­tions in the visible world, and it is certain that hunger and satisfaction of hunger are concrete and visible matters; yet everything depends on this activity being a spiritual reality, precisely because ultimately it is not indeed a question of the reform of earthly conditions, but it is a question of the coming of Christ. (15)
Needless to say, positive concerns with the penul­
timate and involvement in the political resistance
14) cf. Woelfel: Bonhoeffer's Theology, p. 245.
15) Ethics, p. 115. See also pp. 103ff, llOff.
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movement are correlative in him. For Bonhoeffer to 
live in faith as a Christian means to live as a 
secular man completely in this world. Therefore he 
can write frankly in his letter to Bethge of 21st 
July, 1944 as follows:
The Christian is not a homo' religiosus, but simply a man, as Jesus was a man.
And he recognizes his turning plainly in the
same letter. He mentioned a conversation with a
young French pastor (Jean Lasserre), which had taken
place thirteen years ago in America,
We are asking ourselves quite simply what we wanted to do with our lives. He said he would like to become a saint (and I think it's quite likely that he did become one).
His answer is however, different.
I disagreed with him, and said, in effect, that I should like to learn to have faith.
At this point Bonhoeffer makes a remarkable
utterance.
For a long time I did not realize the depth of the contrast. I thought I could acquire faith by trying to live a holy life, or some­thing like it. I suppose I wrote The ' Cost of Discipleshi p as the end of that path. Today I can see the dangers of that book, though I still stand by what I wrote. (16)
Jesus is the man for others, and the world is
reconciled in Jesus Christ. Therefore the Christian
16) Letters’ and Paper s’ from Prison, p . 369.
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should live for others in this world, following the 
pattern of manhood of Jesus, chiefly his sufferings 
in and for the world. Bonhoeffer expresses this 
motif using his characteristic word "conformation", 
which will be discussed later. This ethical conviction 
supports the activities of his last years.
II. THE MAIN THEMES OF BONHOEFFER'S 
ETHICS
Before engaging on a survey of the Ethics, it is 
necessary to discuss the text itself. From the first 
édition of 1948 to the fifth edition Bethge arranged 
various materials thematically. As a result, the 
order of the contents was the following:
I. Ethics as Formation
II. Christ, Reality and Good (Christ, the Church and 
the World)
III. The Last Things and The Things Before the Last
IV. The Love of God and the Decay of the World
V. The Church and the World
VI. History and Good
VII. The 'Ethical' and the 'Christian* as a Theme 
In the sixth German edition published in 1962,
however, Bethge tried a new arrangement and he 
organized the materials chronologically. As a result, 
the order was changed to the following:
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I. The Love of God and the Decay of the World (formerly 
Ch. IV)
II. The Church and the World (formerly Ch. V)
III. Ethics as Formation (formerly Ch. I)
IV. The Last Things and The Things Before the Last 
(formerly Ch. Ill)
V. Christ, Reality and Good (Christ, the Church and 
the World) (formerly Ch.II)
VI. History and Good (formerly Ch. VI)
VII. The 'Ethical' and the 'Christian' as a Theme
1 7(formerly Ch. VII)
Bethge explains his intention in his important 
"Preface to the Rearranged Sixth German Edition".
17) Bonhoeffer's Ethics consists of two parts. The first part is the materials which are clearly to be incorporated in the framework of the book. The second part is a collection of unrelated essays dealing with various ethical themes, such as;I. The Doctrine of the Primus Usus Legis According to the Lutheran Symbolic WritingsII. Personal and 'Real' EthosIII. State and ChurchIV. On the Possibility of the Word of the Church to the WorldV. What is Meant by 'Telling the Truch'?It is clear these five essays in Part Two were not intended as an integral part of the Ethics. Needless to say, they are very important to understand Bonhoeffer's ethical thinking, but we can regard them as an expatiation of some specific problems which are involved in Part One. Therefore this present study will concentrate mainly on Part One.
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He says :
Discussions about the development in Bonhoeffer*s thought leading up to Letters and Papers from Prison made it seem desirable to re-examine the chronology of the composition of Ethics. The inclusion of this new edition in a uniform edition of Bonhoeffer's works has been the occasion for a version of Ethics which sets out to show Bonhoeffer's four fresh starts on the book in chronological sequence. (18)
He then tries to examine the four starting-points 
19in his preface. Bethge presumes two sections, "The
Love of God and the Decay of the World" and "The Church
and the World", belong to the first starting-point.
These two sections have close similarity to The Cost •
of Discipleship in thought and language. The sheets of
paper which were used for these sections give us some
evidence of date, because the same types of paper were
used for letters in spring and summer of 1940 by
Bonhoeffer. He also used leaves from a calendar for May
1939 to write the notes and headings of the latter chapter.
Bethge concludes that these two chapters were written in
1939-1940 and "they were probably broken off before 
20August, 1940."
The former chapter ones "Ethics as Formation", 
becomes the second starting-point. This was written
18) Ethics, p. xii.
19) op. cit., pp. xii-xiv.
20) op. cit., p. xii.
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at Klein-Kroessin (Kieckow) in September 1940 at a 
time when Bonhoeffer was entering into contact with 
the German resistance through the meeting with 
Colonel Oster, and also when Hitler was scoring his 
most astounding successes.
The third starting-point involves "The Last 
Things and the Things Before the Last" and "Christ, 
Reality and Good". These date from the end of 1940 
to the summer of 1941, It is clear that Bonhoeffer 
still had a hope of completing the whole work when 
he wrote these elaborated sections.
The political section "History and Good" and 
uncompleted fragments "The 'Ethical' and the 'Christian' 
as a Theme" form the last part. The former was written 
during the climax of his activity in the conspiracy in 
1941-1942; the latter took shape in the winter of 1942- 
1943.
It is necessary to recognize that the Ethics is 
not only fragmentary, but also there is a development 
of thought. Working in the midst of secular, political 
and underground movements, his ethical thinking or his 
method of thinking might oscillate in various directions 
He uses an ordered vertical structure of divine 
mandates on the one hand, and also an open horizontal 
approach based on the secularity of the world about 
him on the other. Naturally, there is some complexity 
in his Ethics. It is clear, however, that his main
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motifs is to "search for the concrete character of the
divine commandment, understood as the structure of this
world rather than the ideal possibility of some other 
21world." The vertical direction lays the foundation 
of the horizontal direction and where they cross is 
Jesus Christ.
When we take the above-mentioned matters into our 
consideration, the newly arranged sixth edition should 
be the text for our survey, because this edition of 
the Ethics will tell his original intention more clearly 
and will guide to more accurate understanding of his 
thinking. Consequently the text chosen for this study 
of the Ethics is the paperback edition published in 
1978, as this third impression by SCM Press follows 
the order of the sixth German edition.
The task of illuminating the main themes of the 
Ethics must now be given some consideration. It has 
already been noted that in some sense the Ethics is a 
collection of Bonhoeffer's articles on ethical prob­
lems written on various occasions and at different 
22times. There are both continuity and development in 
his thinking. It is appropriate, therefore, to make a 
survey of these themes by summarizing his Ethics in 
order to bring them out in bold relief.
21) A, Dumas; Dietrich Bonhoeffer; Theologian of Reality, p. 140.
22) See Chapter One, pp.SOff, and Chapter Two, pp.Slff
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A. First Part
"The Love of God and the Decay of the World" and 
"The Church and the World".
Bonhoeffer begins the first chapter of this section 
with a challenging sentence, namely:
The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all ethical reflections. The first task of Christian ethics is to invalidate this knowledge." (23)
The foundation of this conviction is that:
Christian ethics claims to discuss the origin of the whole problem of ethics, and thus professes to be a critique of all ethics simply as ethics. (24)
The distinctive difference between Christian ethics 
and all other ethics lies in the fact that the former 
deals with the life in the unity of the knowledge of 
God, while the latter is concerned with the life in 
the disunity of the knowledge of good and evil. He 
explains this connection by referring to the story of 
the Fall in Genesis:
Instead of knowing only the God who is good to him and instead of knowing all things in Him, he now knows himself as the origin of good and evil. Instead of accepting the choice and elec­tion of God, man himself desires to choose, to be the origin of the election. (2 5)
Thus man has become like God. However, he says:
23) Ethics, p. 3.
24) bp. bit., p. 3.
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In becoming like God man has become a god against God. (26)
As a result of the Fall, man's eyes are opened to
his nakedness, i.e. to his disunion with God and with
men, and shame arises;
Shame is man's ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from the origin; it is grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to return to unity with the origin. (27)
Then he discusses the relation of shame and
conscience. He gives a definition:
In shame man is reminded of his disunion with God and with other men; conscience is the sign of man's disunion with himself. (28)
The call of conscience is always a prohibition, 
so that life falls into two parts: what is permitted 
(the good) and what is forbidden (the evil). Con­
science does not embrace the whole of life, but reacts 
only to certain definite actions. It pretends to be 
the voice of God and thus the standard for the relation 
to other men, but it is actually man's judgement over
God and other men and himself. "All knowledge is now
29based upon self-knowledge" and thus all things are 
drawn into the process of disunion.
25) Ethics, p. 5
26) op. cit., p. 5
27) op. cit., p. 6
28) op. cit., p. 9
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After giving a definition of this world as "The 
World of Conflicts", he moves to the thinking of the 
new world. He defines it as "The World of Recovered 
Unity", He declares:
Now anyone who reads the New Testament even superficially cannot but notice the complete absence of this world of disunion, conflict and ethical problems. Not man's falling apart from God, from men, from things and from himself, but rather the rediscovered unity, reconciliation, is now the basis of the discussion and the 'point of decision of the specifically ethical experience'. The life and activity of men is not at all prob­lematic or tormented or dark: it is self-evident, joyful, sure and clear. (30)
He recognizes this difference of the old and the 
new in the encounter of Jesus with the Pharisee. He 
defines the Pharisee as follows:
The Pharisee is not an adventitious historical phenomenon of a particular time. He is the man to whom only the knowledge of good and evil has come to be of importance in his entire life; in other words, he is simply the man of disunion. (31)
For the Pharisee, therefore, the knowledge of
good and evil is the most essential problem, and he
is as severe a judge of himself as of his neighbour
to the honour of God. Such a person cannot confront
any man in any other way than by examining him with
29) Ethics, p. 11.
30) op. cit., p. 11.
31) op. cit., p. 12.
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regard to his decisions in the conflicts of life. On 
the contrary, Jesus answers them from unity with God, 
not from the world of conflict. Therefore, Jesus 
never allows Himself to be drawn into one of their con­
flicts of decision's, but answers in such a way that 
he leaves the case of conflict beneath Him.
That is why their words so strikingly fail to make contact, and that is why Jesus's answers do not appear to be answers at all, but rather attacks of His own against the Pharisees, which is what they, in fact, are. (32)
Jesus speaks with a complete freedom which appears 
to the Pharisee as the negation of all order, all piety, 
and all belief:
The freedom of Jesus is not the arbitrary choice of one amongst innumerable possibilities; it consists on the contrary precisely in the complete simplicity of His action, which is never confronted by a plurality of possibilities, conflicts or alternatives, but always only by one thing. This one thing Jesus calls the will of God. He says that to do this will is His meat. This will of God is His life. He lives and acts not by the knowledge of good and evil but by the will of God. There is only one will of God. In it the origin is recovered; in it there is established the freedom and the simplic­ity of all action. (33)
Then Bonhoeffer tries to show what is new in that 
which He has brought with Him through interpreting 
Jesus's words such as; "Judge not, that ye be not judged" 
(Mt. 7:1), "but when thou doest alms, let not thy left
32) Ethics, p. 13.
33) op. cit., P.15.
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hand know what thy right hand doeth: that thine alms
may be in secret" (Mt. 6:3ff) or the parable of the 
last judgement (Mt. 25s31ff). When the time of judge­
ment will have come, the author stresses, we ourselves 
shall be filled with wonder at what we receive^because 
all judging and all knowing will be on the part of God 
and of Jesus Christ.
It would also be entirely misunderstood if the 
new knowledge of reconciliation was regarded as 
psychologically observable data because the psycho­
logical view is itself always already subject to the 
law of disunion. But at the same time he pays 
attention to the necessity of proving the will of God:
The will of God may lie very deeply concealed beneath a great number of available possibilities. The will of God is not a system of rules which is established from the outset; it is something newand different in each different situation in life,and for this reason a man must ever anew examine what the will of God may be. (34)
This proving takes place solely on the basis of
a metamorphosis, a complete inward transmutation of
one's previous form, namely the overcoming of the
form of the fallen man, Adam, and conformation with
the form of the new man, Christ, It is based on the
knowledge of God's will in Jesus Christ, which means
35that it implies living and increasing in love.
34) Ethics, p. 22
35) cf. Philippians: 1:9-10
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Only upon the foundation of Jesus Christ, only within the space which is defined by Jesus Christ, only 'in' Jesus Christ can man prove what is the will of God. (3 6)
The author then turns our attention to the fact 
that the knowledge of Jesus Christ, metamorphosis, 
renewal or love is something living. His proving 
presupposes one's unity with the origin which is re­
gained in Christ, and yet one must seek to recover 
it anew in his actual concrete life. It is necessary 
to examine what is right in a given situation. And 
for this purpose, intelligence, discernment, attentive 
observation of the given facts, all these must be 
called into action and all embraced and pervaded by 
prayer.
There will be the belief that if a man asks God humbly God will give him certain knowledge of His will. (37)
He underlines that side by side with Jesus's saying 
about not letting the left hand know what the right hand 
is doing, there is Paul's admonition to prove oneself 
with regard to One's faith and works. There is not only 
a proving of the will of God, but also a proving of one's 
self. This self-proving, however, is not directed 
towards one's own knowledge of good and evil and towards 
its realization in practical life, but which every day
36) Ethics, p. 24.
37) bp. bit., p. 25
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afresh renews the knowledge that Jesus Christ is in us. 
Bonhoeffer insists:
Since Jesus Christ is already present and active within us; since He belongs to us, the question can and must certainly now arise, whether and how in our daily lives we belongto Him, believe in Him and obey Him. (38)
But since we ourselves cannot answer this question,
our self-examination will always consist precisely in
our delivering ourselves up entirely to the judgement
of Jesus Christ, and in so doing we will be doing the
will of Jesus Christ in us.
The problem of doing is then discussed.
Only in doing can there be submission to thewill of God. In doing God's will man renouncesevery right and every justification of his own;he delivers himself humbly into the hands of themerciful Judge. If the Holy Scripture insists with such great urgency on doing, that is because it wishes to take away from man every possibility of self-justification before God on the basis of his own knowledge of good and evil. The Bible does not wish man's own deed to be set side by side with the deed of God, even as a thank-offering or sacrifice, but it sets man entirely within% the action of God and subordinates human action to God's action. The error of the Pharisees, there­fore, did not lie in their extremely strict in­sistence on the necessity for action, but rather in their failure to act. 'They say, and do not do it.' (39)
He says the irreconcilable opposite of action is 
judgement. Judgement and action represent two possible 
and mutually exclusive attitudes towards the law. The
38) Ethics, p. 26.
39) op. cit., p. 27.
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man who judges sets himself above the law and envisages 
the law as a criterion which he applies to others.
But the doer of the law submits to the law and does 
not envisage the law as a criterion to his brother. He 
insists the doer of the law must be the hearer of the 
law:
Certainly the doer of the law must also b e . a hearer, but only in the sense that the hearer is always at the same time the doer (Jas. 1:22).A hearing which does not at the same instant become a doing becomes once again that 'knowing* which gives rise to judgement and so leads to the disruption of all action. (40)
The first chapter is concluded by an analysis of 
"love". The word of love marks the distinction between 
man in disunion and man in the origin. After he draws 
our attention to the point that there is a recongnition 
of Christ, a powerful faith in Christ, and indeed a 
conviction and a devotion of love even unto death—  
all without love, he states clearly that according to 
the Bible "God is love" (I John 4:16). This sentence 
must be read with the emphasis on the word God not on 
the word love. "God is love" means not a human atti­
tude, a conviction or a deed, but God Himself is love.
Love, therefore, is the name for what God does to man in overcoming the disunion in which man lives. This deed of God is Jesus Christ, is reconciliation. And so love is something which happens to man, something passive, some­thing over which he does not himself dispose.
40) Ethics, p. 29.
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simply because it lies beyond his existence, in disunion. Love means the undergoing of the transformation of one's entire existence by God? it means being drawn in into the world as it livesand must live before God and in God. Love, there­fore, is not man's choice, but it is the electionof man by God, (41)
The structure of love consists in: "we love him, 
because he first loved us" (I John 4:19). Therefore
our love for God rests solely upon our being loved by
God. In other words, our love is willing acceptance
of the love of God in Jesus Christ. Love is passive
not in a psychological but in a theological sense.
But this passive character of love in the Bible does
not exclude man's mighty thoughts and his spirited 
deeds. He concludes;
It is as whole men, as men who think and who act, that we are loved by God and reconciled with God in Christ. And it is as whole men, who think and who act, that we love God and our brothers. 
( 42)
The second chapter is entitled "The Church and 
the World". Although this is a short and incomplete 
chapter, it must be noted that this was written under 
severe oppression by Nazism and we can recognize some 
reflection of his attitude towards the Third Reich.
Bonhoeffer pays attention to the fact that in 
confrontation with Nazi irrationalism and barbarism
41) Ethics, p. 36.
42) op. cit., p. 37.
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the defenders of such human values as reason, culture, 
humanity, tolerance and self-determination, sought a 
refuge within the sphere of the Christian Church. All 
of such concepts, until very recently, had served as 
battle slogans against the church, Christianity, and 
Jesus Christ Himself. Then he insists that what is 
decisive is rather the fact that there took place a 
return to the origin. He explains that this is just 
like the children of the church returned to their 
mother in the hour of danger. The origin where they 
returned is Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ alone has 
force and permanence against the antichrist.
He is the centre and the strength of the Bible, of the Church, and of theology, but also of humanity, of reason, of justice and of culture. (43)
In the section on "The Total and Exclusive Claim 
of Christ", he takes up two sayings of Jesus: "He 
that is not against us is for us" (Mk. 9:40) and "He
that is not with me is against me" (Mt. 12:30). He
insists that these two sayings appear to be in ir­
reconcilable contradiction, but in reality they 
necessarily belong together. He says:
These two sayings necessarily belong togetheras the two claims of Jesus Christ, the claim toexclusiveness and the claim to totality. The greater the exclusiveness, the greater the freedom But in isolation the claim to exclusiveness leads to fanaticism and to slavery; and in isolation the claim to totality leads to the secularization
43) Ethics, p.39.
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and self-abandonment of the Church, The more exclusively we acknowledge and confess Christ as our Lord, the more fully the wide range of His dominion will be disclosed to us. (44)
The relationship of the Church with the world 
today is quite different from that of the Middle Ages, 
We solely know the deep interrelationship of the Church 
and the world in the recognition of the origin which 
has been awakened and vouchsafed to men in the suf­
fering and in the seeking of refuge from persecution 
in Christ.
It is not that a ’Christian culture' must make the name of Jesus Christ acceptable to theworld; but the crucified Christ has become the refuge and the justification, the protectionand the claim for the higher values and theirdefenders that have fallen victim to suffering.(45)
At the next section of "Christ and Good People",
the author makes clear that both the wicked and the
good belong to Christ. Before Christ both the wicked
and the good are only sinners, because they have fallen
away from the origin. In her history the Church has 
concentrated almost exclusively on the relationship of
Jesus Christ to the wicked and to wickedness. He, 
however, insists that the Church today must take with 
seriousness the question of the relation of the good 
man to Christ. For him, the Gospel should not lose
44) Ethics, p. 41.
45) op. cit., p. 42
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its power over good people. Through his keen and 
concrete analysis of the world, Bonhoeffer recognizes
the dangerous tendencies of the justification of the 
good has been replaced by the justification of the 
wicked; the idealization of good citizenship has given 
way to the idealization of its opposite, of disorder, 
chaos, anarchy and catastrophe; and consequently the 
gospel of the sinners has become a commendation of sin. 
He could say plainly in times when lawlessness and 
wickedness triumph in complete unrestraint —  this 
was the situation of Nazi Germany —  Gospel will make 
itself known rather in relation to the few remaining 
just, truthful and human men.
B . Second Part
"Ethics as Formation"
The third chapter was written in this period. 
Bethge had put this third chapter to the beginning 
of the former edition, for it introduces the basic 
theme of the whole. He begins with these sentences:
Rarely perhaps has any generation shown so little interest as ours does in any kind of theoretical or systematic ethics. ... The reason for this is not to be sought in any supposed ethical indifference on the part of our period. On the contrary it arises from the fact that our period, more than any earlier period in the history of the west, is oppressed by a super- abounding reality of concrete ethical problems.(46)
46) Ethics, p. 46.
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He insists the theoretical or systematic ethics
cannot grasp what is real. According to his insight
the man who is able to deal effectively with evil
today is not the man of,reason or moral fanaticism
or conscience or duty or free responsibility or private
virtue, but alone the man who can combine simplicity 
47with wisdom. Bonhoeffer expresses this matter by
a characteristic phrase, "our business now is to 
replace our rusty swords with sharp ones."^^
To be simple is to fix one's eyes solely on the 
simple truth of God, and to be wise is to see reality 
as it is and to see into the depths of things. And 
simplicity and wisdom are combined by looking in free­
dom at God and at reality, which rests solely upon him. 
But how can man keep his eyes on both at the same time? 
As long as the world and God are torn asunder, it is 
impossible for anyone. There is, however, one place 
where God and the cosmic reality are reconciled,, where 
God and man have become one, and this place does not 
lie beyond reality in the realm of ideas, but in the 
midst of history as a divine miracle. "It lies in
47) See Godseys The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 204.
48) Ethics, p. 50.
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4 9Jesus Christ, the Reconciler of the world,"
It is his conviction that those who gaze at 
Jesus Christ will not watch God without the world 
or the world without God.
Ecce homo1— Behold the manl In Him the world was reconciled with God. It is not by its overthrowing but by its reconciliation that the world is subdued. It is not by ideals and pro­grammes or by conscience, duty, responsibility and virtue that reality can be confronted and overcome, but simply and solely by the perfect love of God. Here again it is not by a general idea of love that this is achieved, but by thereally lived love of God in Jesus Christ. (50)
Ecce homo whom God has taken to himself, has
sentenced and crucified and awakened to a new life.
Jesus is not a man (ein Mensch), but he is man (der
Mensch). Through Him, God loves man, not an ideal
man but man as he is. God loves the world, not an
ideal world but the real world. The miracle of
Christ’s resurrection means God’s "yes" to man. This
"yes" is stronger than judgement and death. It is
God's will to create a new man, a new life, a new
creature. Even while mankind is still living the old
life in the world of death and sin, he is already
beyond them.
Then Bonhoeffer discusses his characteristic
theme "conformation". For him Christian ethics is
49) Ethics, p. 51.
50) op. cit., pp. 51-52.
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the ethics of conformation, because only the form of 
Jesus Christ confronts the world and defeats it.
When he emphasizes formation, he does not mean to form 
the world by means of Christian plans and programmes. 
On the contrary, he says:
Formation comes only by being drawn in into the form of Jesus Christ. It comes only as formation (Gestaltung) in His likeness, as con­formation CGleichgestaltung) with the unique form of Him who was made man, was crucified, and rose again. (51)
This formation, of course, is not achieved by 
man's efforts, but rather it is achieved only when 
the form of Jesus Christ itself works upon us in such 
a manner that it moulds our form in its own likeness 
(Gal. 4:19). Christ remains the only giver of forms. 
In other words:
Christ is the Incarnate, Crucified and Risen One whom the Christian faith confesses. To be transformed in His image (II Cor. 3:18, Phil. 3: 10, Rom. 8:29 and 12:2)—  this is what is meant by the formation of which the Bible speaks. (52)
To be conformed with the Incarnate is to be the
man or to be a real man who is an object of the love
of God. To be formed in the likeness of the Crucified
means to die daily before God for the sake of sin.
He dies the death of a sinner and bears all sufferings
to accept God's judgement upon him. To be conformed
51) Ethics, p. 61.
52) op. cit. , p. 61 .
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with the Risen One means to be a new man before God, 
even though the glory of his new life remains "hidden 
with Christ in God" (Col. 3:3)
He insists that the form which takes shape in man 
in solely Christ's form itself. It is neither the 
form of God nor merely an imitation or repetition of 
Christ's form. God became man, so man becomes man.
Man, however, cannot and does not become God. He points 
out there is a mystery that only a small number of men 
recognize the form of their Redeemer. They are His 
Church.
Formation consequently means Jesus's taking form 
in His Church. In the New Testament the Church is 
called the Body of Christ. The body is the form.
So the church is Christ himself who has taken form among 
men. The Church can be called the Body of Christ because 
in the Body of Jesus Christ man (der Mensch), and also 
all mankind are really taken up by Him. The Church is 
nothing but a section of humanity in which Christ has 
really taken form. What matters in the Church is the 
form of Christ, and its taking form admist a small band 
of men. Therefore he declares:
The point of departure for Christian ethics is the body of Christ, the form of Christ in the form of the Church, and formation of the Church in conformity with the form of Christ. (53)
53) Ethics, p. 64.
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Since Christ is not a principle, the proclaimer of 
a system, a teacher and legislator, but a man, a real 
man (wirkTicher Mensch) like ourselves, the form of 
Christ is one and the same at all times and in all places 
Hé insists that Christ is concerned with helping his 
neighbour to become a man before God. Christ gives 
effect to reality, affirms reality and he himself is the
foundation of all human reality.
And so formation in conformity with Christ has this double implication. The form of Christ remains one and the same, not as a general idea but in its own unique character as the incarnate, crucified and risen God. And precisely for the sake of Christ's form the form of the real man is preserved, and in this way the real man receives the form of Christ. (54)
For this reason the Christian ethics is apart from
any kind of abstract ethics, and is always entirely 
concrete. The point is not what is good once and for 
all, but the way in which Christ takes form among us 
here and now. It means that our concerns are the times 
and places which confront us with concrete problems, set 
us tasks, and charge us with responsibility. However 
it does not mean to admit a room for unrestrained indi­
vidualism. He adds carefully that:
What prevents this is the fact that by ourhistory we are set objectively in a definite
54) Ethics, p. 66.
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nexus of experiences, responsibilities and deci­sions from which we cannot free ourselves again except by an abstraction. (55)
This nexus is characterized in a peculiar manner 
by the fact that the form of Christ has been consciously 
affirmed and recognized as the underlying basis of it.
On this conviction, he intends to pick up the West as 
the region for which we must speak and to discuss the 
way in which in this western world the form of Christ 
takes form.
He concludes this section by emphasizing the concrete 
character of ethics as formation and says:
Ethics as formation is possible only upon the foundation of the form of Jesus Christ which is present in His Church. The Church is the place where Jesus Christ's taking form is proclaimed and accomplished. It is this proclamation and this event that Christian ethics is designed to serve. (56)
"Inheritance and Decay". In this section he tries 
his bold endeavour to speak about the way in which the 
form of Jesus Christ takes form in our wolrd, that is 
in the western world.
In the East, existence is timeless and history 
assumes the character of mythology. He refers to Japan 
saying even "where the western way of existence has 
been most fully accepted, history still retains a
55) Ethics, p. 67.
56) op. cit., p. 68.
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57mythological character." The Christian West, on the 
contrary, is impressed with an awareness of temporality 
and a historical heritage which is consciously or un­
consciously effected by the entry of God into our history 
"here" and "now", that is at a definitive place and a 
definite point of time. God’s "yes" to history in his 
incarnation in Jesus Christ and his "no" in the cruci­
fixion of Jesus Christ gives to each moment of history 
an infinite and unresolvable tension. Through: the life 
and death of Jesus Christ history becomes for the first 
time truly temporal and in its temporality it becomes 
the history of God's consent.
He insists that the historical Jesus Christ is the 
continuity of Western history. Therefore Western history 
is indissolubly linked with the entire history of Israel 
in that Jesus was the promised Messiah of the Israelite- 
Jewish people, and indirectly related to Greco-Roman 
antiquity in that it was the time and world chosen for 
the incarnation (its nearness to Christ), but also the 
time of the crucifixion (its opposition to Him).
It is the Roman heritage which comes to repre­sent the combination and assimilation of antiquity with the Christian element, and it is the Greek heritage which comes to represent opposition and hostility to Christ. (58)
57) Ethics, p. 69.
58) op. cit., p. 70.
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The former is more characteristic of Roman Cathol­
icism and the Western European countries such as France, 
Holland, England and Italy, the latter of the Reformation 
and Germany. He analyzes as follows : Wherever the
incarnation of Christ is more intensely in the foreground 
of Christian consciousness, the reconciliation of antiq­
uity with Christianity is sought for and wherever the 
cross of Christ dominates the Christian message, the 
breach between Christ and antiquity is emphasized. But 
since Christ is both the Incarnate and the Crucified, 
the due acceptance of the historical heritage of antiquity 
is a task which the Christian West has yet to complete, 
and with the completion of this task as their common pur­
pose the Western European peoples and the Germans will 
draw more closely together. He thinks that the unity 
of the West through the form of Christ is the heritage 
from the early periods of the Western history. Pope 
and Emperor alike strove for the formation of this unity. 
And this heritage still remains today in the form of the 
Roman Church, i.e.: the Papacy.
The corpus christianum, however, was broken by 
the Reformation into its two constituent parts, the 
corpus christi and the world, and this because Luther 
was compelled by the word of the Bible to conclude that;
The unity of the Church can lie only inJesus Christ as He lives in His word and sacra-
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ment, and not in any political power. (59)
Luther recognizes two kingdoms which must neither 
be fixed together nor yet be torn asunder. They are 
the kingdom of the preached word of God and the kingdom 
of the sword, the kingdom of the Church and the kingdom 
of the world. Yet the Lord of both kingdoms is the 
God who is made manifest in Jesus Christ.
The Thirty Years’ War finally laid bare the political disunity of the west which had resulted from the schism of faith. The Peace of Westphalia confirmed and ratified the confessional schism as the fate and inheritance of the western world.(60)
However, the fact that both sides called upon the 
name of Jesus Christ means that the common guilt was 
not destined to destroy the unity of the West. Then 
he points out the process of secularization quickly 
set in and continues until today, Luther’s doctrine 
of the two kingdoms was misinterpreted to imply:
The emancipation of man in his conscience, his reason and his culture and as the justifi­cation of the secular as such. (61)
On the Catholic side the process of secularization
rapidly became anti-clerical and even anti-Christian,
and the result was the outbreak of the French Revolution,
with its emphasis on the emancipated man —  emancipated
59) Ethics, p. 74.
60) op. cit., p. 75.
61) op. cit., p. 76.
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reason, class and people.
The emancipated reason, which brought about the 
fresh wind of intellectual clarity and honesty, led to 
the discovery of "that mysterious correspondence 
between the laws of thought and the laws of nature," 
and so fostered "the unparalleled rise of technology. 
Besides technology the Revolution also produces in the 
western world the stirring of the mass movement and 
modern nationalism, so that the total result was the 
creation of a new unity of mind in the West which was 
rooted in the emancipation of man as reason, mass and 
nation.
The new unity, however, already carried within 
itself the seeds of decay. The author asserts sharply, 
in the struggle for freedom these three work together 
in agreement, but once their freedom was achieved they 
became deadly enemies. Because:
The masses and nationalism are hostile to reason. Technology and the masses are hostile to nationalism. Nationalism and technology are hostile to the masses, (63)
Revolution results in nihilism. For Bonhoeffer 
nihilism closely combines with the deification of man. 
The new unity which the French Revolution brought
62) Ethics, p. 78.
63) op. clt., p. 81.
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to Europe, the crisis of which we are experiencing today, 
is western godlessness. He clarifies this western god­
lessness as totally different from the atheism of certain 
individual Greek, Indian, Chinese and western thinkers, 
because it is not the theoretical denial of the existence 
of a God.
It is itself a religion, a religion of hostility to God. (64)
For them God is not the living God of the Bible
but the New Man. In paganism, gods are adored in the
form of men, but in the western godlessness "it is man
who is adored in the form of God, indeed in the form
65of Jesus Christ." This godlessness is essentially 
hostile to the Church. But he also remarks upon the 
fact that this western godlessness should not simply 
identify with enmity towards the Church. There are 
two kinds of godlessness: one is the godlessness in 
religious and Christian clothing, which he calls a 
hopeless godlessness and the other is the godlessness 
against religion and against the Church, which he calls 
a godlessness full of promise.
It is the protest against pious godlessness in so far as this has corrupted the Churches, and thus in a certain sense, if only negatively, it
64) Ethics, p. 82.
65) op. cit., p. 82
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defends the heritage of a genuine faith in God and of a genuine Church, There is relevance here in Luther's saying that perhaps God would rather the curses of the ungodly than the alleluia of pious. (66)
Bonhoeffer then turns his attention to the composite 
problem which he feels within the American way of life.
He recognizes the difference in character between the 
American Revolution and the French Revolution, because 
the fundamental stream of the American democracy is it­
self founded upon the kingdom of God and the limitation 
of all earthly powers by the sovereignty of God and not 
upon the emancipated man. He notices the fact that in 
Anglo-Saxon countries democracy is regarded as the Chris­
tian form of the state. In spite of this the Anglo- 
Saxon countries have not escaped the process of secular­
ization. He explains the reason as follows:
The cause does not lie in the misinterpretation of the distinction between the two offices of king­doms, but rather in the reverse of this, in the failure of the enthusiasts to distinguish at all between the office or kingdom of the state and the office or kingdom of the Church. (67)
In consequence, the Church totally capitulates to
the world and the godlessness remains more covert.
By the loss of the unity which is possessed
66) Ethics, p. 83. Bonhoeffer developed this thinking in his Letters and Papers from Prison. The phrases such as "to live without God before God", "non-religious interpretation of the Bible" or his positive attitude towards the modern secular world should be understoodin this context. See also p. 44ff.
67) op. cit., p. 84.
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through the form of Jesus Christ, the western world is brought to the brink of the void. (68)
He thinks that the western world is now facing a 
decisive struggle of the last days. The void towards 
which the west is drifting is a rebellious and outra­
geous void, and one which is the enemy of both God and 
man. In the face of the peril of the void the question 
of the historical inheritance loses its meaning. There 
is no future nor past. People fluctuate between the 
most bestial enjoyment of the moment, and an adven­
turous game of chance. Bonhoeffer says:
If we ask what remains, there can be only one answer: fear of the void. (69)
Then he asserts:
Two things alone have sill the power to , avert the final plunge into the void. (70)
First is the miracle of a new awakening of faith, 
which is proclaimed by the Chruch. Second is the force 
which the Bible calls the "restrainer" %aTexwv(ii Thess. 
2:7), that is the power of the state to establish and 
maintain order, These two, church and state, are dif­
ferent in nature, but in the face of imminent chaos 
they are in close alliance.
68) Ethics, p. 85. 
.69) op. cit. , p. 87. 
70) op. cit., p. 88.
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The Church now stands in a peculiar situation and 
she is called to an unprecedented task. The western 
world has refused to accept its historical inheritance
by turning its back on Christ. "The corpus christianum.
71is broken asunder." In this situation the Church, 
corpus christi, must prove that Christ is the living 
Lord of this hostile world. In other words, as the 
bearer of a historical inheritance the Church has an 
obligation to the historical future. The Church must 
leave not only the last day to God's decision, but 
also the possibility of the continuance of history.
".Guilt, Justification and Renewal". In this section 
he reiterates his assertion that only the man who is • 
taken up in Christ is the real man. Therefore the man 
who is apostate from Christ is at the same time apostate 
from his own essential nature. The only way for man 
to turn back is through recognition of guilt of his 
defection from Christ and this marks the beginning of 
his conformation with Christ. It is the Church that 
the place where this recognition of guilt becomes real. 
The Church is the community of human beings which re­
cognize their guilt towards Christ by the grace of 
Christ. The recognition of guilt must be confessed 
in the sense that they themselves are guilty of it.
71) Ethics, p. 88
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And it is a sign of the living presence of Christ.
With this confession the entire guilt of the world falls upon the Church, upon the Chris­tians, and since this guilt is not denied here, but is confessed, there arises the possibility of forgiveness, (72)
He enumerates eight guilts which the Church should 
confess. Through the confession alone the Chruch can 
become partaker of the form of Christ, sharing in his 
cross and in the glory of his new righteousness and 
new life.
Bonhoeffer insists plainly that the justification 
and renewal of the Western world lie solely in the 
divine justification and renewal of the Church. Of 
course the justification and renewal of the Church and 
the western world must be spoken, in a different sense.
For the Chruch and for the individual believer there can be only a complete breach with guilt and a new beginning which is granted through the for­giveness of sin, but in the historical life of the nations there can always be only the gradual process of healing. (73)
The justification and renewal of the west will come 
only when justice, order and peace are restored, when 
past guilt , is forgiven, when it is no longer imagined
that what has been done can be undone by means of puni­
tive measures and reprisals, and when the Church is
given room to carry her work among the nations.
72) Ethics, p. 91.
73) op. cit., p. 96,
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C. Third Part
"The Last Things and the Things Before the Last". 
Chapter Four, the discussion of the ultimate and 
the penultimate, is a new motif for him which becomes 
a reality derived from his experience in the resistance 
movement. Catholic theology usually deals with the 
penultimate in the light of the ultimate which perfects 
it. However Protestant theology does not pay much 
attention to the penultimate. Bonhoeffer now tries to 
re-evaluate the meaning of the penultimate.
He begins this section as follows:
The origin and the essence of all Christian life are comprised in the one process or event which the Reformation called justification of the sinner by grace alone. (7 4)
It is his presupposition that the last word is 
justification. He insists that the whole life of man 
—  his past and future —  is merged in one in the 
presence of God. His past is forgiven, his future is 
secure, and his life is justified in Christ and new in 
the Church.
Then he points out justification is not just by 
grace alone, but also by faith alone. Faith alone sets 
life on the new foundation which alone can justify life 
before God and this foundation is the life,death, and
74) Ethics, p. 98.
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resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. Faith means the 
finding and holding of this foundation. And faith is 
a passive submission to an action and in this submission 
alone it is itself an action. He insists:
My faith that my life is justified is faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. There is, therefore, no other means of access to the justification of my life than through faith alone. (75)
God's justifying word is final in two aspects;
first, it is. final in a qualitive sense because it is
completely free and consequently excludes man's every
effect and method of achieving it on his own; second,
it is final in a temporal sense because it is always
preceded by something penultimate which remains, even
though the ultimate entirely annuls and invalidates it.
In other words, for the sake of the ultimate we can
travel the whole length of the way of the things before
the last.
In the section of "The Penultimate", he raises a 
question whether to take the penultimate seriously in 
its own way is to incur guilt? Or:
Does not this mean that, over and over again, the penultimate will be what commends itself pre­cisely for the sake of the ultimate, and that it will have to be done not with a heavy conscience but with a clear one? (76)
75) Ethics, p. 99.
76) op. cit., p. 104.
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The author now points out the fact that to solve 
the problem of the relation between the ultimate and 
the penultimate in Christian life, two extreme solutions 
were given. They are to be radical or to compromise and 
he denies both of these approaches, because the radical 
solution can see only the ultimate and considers 
everything penultimate as enmity towards Christ on the 
one hand, and the compromise solution can on priciple 
set apart the ultimate from the penultimate, in which 
case the penultimate retains its right on its own 
account and is not threatened of imperilled by the 
ultimate on the other. He explains both solutions are 
equally extreme and both alike contain truth and untruth.
In both cases thoughts which are in themselves equally right and necessary are in an inadmissible manner made absolute. The radical solution has as its point of departure the end of all things,God the Judge and Redeemer ; the compromise solution bases itself upon the Creator and Preserver. On the one side it is the end that is regarded as absolute, and on the other side it is things as they are. Thus creation and redemption, time and eternity confront one another in a conflict which cannot be resolved; the unity of God Himself is sundered, and faith in God is broken apart. (77)
Further he insists:
In Jesus Christ there is neither radicalism nor compromise, but there is the reality of God and men. (78)
77) Ethics, pp. 105-106.
78) op. cit., p. 106.
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For him only the God-man Jesus Christ is real, 
and only through Him the world will be preserved. The 
true relationship between the ultimate and the penulti­
mate can be found solely in Jesus Christ, the incarnate, 
crucified, and risen God-man.
The incarnation means that God enters into created 
reality and thereby reveals his love for his creation. 
The manhood of Jesus implies both the absolute condem­
nation of sin and the relative condemnation of the 
established human orders. But even in this condemnation 
Jesus allows human reality to remain a penultimate 
which must be taken seriously in its own way.
The crucifixion means that God pronounces the 
final condemnation on the fallen creation and thereby 
reveals his judgement upon all flesh. The cross of 
Jesus discloses the judgement of the ultimate upon 
all that is penultimate. But at the same time the 
cross reveals mercy towards that penultimate which 
bows before the judgement of the ultimate.
The resurrection means that God sets an end to 
death and calls a new creation into life, thereby 
manifesting his will for a new world. Man has already 
risen again with Christ to newness of life. However 
he still remains in the world of the penultimate until 
he passes the boundary of death.
The life of the Christian with the incarnate, 
crucified, and risen Christ means being a man through
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the efficacy of the incarnation, being sentenced and 
pardoned through the efficacy of the cross, and living 
a new life through the efficacy of the resurrection.
There cannot be one of these without the rest.
He concludes:
As for the question of the things before the last, it follows from what has been said so far that the Christian life means neither a destruction nor a sanctioning of the penultimate. In Christ the reality of God meets the reality of the world and allows us to share in this real encounter.It is an encounter beyond all radicalism and beyond all compromise. Christian life is participation in the encounter of Christ with the world. (79)
Then he considers the penultimate more closely in
the section "The Preparing of the Way". He says that
the penultimate, which is everything that precedes the
justification of the sinner by grace alone, must be
taken seriously simply on account of its relation to the
ultimate. He specifies concretely two things as the
penultimate: they are being man (Menschsein) and being
good (Gutsein).
He emphasizes that Christ makes His own way when he 
comes, regardless of man's preparation or readiness.
His coming belongs to the. matter of the ultimate. Never­
theless, this does not give us any excuse for neglecting 
to prepare for his coming by removing every possible 
obstacle in his way.
79) Ethics, p. 110.
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Hunger, injustice, loneliness, disorder —  these 
are penultimate conditions which the Christian must 
continually seek to lessen for the sake of the ultimate, 
But the preparation of the way for Christ cannot be 
simply a matter of the establishment of certain 
desirable conditions. He insists that:
It is quite certain that the preparation of the way is a.matter of concrete interventions in the visible world, ... yet everything depends on this activity being a spiritual reality, precisely because ultimately it is not indeed a question of the reform of earthly conditions, but it is a question of the coming of Christ. (80)
It implies that they must be acts of humiliation
before the coming of the Lord, that is to say, they
must be acts of repentance. But repentance means a
concrete action and this action should be directed
towards the twin goals: to be man and to be good.
He sees what 'to be man' and 'to be good' means, in
the coming Lord himself. It is because Christ is
coming that we must be man and we must be good. He
explains:
It is in relation to Christ that the fallen world becomes intelligible as the world which is preserved and sustained by God for the coming of Christ, the world in which we can and should live good lives as men in orders which are established. (81)
80) Ethics, p. 115.
81) op. cit., p. 116
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The matter of the penultimate and the preparation 
of the way must be taken seriously. However there is 
no method, no way to attain to the ultimate from the 
penultimate. Preparation of the way is always His way
to us, that is, a way from the ultimate to the penul­
timate.
Then he analyzes the spiritual situation of western 
Christendom as follows:
The calling in question of the last things, of the ultimate, which has been taking place to an ever increasing extent during the past two hundred years, has at the same time imperilled the stability of the penultimate, which was closely linked here with the ultimate, and has brought it near to disruption. And in. its turn the breaking up of the penultimate has as its consequence an intensified neglect and depreci­ation of the ultimate. (82)
He urges the need to protect the ultimate by
taking due care for the penultimate. It is his con­
viction thatthe more Christian attitude nowadays is :
To claim precisely that man as a Christian who would himself no longer dare to call himself a Christian, and then with much patience to help him to the profession of faith in Christ. (83)
From this point of view Bonhoeffer now attempts 
to recover the meaning of "The Natural" for Protes­
tant ethics. Protestant tradition has tended to exalt 
grace to such an extent that everything human and
82) Ethics, pp. 118-119.
83) op. cit., p. 119.
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natural sank into the abyss of sin, so that no one 
dared to consider the relative distinctions within the 
fallen creation. As the result, the concept of the 
natural lost a place in Protestant thought. He recog­
nizes this is a serious and substantial loss for the 
Protestants and insists on the necessity to recover 
its real meaning on the basis of the gospel.
What is, then, the natural according to Bonhoeffer?
It is neither the creaturely nor the sinful, but it is
"that which, after the Fall, is directed towards the
84coming of Christ." On the contrary, the unnatural
closes its doors against the coming of Christ. Through 
the Fall the 'creature' becomes 'nature', and this means 
that the direct dependence of the creature on God is 
replaced by the relative freedom of natural life. This 
relative freedom, which can be used in either a true 
(natural) or false (unnatural) way, should not be 
confused with an absolute freedom for God and for the 
neighbour which is imparted by the word of God alone.
The natural, which is the form of life preserved 
by God for the fallen world and directed towards 
justification, redemption and renewal through Christ, 
is determined according to its form through God's will 
to preserve it and through its being directed towards
84) Ethics, p. 121
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Christ. According to its contents, the natural is the 
form of the preserved life itself, the form which em­
braces the whole human race. Formally the natural 
can be discerned only in-its relation to Jesus Christ, 
but in regard to its contents it can be perceived by 
man's reason. Reason is not a divine principle of 
knowledge but it is wholly embedded in the natural.
Therefore he states:
Reason understands the natural as something that is universally established and independent of the possibility of empirical verification.From this there follows as conclusion that is of crucial importance, namely, that the natural can never be something that is determined by any single part or any single authority within the fallen world. (85)
The natural simply exists, and its innate power of 
existence serves to protect life against the unnatural 
and therefore provides "a solid basis for that optimistic 
view of human history which confines itself within the 
limits of the fallen world.
Then he moves to the section of "Natural Life". 
Natural life is formed life. It is neither vitalism, 
which is an absolutization of life as an end in itself, 
nor mechanization, which is an absolutization of life 
as means to an end. He insists that natural life stands
85) Ethics, p. 123.
86) op. cit., p. 125
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between them and explains as follows;
In relation to Jesus Christ the status of life as an end in itself is understood as creaturehood, and its status as a means to an end is understood as participation in the kingdom of God; while, within the framework of the natural life, the fact that life is an end itself finds expression in the rights with which life is endowed, and the fact that life is a means to an end finds expression in the duties which are imposed on it. Thus, for the sake of Christ and His coming, natural life must be lived within the framework of certain definite rights and certain definite duties. (87)
Christian ethics speaks of rights firstly and of 
duties later. It is the same within the framework of 
the natural life, and by following this precept we are 
allowing the Gospel to have its way.
He believes that Roman law dictum suum cuigue (to 
each his own) expresses the most general formulation of 
the rights which are given with its natural, but it is 
misapplied either if 'his own' is taken to mean 'the 
same', so that the manifoldness of the natural is de­
stroyed in favour of an abstract law, or if 'his own' 
is defined arbitrarily and subjectively, so that the 
unity of rights is nullified in the interests of free 
self-will. Any 'innate right' must be predicated on the 
recognition of the natural rights of others, which 
implies that the conflict of rights is inherent in the 
natural itself. This points to a limitation of the
87) Ethics, p. 126.
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principle of suum cuigue, since it does not take into
account the fact of sin operating in the natural and
therefore the unavoidable rise of conflicts that can
be settled only through the application of a positive
right introduced from without. Yet this fact does not
deprive the principle of its relative correctness of
88its status as penultimate.
A presupposition of suum cuigue, that is each man 
comes into the world with a natural right of his own, 
is contradicted by social eudaemonism (Sozialeudaemo- 
nismus), However he insists that the right of individual 
must not be subordinated to the right of the community.
It is his conviction that the existence of a natural 
right of the individual follws from the fact that it is 
God’s will to create the individual and to endow him 
with eternal life. Social eudaemonism, which allies 
itself with a sort of blind voluntarism, can be checked 
only by the reason which perceives and introduces into 
consciousness the reality of the fallen world. He 
concludes this section as follows;
The principle of suum: cuigue is the highest possible attainment of a reason which is in accord with reality and which, within the natural life, discerns the right which is given to the individ­ual by God (of whom reason knows nothing), (89)
88) See Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 224.
89) Ethics, p. 130.
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Then he continues his discussion of the rights of
natural life from the point of view of their contents.
He points out the question of the guarantor of these
rights as an essential one. His answer is God. But
at the same time he emphasizes that God continually
makes use of life itself to overcome every violation
of the natural. So he says in any case the individual
will always have to bear in mind that his most powerful
ally is life itself. He answers clearly 'yes’ to the
question whether the individual is entitled to defend
his natural rights. From this perspective he discusses
several important problems concretely such as : "The
right to Bodily Life", "Suicide", "Reproducion and
nascent Life", "The Freedom of Bodily Life" and "The
90Natural Rights of the Life of the Mind".
The fifth chapter of the Ethics is entitled "Christ, 
Reality and Good (Christ, the Church and the World)." 
Bonhoeffer begins this chapter with the definition, 
that the task of Christian ethics is not to ask "How 
can I be good?" or "How can I do good?" but "What is 
the will of God?" The starting-point of Christian 
ethics is faith in God as the ultimate reality who 
reveals himself in Jesus Christ, and so the problem
90) Ethics, pp. 131-160
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of Christian ethics is how the revelational reality 
of God in Christ becomes real among men:
The problem of Christian ethics is the reali­zation among God's creatures of the revelational reality of God in Christ, just as the problem of dogmatics is the truth of the revelational reality of God in Christ. The place which in all other ethics is occupied by the antithesis of 'should be' and 'is', idea and accomplishment, motive and performance, is occupied in Christian ethics by the relation of reality and realization, past and present, history and event (faith), or, to replace the equivocal concept with the unambiguous name, the relation of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.The question of good bocomes the question of par­ticipation in the divine reality which is revealed in Christ. (91)
The good is the real, and the real is not abstract 
but possesses reality only in the reality of God. There­
fore, only when we share in this reality do we share in 
the good. He states:
Man is an indivisible whole, not only as an individual in his person and work but also as a member of the community of men and creatures in which he stands, (92)
The question of good deals with this reality.
Participation in the indivisible whole of the divine reality— this is the sense and the purpose of the Christian enquiry concerning good. (93)
Then what is meant by reality? The positivist 
believes that reality itself teaches what is good. But
91) Ethics, p. 163.
92) op. cit., p. 165.
93) op. cit., p. 166.
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the Christian sees both the reality of the world and 
the reality of God in Jesus Christ. Bonhoeffer explains:
The reality of God discloses itself only by setting me entirely in the reality of the world, and when I encounter the reality of the world it is always already sustained, accepted and recon­ciled in the reality of God. This is the inner meaning of the revelation of God in the man Jesus Christ. (94)
Christian ethics inquires about the way this reality 
is being realized in the present, the way in which life 
may be conducted in this reality, and therefore, the way 
one participates in the reality of God and of the world 
in Jesus Christ today.
The discussion of what he calls "Thinking in Terms 
of Two Spheres" is notable one. Since the beginnings 
of Christian ethics the main underlying conception in 
ethical thought has been the conception of a juxtaposition 
and conflict of two spheres, the one divine, holy, super­
natural and Christian, and the other worldly, profane, 
natural and un-Christian. As the result reality is 
divided into two parts and ethical task is thought to 
find the proper relation between the two. In medieval 
scholasticism the realm of the natural is made subordinate 
to the realm of grace; in pseudo-Lutheranism the autonomy 
of the orders of this world is proclaimed in opposition 
to the law of Christ; and in the Enthusiasts the congre­
gation of the Elect takes up the struggle with a hostile
94) Ethics, p. 167.
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world for the establishment of God's kingdom on earth.
It is Bonhoeffer's conviction that all these schemes
are contradictory to the thought of the Bible and the
Reformation. He insists there is only one reality and
that is the reality of God, which has become manifest
in Christ in the reality of the world. In other words,
there is "only the one sphere of the realization of
Christ, in which the reality of God and the reality of
95the world are united."
He criticizes those who see the world in terms of 
such pairs of concepts as secular and Christian, 
natural and supernatural, profane and sacred, rational 
and revelational. He asserts the natural, profane and 
rational world is taken up into the divine and cosmic 
reality in Christ and must always be seen in the move­
ment of being accepted and becoming accepted by God in 
Christ. Of course what is Christian is not identical 
with what is of the world, but there is a unity which 
derives solely from the reality of Christ or from faith 
in this ultimate reality. He interprets Luther's 
doctrine of the two kingdoms as originally intended to 
be understood in the sense of polemical unity. Therefore 
he insists that there is no real possibility of being a 
Christian outside the reality of the world and also 
there is no real worldly existence outside the reality
95) Ethics, p. 170.
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of Jesus Christ.
Nevertheless he also recognizes that we are still 
confronted with other important questions.
Are there really no ultimate static contraries, no spaces which are separated from one another once and for all? Is not the Church of Jesus Christ such a space, a space which is cut off from the space of the world? And, finally, is not the king­dom of the devil a space of this kind, and one which will never enter into the kingdom of Christ? (96)
He recognizes that the Church occupies a definite 
space in the world —  a space which is delimited by her 
public worship, her organizations and her parish life.
But he insists that this space is not interpreted in 
a purely empirical sense. The Church is the space in 
the world where Christ's reign over the whole world 
is evidenced and proclaimed, and it is not something 
which exists on its own account. It is continually 
reaching out beyond itself and extending its boundaries. 
The Church needs the space in order to serve the world 
by proclaiming the world is loved by God and reconciled 
with Him. He explains that:
The only way in which the Church can defend her own territory is by fighting not for it but for the salvation of the world. Otherwise the Church becomes a 'religious society' which fights in its own interest and thereby ceases at once to be the Church of God and of the world. (97)
96) Ethics, p. 173.
97) op. cit., pp. 174-175
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Then he moves to the third question. At first 
sight the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of the devil 
would justify thinking in terms of two spheres. He says, 
however, yet the devil must serve Christ even against 
his will and so the realm of devil is not contrary to 
but beneath the feet of Jesus Christ. Even the.dis­
ordered world possesses its final and true reality not 
in the devil but in Christ, because it is reconciled 
with God in Christ,
In the New Testament it is presupposed that the 
world needs reconciliation with God but that it is not 
capable of achieving it by itself. Therefore, even as 
the world opposes and rejects the reality of the love 
of God, the Church must open the eyes of precisely this 
rebellious world to this reality and to its reconcili­
ation with God. In this way the lost and sentenced 
world is incessantly drawn into the event of Christ.
He tries to replace the picture of the two spheres 
by the picture of the body of Christ. He explains:
We shall need above àll to direct our gaze to the picture of the body of Christ Himself, who became man, was crucified and rose again.In the body of Jesus Christ God is united with humanity, the whole of humanity is accepted by God, and the world is reconciled with God.Whoever sets eyes on the body of Jesus Christ in faith can never again speak of the world as though it were lost, as though it were separated from Christ; he can never again with clerical arrogance set himself apart from the world. (98)
98) Ethics, p. 177.
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The Church as the body of Christ does not intend 
to separate from the world but to summon the world into 
the fellowship of this bodÿ of Christ. Even though 
the Church and the world are different from each other. 
Here Bonhoeffer uses the terms of "the four mandates" 
to explain their distinction.
The section on "The Four Mandates" is quite unique 
in the Ethics. After mentioning that the world is 
relative to Christ, he claims as follows:
This relativeness of the world to Christ as­sumes concrete form in certain mandates of God in the world. The Scriptures name four such mandates; labour, marriage, government and the Church. (99)
He uses the term "fnandate" in distinction from the term 
"order", because the term "mandate" refers more clearly 
to a divinely imposed task rather than to a determination 
of being. The first three are not secular in contra­
distinction to the fourth, but all are equally divine 
by virtue of their original and final relation to Christ.
The Mandates of labour and marriage confront the 
first man after creation, and both permit man to share 
in God's creative power for the glory and service of 
Christ. Because both mandates are to be carried out 
by the race of Cain, however, a shadow falls from the 
outset on all human labour and on marriage and the 
family in this our world.
99) Ethics, p. 179.
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The divine mandate of government presupposes those 
of labour and marriage; unlike them, it is not creative, 
but functions to preserve what has been created. Thus 
the governing authority is not the performer but the 
witness and guarantor of marriage; it is not the admin­
istrator but the inspector and supervisor of labour.
The task of the governing authority is to preserve the 
world for the reality of Jesus Christ by law and force. 
For Christ ' s sake we must obey to this governing authority 
The divine mandate of the Church differs from the 
other three. It is the task of enabling the reality of 
Jesus Christ to become real in the preaching and organ­
ization of the Church and the Christian life. The 
mandate of the Church extends to all mankind by over­
lapping of the three mandates, so that now it is the 
Christian who is at once labourer, partner, in marriage, 
and subject of a government. It is not permitted to 
divide them into separate spheres:
The whole man stands before the whole earthly and eternal reality, the reality which God has prepared for him in Jesus Christ. (100)
Man can live up to this reality only by responding
fully to the totality of the offer and the claim.
At the end of the chapter Bonhoeffer returns to his
earlier affirmation that instead of asking how one can
100) Ethics, pp. 182-183.
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be good and do good, one must ask what is the will of 
God. His answer is :
The will of God is nothing other than the becoming real of the reality of Christ with us and in our world. (101)
The will of God is not an idea still to be realized, 
nor is it simply identical with what is in being. It is 
not something hidden and unfulfilled, but something that 
has become manifest and that has already been fulfilled 
by God in his reconciliation of the world with himself 
in Christ. Thus the purpose of ethics is to participate 
in the reality of the fulfilled will of God;
But this participation, too, is possible only in virtue of the fact that I myself am already included in the fulfillment of the will of God in Christ, which means that I am reconciled with God,(102)
Therefore, faith in Jesus Christ is the sole 
fountain-head of all good, the will of God.
D. Fourth Part
"History and Good" and "The 'Ethical* and 'Christian' 
as a Theme" are involved in this part,
Bonhoeffer begins the former chapter with the asser­
tion that the question of good is ultimately connected 
with the fact that we are alive;
The question of good is posed and is decided in the midst of each definite, yet unconcluded, unique and transient situation of our lives, in
101) Ethics, p. 183.
102) op. cit., p. 184.
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the midst of our living relationships with men, things, institutions and powers, in other words in the midst of our historical existence. The question of good cannot now be separated from the question of life, the question of history.(103)
This means that our ethical thought must be not 
abstract but concrete. So our question is life itself. 
Jesus said: "I am the life" (John 14:6, 11:25) and this 
declaration makes clear that we can only live life but 
cannot define it. Life is not a thing, an entity or 
concept, but a particular and unique person.
The question of what is life gives place to the answer who is life. (104)
By saying "I ^  the life", Jesus binds the life
to the person of Jesus. In proclaming this, Jesus
says our life is outside ourselves and in Him. He
explains that we have fallen away from life and we must
hear the negation of our life. This negation, the "no"
to our fallen life, brings us to the end, to death, but
precisely in this bringing the "no" becomes a mysterious
"yes", the affirmation of the new life in Christ. The
human being lives now in tension between the negation
and the affirmation, and only in this tension do we
recognize Christ as our life.
It is the 'yes' of creation, atonement and redemption, and the 'no' of the condemnation
103) Ethics, p. 185.
104) op. cit., p. 188.
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and death of the life which has fallen away from its origin, its essence and its goal. But no one who knows Christ can hear the 'yes’ with­out the 'no' or the 'no' without the 'yes'. (105)
Returning to the question of good, he maintains
that good is not a quality of life, but is life itself,
life in the sense of the saying "Christ is my life" (Phil.
1:21). To be good (gut sein) is to live (leben). This
life assumes concrete form in the contradictory unity of
"yes" and "no", which life finds outside itself in Jesus
Christ, but because Jesus Christ is both man and God in
one, humanity and God have thereby become integrally
related to one another for eternity. He explains the
motifs as follows;
Man is the man who was accepted in the incar­nation of Christ, who was loved, condemned and reconciled in Christ; and God is God become man. There is no relation to men without a relation to God, and no relation to God without a relation to men, and it is only our relation to Jesus Christ which provides the basis for our relation to men and to God. ...We live by responding to the word of God which is addressed to us in Jesus Christ. Since this word is addressed to our entire life, the response, too, can only be an entire one. (106)
He uses the term "responsibility" (Verantwortung) 
to characterize our response (Antwort) to the life of 
Jesus Christ as the "yes" and "no" to our life. Respon­
sibility in this context involves the total and unified
105) Ethics, p. 190.
106) op. cit., p. 192.
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response of one's whole life, so that one's action becomes 
a matter of life and death. Responsibility in the bib­
lical sense is, in the first place, a verbal response 
given at the risk of man's life to the question asked
by another man with regard to the event of Christ (II
107Tim. 4:16, I Pet. 3:15, Phil. 1:7, 17). In answer­
ing, one stands for Christ before men and for men before 
Christ.
"The Structure of Responsible Life". In this section 
he states that the structure of responsibility is condi­
tioned by two factors; firstly, that life is bound to 
man and to God, and secondly, that a man's own life is 
free. Without this obligatory bond and without this 
freedom, there is no responsibility. He defines respon­
sibility:
The obligation assumes the form of deputyship (Stellvertretung) and of correspondence with real­ity (Wirklichkeitsgemaessheit); freedom displays itself in the self-examination (Selbstpruefung) of life and of action in the venture of a concrete decision. (108)
Deputyship may be illustrated by reference to a 
father who acts, works, cares and intercedes for his 
children. He is obliged to act in their place and 
thus unavoidably assumes the role of their deputy or
107) See Ethics, p. 193
108) op. cit., p. 194.
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representative. It is Bonhoeffer's conviction that 
there is no man who can avoid deputyship. For even 
the solitary lives as a deputy for his own self, and 
that means for mankind in general. However, the full 
meaning of deputyship is revealed to us only in the 
life of Jesus Christ, who lived and acted and suffered 
death for all men. Deputyship, and therefore also 
responsibility, consists in a total surrender of one's 
own life to the other man. Only the selfless man lives 
responsibly.
The responsible life must correspond with reality.
This means that man's responsible conduct does not
arise from some pre-established principle, but from
the given situation. He warns that the concept of
correspondence with reality must not be understood in
the sense of that "servile conviction in the face of
109the fact (Nietzsche)". This is just the contrary
of responsibility. He explains:
In action which is genuinely in accordance with reality there is an indissoluble link between the acknowledgement and the contradiction of the factual. The reason for this is that reality is first and last not lifeless; but it is the real man, the incarnate God. ...It is from this action of God, from the real man, from Jesus Christ, that reality now receives its 'yes' and its 'no', its right and its limitations Affirmation and contradiction are now conjoined in the concrete action of him who has recognized the real man. (110)
log) Ethics, p. 198.
110) op. dit., pp. 198-199
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Thus he concludes that the action which is in ac­
cordance with Christ is the action which is in accordance 
with reality and the origin of such action is the incar­
nate God Jesus who has accepted man and who has loved, 
condemned and reconciled man and with him the world. 
Therefore Christian principle does not oppose the secular 
principle. He states:
It is now no longer established in advance what is 'Christian' and what is 'secular'; both of these are recognized, with their special qualities and with their unity, only in the con­crete responsibility of action which springs from the reconciliation that has been effected in Jesus Christ. (111)
The world is the sphere of concrete responsibility 
which is given to us and through Jesus Christ, We must, 
therefore, live and act in limited responsibility and 
thereby allow the world ever anew to disclose its. essen­
tial character to him. Responsible action is limited, 
firstly by our creatureliness, and secondly by our 
recognition of the responsibility of the other man.
Our responsibility is neither infinite nor absolute, 
but always stands under the ultimate judgement and 
grace of God and within the boundary drawn by our 
neighbour's own responsibility. It is precisely this 
limitation which makes our action a responsible one.
Then the author turns his eyes to the realm of 
"things". He calls the relation between responsible
111) Ethics, p. 202.
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man and things "pertinence" (Sachgemaessheit). That 
has two implications. First, that attitude to things 
is pertinent which keeps steadily in view their 
original, essential and purposive relation to God 
and to men. Second, from its origin there is inherent 
in every thing its own law of being (Wes'ensgesetz ) , no 
matter whether this thing is a natural object or a 
product of the human mind, and no matter whether it is 
a material or an ideal entity.
Bonhoeffer points out there comes a time in his­
torical life when the exact observance of a formal law 
comes into conflict with the ineluctable necessities 
of the lives of man. In such a case of extreme 
necessity, the responsible man is faced with the ques­
tion of ultima ratio, i.e., an action that lies beyond 
the law of reason. He states that in such an abnormal 
situation, the man is called forth to make decision as 
a free venture that openly admits the violation of law. 
Yet precisely in this breaking of the law the validity 
of the law is acknowledged and one's action entrusted 
unreservedly to the divine governance of history.
The structure of responsible action includes readi­
ness to accept both guilt and freedom.
Jesus took upon Himself the guilt of all men, and for that reason every man who acts responsibly becomes guity, ,.. Through Jesus Christ it becomes an essential part of responsible action that the lyian who is without sin loves selflessly and for
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that reason incurs guilt. (112)
He recognizes that those who invoke the authority 
of conscience will oppose this statement. Then he 
picks up the problem of conscience. He argues that 
conscience comes as an .indictment of one's loss of 
unity with his own self. Primarily it is directed not 
towards a particular kind of doing but towards a par­
ticular mode of being. Then he asks what constitutes 
this unity?
The first constituent is the man's own ego in its claim to be 'like God', sicut deus, in the knowledge of good and evil. The call of conscience in natural man is the attempt on the part of the ego to justify itself in its knowledge of good and evil before God, before men and before itself, and to secure its own continuance in this self-justifi­cation. Finding no firm support in its own contingent individuality the ego traces its own derivation back to a universal law of good and seeks to achieve unity with itself in conformity with this law. (113)
However the man of faith finds unity beyond his own 
ego and its law in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is our 
conscience. True unity can be found in the surrender of 
the ego to God and to other men. Jesus Christ sets 
conscience free for the service of God and of our neigh­
bour. The responsible action, which enters into the 
quilt of another man for the other's sake, indirectly 
shares in the action of Jesus Christ.
Even though conscience and responsibility unite in
112) Ethics, p. 210.
113) op. cit., pp. 211-212.
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this matter, they continue to confront one another in a 
relation of irreducible tension. In the first place, 
the conscience which is set free in Christ does not 
abandon to unity with myself. So there is a limit to 
the amount of guilt that conscience will permit a 
person to carry without breaking under the weight; 
care should be taken that the pursuit of responsible 
action does not lead to the destruction of man's unity 
with himself. Secondly, the conscience which is set 
free in Christ must still reckon with the law of life, 
which is known, at least in a distorted and perverted 
way, by the natural conscience. Thus there arises a 
conflict between a conscience and concrete responsi­
bility. In this situation ultimate unity can be gained 
only by a free decision for Christ, who is indeed the 
foundation, essence and goal of concrete responsibility, 
and also the Lord of conscience.
Thus responsibility is bound by conscience, but conscience is set free by responsibility.(114)
He concludes the analysis of the structure of 
responsible action by thinking of "freedom".
Responsibility and freedom are corresponding concepts. Factually, though not chronologically, responsibility presupposes freedom and freedom can consist only in responsibility. Responsibility
114) Ethics, p. 216.
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is the freedom of men which is given only in theobligation to God and to our neighbour. (115)
To act responsibly means to act in freedom of his 
own self. And this responsible action is performed 
in the obligation which alone gives freedom, the obli­
gations to God and to our neighbour as they confront us
in Jesus Christ. Therefore it is exactly the free man 
who ultimately commits his action to the guidance of
God. Those who abandon of knowledge of their own good
perform the good of God.
Here Bonhoeffer discusses the relationship between 
free responsibility and obedience. It seems at first 
sight the former category is applicable only to those 
who have some responsible position in life and the latter 
to the common people who lives in an unexciting workday 
world. If so there are two ethics, one for the great
and the strong, for the rulers, and another for the
small and the weak, for the subordinates. However, 
he indicates that;
Even when free responsibility is more or less excluded from a man's vocational and public life, he nevertheless always stands in a respon­sible relation to other men? these relations extend from his family to his workmates. The fulfilment of genuine responsibility at this point affords the only sound possibility of extending the sphere of responsibility once more into vocational and public life. (116)
115) Ethics, pp. 216-217
116) op. cit., p. 219.
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Furthermore he points out the fact that respon­
sibility does not only stand side by side with relation­
ship of obedience? it has its place within these 
relationships. In the actual situation obedience 
and resposibility are closely interlinked and obedience 
is rendered in responsibility. There is a tension 
between obedience and freedom; both are realized in 
responsibility. The responsible man delivers up 
himself and his deed to God.
The final section of this chapter is "The Place 
of Responsibility". He discusses the concept of the 
calling (Beruf). It is his conviction that the biblical 
concept of the calling has nothing to do with Max 
Weber's definition in terms of a "limited field of 
accomplishments" (als abgegrenztes Gebiet von Leistungen) 
or with the pseudo-Lutheran view which simply provides 
the justification and sanctification of secular insti­
tution. According to the Bible it concerns the gracious 
calling of God to live in the fellowship of Jesus Christ. 
Man does not seek out grace in its own place, but grace 
seeks and finds man in his place. This visitation of 
man by grace occured in the incarnation, and it is still 
occurring in the world of Jesus Christ which is brought 
by the Holy Ghost. Only through this call can one live 
a life justified before God. This life is my calling 
from the standpoint of Christ, and it is my responsibility 
from my own standpoint.
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The author criticizes two disastrous misunderstand­
ings: secular Protestantism which identified the calling 
with the loyal discharge of worldly obligations, and 
medieval monasticism which attempted to find a place 
withdrawn from the world where the call could be
answered more appropriately. Jesus Christ calls man to 
unite in concrete responsibility the "yes" and the "no", 
to life in the world. Therefore Bonhoeffer states the 
place of one's responsibility is determined by the call 
of Jesus Christ which is addressed to us. He explains
it by referring to Luther.
Luther's return from the monastery to the world, to the 'calling', is, in the true NewTestament sense, the fiercest attack and assault to be launched against the world since primitive Christianity. Now a man takes up his position against the world the world? the calling isthe place at which the call of Christ is answered, the place at which a man lives responsibly.Thus the task which is appointed for me in my calling is a limited one, but at the same time the responsibility to the call of Jesus Christ breaks through all limits. (117)
The final chapter is entitled "The 'Ethical' and 
the 'Christian' as a Theme."
He starts with these words:
We cannot, in fact, even set foot in the field of Christian ethics until we have first of all recognized how extremely questionable a course we are pursuing if we take the 'ethical'
117) Ethics, pp. 223-224.
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and the 'Christian' as a theme for our consid­eration or discussion or even as a subject for scientific exposition, (118)
He asserts that the 'ethical' as a theme is bound 
to a difinite time and a definite place, namely, the 
sphere of everyday happenings. But the general moral 
principles overlook this fact and misunderstand man's 
nature of creaturely existence, so they are completely 
inadequate and unfitting. The so-called 'ethical 
phenomenon' must have its place in the life of man.
It would be, however, destructive of creaturely whole­
ness of life if the unconditional character of the 
experience of obligation is taken to imply an exclusive 
and all-embracing claim.
To confine the ethical phenomenon to its proper place and time is not to invalidate it? it is, on the contrary, to render it fully operative. (119)
According to Bonhoeffer 'shall' or 'should' is 
always an ultimate word. The morality simply 'goes 
without saying,' and the ethical phenomenon is strictly 
a peripheral event. 'Shall' and 'should' make themselves 
heard only when fellowship is disrupted or organization 
is endangered, and as soon as order is restored they 
have nothing more to say.
118) Ethics, p. 231,
119) op. cit., p. 233.
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Then he moves to the topic of what is an ethic and 
an ethicist. He says:
An ethic cannot be a book in which there is set out how everything in the world actually ought to be but unfortunately is not, and an ethicist cannot be a man who always knows better than others what is to be done and how it is to be done. (120)
On the contrary, the essential task of ethics and
ethicists is by speaking strictly from the standpoint
of the ’ethical', from the standpoint of the-peripheral
event of 'shall' and 'should', to help people to learn
to share in life:
To share in life within the bounds of 'shall' arid 'should' (not, however, from the motives of 'shall' and 'should') in the abundant fulness of the concrete tasks and processes of life with all their infinite multiplicity of different motives.(1 2 1)
He then discusses the problem of the warrant (Br- 
maechtigung) for ethical discourse. He explains delicate 
implications very frankly. He insists that it is in­
herent and essential in the ethical, that there is a 
direction from the superior to the inferior. He even 
says without the courage to accept the superiority 
which modern man has so completely lost, ethical discourse 
is dissipated in generalities. Because in ethical 
discourse it is the problem not only of what is said 
but also of who says it:
120) Ethics, p. 236.
121) op. cit., p. 237.
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Ethical discouse, therefore, is not a system of propositions which are correct in themselves, a system which is available for anyone to apply at any time and in any place, but it is inseparably linked with particular persons, times and places.(1 2 2)
The ethical already implies a definite structure 
of human society and certain concrete sociological 
relations which involve authority.
He picks up the theme of "The Commandment of God", 
because it is the only possible object of a 'Christian 
ethic' which lies beyond the 'ethical'. It is his 
conviction that:
God's commandment is the only warrant for ethical discourse. The commandment of God is the total and concrete claim laid to man by the merciful and holy God in Jesus Christ. (123)
God's commandment is not an abstract principle or a 
timeless truth, but in both content and form, it is the 
concrete speech of God to the concrete man. The concrete­
ness of the divine commandment consists in its historicity 
He states simply and clearly— even at the risk of a 
misunderstanding— that :
God's commandment, which is manifested in Jesus Christ, comes to us in the Church, in the family, in labour and in government, (124)
It is his important presupposition that God's 
commandment is and always remains that which is made
122) Ethics, pp. 238-239.
123) Op. cit., p. 244.
124) op. cit., p. 245.
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manifest in Jesus Christ. This means that it does not
spring from the created world, "but comes down from above. 
Since God's commandment is the commandment that is 
revealed in Christ, it means no single authority, among 
those which are authorized to proclaim the commandment, 
can claim to be absolute. It is always concrete speech 
to somebody, it embraces the whole of life, and it is 
the permission to live as man before God. For Bonhoeffer 
the commandment of God is not only, like the ethical, 
keep watch on the untransgressable frontier of life, but 
it is at the same time the centre and the fullness of 
life, permission, freedom and positive recognition to 
live as a man before God. So he proclaims that before 
the commandment of God man no longer stands at the cross­
roads or stands always before it, but he can now have 
the right decision really behind him.
It is clear that Bonhoeffer uses the 'ethical' and 
the 'commandment of God' in different senses. The ethical 
is concerned with human life from its periphery, but 
God's commandment embraces the centre and fulness of 
life. The ethical defines only the boundary, the formal 
and the negative with a "thou shalt not"; the God's com­
mandment concerns with positively "sharing in life."
It is clear that the commandment of God also comprises 
the 'ethical', but the opposite of this proposition is 
never true. In a like manner, if the philosophical 
concept of the 'ethical' is replaces by the Biblical
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concept of the 'law', the result must be that the com­
mandment of God and the law are inseparably linked 
together, but that the law is comprised within the 
commandment, arises from it, and must be understood 
by reference to it.
"The Concrete Commandment and the Divine Mandates"
He begins this section with the definition of the 
commandment of Gods
It is to be found where there are the divine mandates which are founded upon the revelation of Christ. Such mandates are the Church, marriage and the family, culture and government. (125)
He understands 'mandate* as follows;
By the term 'mandate' we understand the concrete divine commission which has its foundation in the revelation of Christ and which is evidenced by Scripture; it is the legitimation and warrant for the execution of a definite divine commandment, the conferment of divine authority on an earthly agent.... The bearer of the mandate acts as a deputy in the place of Him who assigns him his commission,(126)
Bonhoeffer prefers to use the term 'mandate' rather 
than 'institution', 'order' (Ordnung), 'estate' (Stand), 
or 'office' (Amt), because these notions no longer con­
note their pristine meaning, namely, that they are divine 
commissions and in no sense the products of history. 
Therefore the commandment of God meets man always in an
125) Ethics, p. 253.
126) op. Cit., p. 254.
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earthly relation of authority, in a clearly defined 
order of superiority and inferiority. He explains the 
relation more closely, namely, it is not identical with 
an earthly relation of superior and inferior power, the 
divine mandate establishes not only superiority but 
also inferiority, and superiority and inferiority here 
represent a relation not of concepts or of things but 
of persons.
Then he emphasizes these that four mandates come 
into force as the commandment of God which is revealed 
in Jesus Christ only in conjunction, in combination and 
in opposition with one another.
The mandates are conjoined ; otherwise they are not mandates of God. In their conjunction they are not isolated or separated from one another, but they are directed towards one another. They are 'for' one another; otherwise they are not God's mandates. Moreover, within this relation of con­junction and mutual support, each one is limited by the other; even within the relation of mutual support this limitation is necessarily experienced as a relation of mutual opposition. Wherever this mutual opposition no longer exists there is no longer a mandate of God, (127)
The discussion goes on to the mandate of the 
1 28Church. ' The commandment of God in the Church con­
fronts men in two ways, both in public way, in the preaching 
of the word and in private way, in the confession or
127) Ethics, p. 257.
128) This chapter is unfinished. Unfortunately he could not reach his interpretation of the latter three mandates.
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ecclesiastical discipline. Both forms of the com­
mandment must go together. If preaching is emphasized 
and the confession or discipline neglected, then the 
commandment becomes devoid of any concrete claim 
(Protestantism); on the contrary, if the confession is 
emphasized but the preaching neglected, a legalistic 
casuistry will result (Catholicism). He emphasizes that 
two forms of the commandment in the Church are same in 
the sense that they are both the proclamation of divine 
revelation. Therefore the mandate of the Church is the 
mandate of proclamation (Verkuendigung). The preacher 
is the bearer of the office of preaching with the 
proclamation in the place of God and of Jesus Christ. 
His office "is established the congregation and not
by the congregation, and at the same time it is With
.129the congregation."
The office of proclamation is inseparably bound 
up with Holy Scripture. And he insists without hes­
itation that Scripture is essentially the property or 
the office of preaching and that it is the preaching 
which properly belongs to the congregation. Scripture 
requires to be interpreted and preached and it is the 
book for preacher. This by no means implies that the 
Bible should be withheld from the laity. He merely 
wants to emphasize the essential and primary relation
129) Ethics, p. 259.
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of the Scripture to the office of proclamation. The 
preacher proclaims Christ as the Lord and Saviour of 
the world on the basis of Holy Scripture to both be­
lievers and unbelievers. Likewise he proclaims same 
commandment for the Church and the world.
The Church proclaims Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ, 
the eternal Son; this means that no created thing can 
be conceived or understood apart from Christ, the 
Mediator of creation.
Jesus Christ, the incarnate God; this means that 
God has taken upon himself bodily all human being, 
that henceforwards divine being cannot be found other­
wise than in human form, that in Jesus Christ man is 
made free to be really man before God, that God does 
not wish to exist for himself but for us.
Jesus Christ, the crucified Reconciler; this means 
that whole world has become godless by its rejection of 
Jesus Christ, what it is precisely this godless world 
which has been reconciled to God, that only through the 
proclamation of Christ crucified is a life in genuine 
worldliness possible.
Jesus Christ, the risen and ascended Lord; this 
means that he has overcome sin and death, that he is the 
living Lord to whom all power is given in heaven and 
on earth, that all the powers of the world are made 
subject to him and must serve him, that his commandment 
sets creation free for the fulfilment of the law which
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is its own, that is to say, the law which is inherent
in it by virtue of its having its origin, its goal
1 30and its essence in Jesus Christ.
Here Bonhoeffer indicates an important point.
The name of Jesus Christ, whom the Church proclaims,
does not only designate an individual man, but embraces
at the same time the whole of human nature. In Jesus
Christ is the new humanity, the congregation of God,
so that through him the word of God and the congregation
of God are indissolubly linked together. Therefore
where Jesus Christ is proclaimed in accordance with the
divine mandate, there is the congregation. Church.
He explains that:
The word of God, proclaimed by virtue of a divine mandate, dominates and rules the entire world; the 'community' which comes into.being around this world does not dominate the world, but it stands entirely in the service of the fulfilment of the divine mandate. (131)
The Church has her own law, and this can never
become the law of the worldly order, conversely the
law of a worldly order can never become the law of this
community. Yet both are subject to the Lordship of
Christ.
The Church as a self-contained community fulfills 
its mandate of proclamation in two ways. First by being
130) See Ethics, pp.262-264
131) op. cit., p. 265,
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a means to an end, that is, the Church organizes herself 
to be an effective instrument for the proclamation of 
Christ. Secondly by being an end in itself, that is, 
through the congregations's action on behalf of the 
world its purpose is achieved, the congregation has 
become the goal and centre of all God's dealing with 
the world.
He .concludes his argument by clarifying the 
meaning of his characteristic word "deputyship"
(StelIvertretung).
The concept of deputyship characterizes this twofold relationship most clearly. The Christian congregation stands at . the point at which the whole world ought to be standing; to this extent it serves as deputy for the world and exists for the sake of the world. On the other hand, the world achieves its own fulfilment at the point at which the congregation stands. The earth is the 'new creation', the 'new creature', the goal of the ways of God on earth. The congregation stands in this twofold relation of deputyship entirely in the fellowship and disciplehood of its Lord, who was Christ precisely in this, that He existed not for His own sake but wholly for the sake of the world. (132)
We must now undertake a survey of the fundamental 
motifs in Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics.
132) Ethics, p. 266.
CHAPTER THREE
A SURVEY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MOTIFS 
OF BONHOEFFER'S ETHICS
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According to A. Damas, the central motif of 
Bonhoeffer*s Ethics is to "search for the concrete char­
acter of the divine commandment, understood as the 
structure of this world rather than the ideal possibility 
of some other world." In other words, it is to make 
clear God's concrete commandments in the midst of reality.
This chapter is devoted to describing the fundamental 
motifs of the Ethics by examing several important and 
characteristic conceptions.
I. CONFORMATION
For Bonhoeffer, ethics has its foundation in the 
encounter with Christ, the Incarnate, the Crucified, 
the Risen One. That Christ takes form among us and we 
are conformed with him is the fundamental thought of 
his ethics.
Out of love for man God becomes man. He does not seek out the most perfect man in order to unite Himself with him, but He takes human character upon Himself as it is. Jesus Christ is not the transfiguration of sublime humanity.He is the 'yes* which God addresses to the real man. Not the dispassionate 'yes' of the judge, but the merciful 'yes' of Him who has compassion.In this 'yes' there is comprised the whole life and the whole hope of the world. (2)
Therefore he intended to begin the Ethics with the
1) A. Dumas; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Theologian of Reality, trans. by R. M. Brown, London, T¥71, p. 140.
2) Ethics, P. 53.
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section entitled "Ethics as Formation". It is the task 
of Christian ethics to investigate how Christ is formed 
in us today and here. It does not mean that man becomes 
like Jesus, but that the form of Jesus Christ itself
works upon us in such a manner that it moulds our form
3in its own likeness. Conformation with Christ is a 
structural conception of responsible behaviour in the 
ethical situation. To be conformed with Christ must 
be considered concretely, the Christ who is Incarnate, 
Crucified and Risen,
Because Christ is the Incarnate it is man's right 
and duty that man should be man. The quest for the 
superman, i.e., the endeavour to outgrow the man within 
the man, the pursuit of the heroic, the cult of the 
demigod must be rejected.
To be conformed with the Incarnate is to have the right to be the man one really is. (4)
Because Christ is the Crucified, conformation to 
Him means being a man sentenced by God. Man accepts 
the judgement upon himself. He dies every day the 
death of a sinner before God. He bears all the suffer­
ings that comes to him, in the knowledge that it serves 
to enable him to die to his own will.
3) See Gal. 4:19
4) Ethics, p. 62
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In surrendering himself to God's judgement upon him and against him he is himself just in the eyes of God. (5)
Because Christ is the Risen One, conformation to 
Christ means to be a new man before God. This newness, 
however, is hidden with Christ in God. Man lives as a 
new man in the midst of death, sin and the old.
The new man lives in the world like any other man. Often there is little to distinguish him from the rest. Nor does he attach importance to distinguishing himself, but only to distinguishing Christ for the sake of his brethren. Transfigured though he is in the form of the Risen One, here he bears only the sign of the cross and the judgement. (6)
Man is not transformed into the form of God, but 
into his own form, the form which is essentially proper 
to him. As God became man, man becomes man. It is 
correct to say that Bonhoeffer's ethics is an ethics of
7the cross rather than an ethics of glory. Conformation 
is not achieved by merits of efforts to become like Jesus 
Christ, but only by being drawn into the form of Him,
The place of this conformation is in the Church.
He insists that: the Church is Christ Himself who has
taken form among us ; the Church is nothing but a section 
of humanity in which Christ has really taken form; the 
Church is the man in Christ, incarnate, sentenced and
5) Ethics, p. 62.
6) op. cit., p. 63.
7) cf. George W. Forell: "Realized Faith, the Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer" in The Place of -Bonhoeffer, ed. by M. E. Marty, p. 213.
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awakened to new life. This is the starting point of 
Christian ethics.
Since Christian ethics is an ethics of the cross, 
the Church is not set up as a model for the world. On 
the contrary, the Church bears the form which is in 
truth the proper form of all humanity, Bonhoeffer even 
declares that "what matters in the Church is not religion 
but the form of Christ, and its taking form amidst a 
band of men."^
Thus the problem of how Christ is formed among us 
here and now becomes urgent. He understands this hie 
et nunc not only as the issue of the individual and un­
repeatable ethical situation but also in relation to 
the collective person. He develops his thought as 
follows :
But the question of how Christ takes form among us here and now, or how we are conformed with His form, contains within itself still further difficult questions. What do we mean by 'among us*, 'now' and 'here'? If it is impossible to establish for all times and places what is good, then the question still arises for what times and places can any answer at all be given to our enquiry. It must not remain in doubt for a single moment that any one section to which we may now turn our attention is to be regarded precisely as a section, as a part of the whole of humanity.In every section of his history man is simply and entirely the man taken upon Himself by Christ.And for this reason whatever may have to be said about this section will always refer not only to this part but also to the whole. However, we must now answer the question regarding the times and places of which we are thinking when we set out to speak of formation through the form of Christ.
8) Ethics, p. 64
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These are in the first place quite generally the times and places which in some way concern us, those of which we have experience and which are reality for us. They are the times and places which confront us with concrete problems, set us tasks and charge us with responsibility. The 'among us’, the ’now’ and 'here’ is therefore the region of our decisions and encounters. This region undoubtedly varies very greatly in extent according to the individual, and it might consequently be supposed that these defi­nitions could in the end by interpreted so widely and vaguely as to make room for unrestrained indi­vidualism. What prevents this is the fact that by our history we are set objectively in a definite nexus of experiences, responsibilities and decisions from which we cannot free ourselves again except by an abstraction. We live, in fact, within this nexus, whether or not we are in every respect aware of it. (9)
In ethics there are both individual situations arid 
collective situations, in other words, individuals are 
inescapably involved in collective situations.
According to Bonhoeffer's presentation this is the realm in the history of mankind which up to now has been palpably stamped in an exceptional way by the event of Christ. Here Christ for the first time has begun to take form in the visible history of mankind. (10)
It is possible to speak of how Christ is able to 
take form among us within the framework of a collective 
situation. Ethics should think and teach not unhistori- 
cally, rather for a definite situation. The ethicist 
seeks in a certain way representatively to know the nature 
and the demands of the collective situation, he gives the 
teaching representatively for his contemporaries who stand
9) Ethics, pp. 66-67.
10) H. Ott: Reality and Faith,' The Theologica1 Legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. by A. A. Morrison, London, 1971, p. 274,
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with him in the same complex of history
Ethics as formation is possible only upon the foundation of the form of Jesus Christ which is present in His Church. The Church is the place where Jesus Christ's taking form is proclaimed and accomplished. It is this proclamation and this event that Christian ethics is designed to serve. (11)
At the same time the thought of conformation includes
a strong element of the personal. It means that the
ethics of conformation is not a matter of the realization
of ideas and principles, or of abstract duties, virtues
and values, but of encounter with a concrete person.
By such a personalizing of ethics Bonhoeffer seeks to reach that concreteness which forces itself upon ethical thought. (12)
This encounter, needless to say, arises always with 
the same person, that is the person of Jesus Christ.
Such a personalizing of ethics overcomes not only abstract 
ethics but also casuistry and formalism. Casuistry, 
which depends upon general principles, is overcome because 
a person is not anything general and unhistorical, but 
can only encounter in concrete historical situations 
every time. The formalism of a pure situation ethic 
is overcome because a definite concrete content runs 
through all situations.
For the ethics of conformation the concept of 
reality has an important meaning. We shall discuss
11) Ethics/ p. 68.
12) H. Ott: Reality and Faith, The Theological Legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 277.
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the reality in detail later, Bonhoeffer insists that 
Jesus Christ who seeks to take form among us is the 
reality in all realities of ethical situations. There­
fore when a person becomes conformed with Him he.is 
also in keeping with reality. It is an important task 
of Christian ethics to discern, and therefore enable 
the Christian to be open to the sustaining reality of 
Christ, the Reconciler in the reality of each situation.
II. PENULTIMATE AND ULTIMATE
Bonhoeffer's conviction that it is the reality of
God in Jesus Christ who entered into the reality of
this world, means that he no longer desires "Christ
1 3without the world or the world without Christ." This
may be shown in the differentiation of ultimate and
penultimate which is characteristic of his Ethics.
The justifying word is the final word of God in
the qualitive sense of the non plus ultra: "There is
nothing that goes beyond a life which is justified 
1 4before God." He begins the section entitled "The
Penultimate" as these words.
Justification by grace and faith alone remains in every respect the final word and for this reasons, when we speak of the things before the last, we
13) Ethics, p. 169.
14) op. cit., p. 100.
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must not speak of them as having any value of their own, but we must bring to light their relation to the ultimate. (15)
The relationship between the ultimate and the penul­
timate is defined in such a way that they are neither in 
absolute contrast to one another, nor is there a compro­
mise in which the ultimate is finally eradicated. Both 
positions would, be against Christ.
In Him alone lies the solution for the problem of the relation between the ultimate and the penul­timate.In Jesus Christ we have faith in the incarnate, crucified and risen God. In the incarnation we learn of the love of God for His creation? in the crucifixion we learn of the judgement of God upon all flesh; and in the resurrection we learn of God’s will for a new world. (16)
In this unity of Christ’s event, the penultimate is 
neither sanctioned nor destroyed. The penultimate must 
not be dispensed with for the sake of the ultimate, for 
it ensures the eschatological character of the eschato- 
logical. The dimension of the penultimate, of history, 
of exterior life is permeated, ordered, and arranged by 
the divine mandates. In these mandates God’s final word 
gets concrete form and embodiment. The time of the 
penultimate has its place in salvation history and it is 
the time granted to prepare the way for the coming of 
Christ. Thus the penultimate is nothing in itself; it 
cannot justify itself. The penultimate cannot determine
15) Ethics,p. 103.
16) op. cit., p. 108
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the ultimate rather it is the ultimate which determines
and directs the penultimate. This is why the penultimate
has to be taken seriously despite its provisional character
In regard to man, therefore, he must not be robbed of his
humanity or be destroyed. For "only man can be justified,
precisely because only he who is justified becomes 
17'man'." The ultimate word, which is justification, 
turns the believer towards the penultimate, which is 
natural life and the whole cultural enterprise, since 
the God of grace commands us not to look for him on the 
edges but to meet him in the middle of the world. The 
ultimate is not found at the edge of the world, but in 
its centre as a way of structuring the penultimate. He 
says :
Now from this there follows something which is of crucial importance. For the sake of the ultimate the penultimate must be preserved. Any arbitrary destruction of the penultimate will do serious injury to the ultimate. If, for example, a human life is deprived of the conditions which are proper to it, then the justification of such a life by grace and faith, if it is not rendered impossible, is at least seriously impeded. ... It is necessary to see to it that the penultimate, too, is provided with the preaching of the ultimate word of God, the proclamation of the justification of the sinner by grace alone, lest the destruction of the penultimate should prove a hindrance to the ultimate. (18)
From this standpoint, Bonhoeffer pays carefull 
attention to the natural, which he prefers to the sub­
stantive "nature," a word so charged with traditional
17) Ethics, p. 111.
18) op. cit., p. Ill
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meanings that it suggests a second way of immanent
knowledge of the will of God the Creator, parallel to 
1 9revelation. He uses the word "natural", not natu­
ralistic, as opposed, not to "artificial", but to 
"christological". The concept of the natural has been 
neglected in the Protestant tradition. It had no place 
in Protestant thought and only Catholic ethics thinks 
seriously about nature. Bonhoeffer insists that this 
is a serious and substantial loss to Protestant thought 
and tries to rediscover the meaning of the natural.
The concept of the natural must, therefore, be recovered on the basis of the gospel. We speak of the natural, as distinct from the creaturely, in order to take into account the fact of the Fall; and we speak of the natural rather than of the sinful so that we may include in it the creaturely.The natural is that which, after the Fall, is directed towards the coming of Christ. The unnatural is that which, after the Fall, closes its doors against the coming of Christ, There is indeed only a relative difference between that which is directed towards Christ and that which closes its doors to Christ; for the natural does not compel the coming of Christ, and the unnatural does not render it impossible.In both cases the real coming is an event of grace.And it is only through the coming of Christ that the natural is confirmed in its character as a penul­timate, and that the unnatural is exposed once and for all as destruction of the penultimate. Thus, even in the sight of Christ, there is a distinction between the natural and the unnatural, a distinction which cannot be obliterated without doing grave harm. (20)
19) See A. Dumas: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Theologian ofReality, p. 159.
20) Ethics, p. 120-121.
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21As has been pointed out, Bonhoeffer used the 
term i"order of preservation" in 1932 in contrast to the 
"order of creation." By this term he meant the whole 
world order of fallen creation, as directed solely 
towards Christ, towards the new creation. The reason 
why he refused to use of "order of creation" was that 
each worldly institution is founded by God, and there­
fore it can be recognized and appreciated only in the 
light of God's revelation in Christ. In Ethics, 
however, he drops the term "order of preservation" 
too. He recognizes that this term is equally open 
to misuse at that time, "because the preservation of 
the world is a rational notion, not identical with 
'relative justification' which experiences the 
penultimate and its institutions in the incarnation
of Christ —  the 'entering of God* into the reality of 
22the world."
Thus the natural exists not only for Christ but 
Christ himself exists for the natural life in this world.
In relation to Jesus Christ the status of life as an end in itself is understood as creaturehood, and its status as a means to - ah end is understood as participation in the kingdom of God; while within the framework of the natural life, the fact
21) See Chapter Two, pp. 54ff,
22) J. Moltmann; "The Lordship of Christ and Human Society" in Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, trans. by R.H. Fuller and I. Fuller, p. 81.
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that life is an end in itself finds expression in the rights with which life is endowed, and the fact that life is a means to an end finds expression in the duties which are imposed on it. (23)
The natural is the form of life preserved by God 
after its fall. It is not something which is deter­
mined by any single part or any single authority within 
the fallen world. Therefore it cannot be justified in 
terms of the history of salvation as the "preservation" 
of the world and as a means to an end. Natural life 
must not be understood as a preliminary stage for the 
life with Christ, since it receives its validation from 
Christ Himself. Christ himself entered into the world, 
that is the natural life, and through him the natural 
life becomes the penultimate which is directed towards 
the ultimate. Only on this basis we have the right to 
call others to the natural life and to live the natural 
life ourselves. The penultimate must be respected 
because it is preserved and sustained by God for the 
coming of Christ.
On the conviction that "so long as life continues,
24the natural will always reassert itself", Bonhoeffer 
develops a detailed exposition of natural rights and 
duties as well as natural relationships between man and
23) Ethics, p. 126.
24) op. cit., p. 124
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man. In the section entitled as "The Right to Bodily 
Life" he defends the legitimacy of bodily pleasures 
such as those of sex, food, recreation, and discusses 
the problems of corporal punishment, torture, euthanasia, 
murder, suicide, and birth control. The discussion 
begins with these words.
Bodily life, which we receive without any action on our own part, carries within itself the right to its own preservation. This is not a right that we have justly or unjustly appropriated to ourselves, but it is in the strictest sense an 'innate' right, one which we have passively received and which pre­exists our will, a right which rests upon the nature of things as they are. Since it is God's will that there should be human life on earth only in the form of bodily life, it follows that it is for the sake of the whole man that the body possesses the right to be preserved. (25)
Bodily life, like life in general, is not only a 
means to an end but also an end in itself. According to 
Christian ethics the thought that the body is only the 
prison from which the immortal soul is released for ever 
by death must be rejected, for it is God's will that man 
is à bodily being and bodiliness is entitled to be called 
an end in itself. The positive attitude to the life of 
the body is expressed clearly and concretely in these 
sentences.
The homes of men are not, like the shelters of animals, merely the means of protection against bad weather and the night or merely places for rearing the young; they are places in which a man may relish the joys of his personal life in the
25) Ethics, p. 131
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intimacy and security of his family and of his property. Eating and drinking do not merely serve the purpose of keeping the body in good health, but they afford natural joy in bodily living. Clothing is not intended merely as a mean covering for the body, but also as an adornment of the body. Re­creation is not designed solely to increase working efficiency, but it provides the body with its due measure of repose and enjoyment. Play is by its nature remote from all subordination to purpose, and it thus demonstrates most clearly that the life of the body is an end in itself. Sex is not only the means of reproduction, but, independently of this defined purpose, it brings with it its own joy, in married life, in the love of two human beings for one another. From all this it emerges that the meaning of bodily life never lies solely in its subordination to its final purpose. The life of the body assumes its full significance only with the fulfilment of its inherent claim to joy.(26)
Corporal punishment is only correct for the case of 
the person who is not yet independent and through this 
punishment may develop independence.
Torture inflicts the most extreme dishonour on the 
human being, and consequently engenders an intense 
hatred and the natural bodily impulse to restore this 
wounded honour by the application of bodily force, and 
it destroys the foundation of the fellowhip of human 
society.
The first right of natural life consists in the safeguarding of the life of the body against arbitrary killing. (27)
26) Ethics, p. 133.
27) op. cit., p.. 134.
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The problem of euthanasia is a difficult one.
However Bonhoeffer, insists, first of all, "killing
and keeping alive are never of equal value in the
taking of this decision; the sparing of life has an
28incomparably higher claim than killing can have."
Admitting the destruction of other's lives is 
fundamentally to deny the work of God as Creator and 
Preserver of life. The answer must be negative to 
any request for termination of the life, even for the 
incurably sick.
It is also not permitted to judge the right of life 
on the basis of the usefulness to society of the person. 
Rationalistic thinking of modern times often is based on 
an assumption that every life must posses a certain uti- 
lizable value for the community and that when this utility 
ceases the life has no right to exist. Against this 
assumption, the Bible proclaims that in the sight of God 
there is no life that is not worth preserving, for the 
right to live is the essence, and not the value of life. 
God, the Creator, Preserver and Redeemer of life, makes 
each life, even the most wretched life in the sight of 
human being, worth living before Him.
It cannot be denied that serious incurable or 
hereditary diseases constitute a grave problem and a 
certain danger for community. This danger, however,
28) Ethics, p. 136
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should not be removed by means of destroying this life.
We must be ready to shoulder these unhappy lives 
together, through which we can appreciate our own health 
and realize the importance of the healthy.
Only for an exceptional borderline case, the 
decision would have to remain open. This must be a 
really special case and, needless to say, it should 
not be abused. Bonhoeffer concludes;
Consideration for the healthy also establishes no right to the deliberate destruction of innocent life, and from this it follows that the question regarding euthanasia must be answered in the negative The Bible sums up this judgement in the sentence: ’The innocent ... slay thou not* (Ex. 23:7) (29)
Barth deals with the problem of euthanasis in his 
Church Dogmatics. He emphasizes that "the central in­
sight in this whole complex of problems is that it is 
for God and God alone to make an end of human life, and
that man should help in this only when he has a specific
30and clear command from God." Barth and Bonhoeffer are 
taking the same line, and both are aware of the dangers 
of rationalism which will lead to the destruction of 
the right of all creatures to live and also of the right 
to life of all society.
Then he picks up the problem of suicide. The main
29) Ethics, pp. 140-141.
30) K. Barth: Church Dogmatics, III/4, p. 425
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difference between beasts and man is in the fact that 
man can distinguish himself from the life of his body.
Man is free either to accept his life or destroy it.
From the human point of view suicide is a specifically 
human action, for it is the ultimate and extreme self­
justification of man as man, and it is a man's attempt 
to give a final human meaning to life which has become 
humanly meaningless. The actual originator of suicide 
is not man's despair itself but man's freedom to perform 
his supreme act of self-justification even in the midst 
of the despair. From the point of view of God, however, 
suicide must be said to be wrong, even if it is a 
specifically human action. Suicide is not a moral 
failing, rather it is a failing of faith. Thus suicide 
is only indictable by God, and not man, as it does not 
release man from the hand of God. God is the Maker and 
Master of his life and commands human's destiny. It 
must, be noticed that the Bible does not expressly 
forbid suicide, but often talks about it as a consequence 
of extremely grave sin,
Bonhoeffer recognizes the difference between the 
self-killing for one's own release and for other men 
as a sacrifice. It is quite difficult to judge each 
particular case. Nevertheless, from the stand point 
of Christian faith it must be said there is no right 
of self-killing before God. He concludes?
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It is not the right to life that can over­come this temptation to suicide, but only the grace which allows a man to continue to live in the knowledge of God's forgiveness. But who would venture to say that God's grace and mercy cannot embrace and sustain even a man's failure to resist this hardest of all temptations? (31)
The discussion about "Reproduction and Nascent
Life" follows the same lines. He insists that for
human beings marriage is based upon the personal choice
by the two partners. Similarly reproduction is a
personal decision, or a conscious will to have their
V' own child, rather than a necessity of the preservation
of the species. It does not, however, mean that the
right of life that is to come into being is subjected
to the disposal of the married couple. He warns that
marriage ceases to be marriage and becomes a mere liaison
without an acknowledgement of this right. The right of
the new life, as well as our lives, belongs to God, An
abortion, even if there are many different motives and
reasons, must be considered as nothing but murder. The
birth of the child is the blessing which has been bestowed
upon marriage by God.
The Roman Catholic Church puts contraception and
abortion in the same category, and characterizes both
32of them as murder. Bonhoeffer, however, draws the
31) Ethics, p. 147
32) See Cat. Rom. 2, 8. 13. \ '\
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distinction between the consistent refusal, to allow 
children to come of a marriage and the concrete res­
ponsible control of births.
Christian ethics should not ignore the fact that 
the problem of birth control, which has become such a 
burning question during the past hundred years, is 
undoubtedly connected with the increasing mastery over 
nature which has been achieved by technology in all 
fields of life and with the incontestable triumphs 
of technical science in the widest sense over the realm 
of nature. It cannot be denied the necessity of fewer 
births, for the total population of the world is steady 
increasing because of the reduction of infant mortality 
and the considerable raising of the average age of the 
population.
Catholic morality recognizes this situation, but 
it permits only one means of contraception, that is 
total abstention. This rigorous principle comes from 
the Catholic thinking that it is unnatural to delib­
erately frustrate the reproduction which is the natural 
and first purpose of marriage. Bonhoeffer plainly 
recognizes that this is a demand which most people can­
not stand, and it is unnatural for married couples to 
avoid bodily union. He concludes that in approaching 
this question it is indispensable, for the sake of 
marriage as a whole, that one should acknowledge a
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right to full bodily union. At the same time he 
emphasizes that one must concede that this right of 
nature nevertheless requires to be exercised rationally, 
precisely because it is a human right.
The question of sterilization arises only in con­
nexion with disease. In such cases to prevent unwanted 
births of to protect against a danger to one's own life 
and to the lives of others, sterilization will be the 
lesser evil. The Roman Catholic Church rejects 
sterilization entirely and prohibits the doctor from 
performing this operation.Recognizing an infringe­
ment of the natural right of reproduction and of natural 
right of nascent life, Bonhoeffer prefers to take the 
way of the lesser evil. In other words he recognizes 
the penultimate character of Christian ethics. He intend­
ed to continue with sections on "The Natural Rights of the 
Life of the Mind" and "The Natural Right to Work and 
Property", but the chapter remained unfinished.
It has already been shown that Bonhoeffer's partic­
ipation in the German Resistance movement was the cause 
of his turning his thoughts to the problem of the 
penultimate. His ethical thinking was formed in the 
conflict of the times, namely against Nazi nihilism. It 
was his endeavour to discern the concrete commandment of
33) cf. The papal encyclical casti connubii of 3rd December, 1930 and moral Theology.
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God in the midst of that situation. The re-evaluation 
of the penultimate does not mean identifying the every 
day with the divine will. He never deifies the every­
day world. For it is from Christ as Mediator of creation 
that the character of all created things derives. 
Bonhoeffer asserts that only the Christian believer is 
able to live a truly natural and worldly life, since 
only he is free from the need to deify the world. For 
the Christian knows that precisely in its secularity, 
the world has already been accepted and redeemed by God.
Ethics denounces whatever in the everyday world 
destroys the reality given by God, by means of its 
characteristic motifs. The conception of the last things 
and the things before the last, ultimate and penultimate, 
must be understood in this context. It had not yet been 
developed fully, but it would be correct to see this con­
ception as a new and unique approach in the Ethics. In it 
may be seen some influences from the Lutheran heritage 
and Catholic tradition, though its main roots are found 
in his understanding of the Old Testament. He under­
stands that worldliness is a characteristic of the God 
of the Bible, as opposed to the other-worldliness of the 
gods of religion. God speaks the ultimate word in the 
midst of the realities of the penultimate, in other words, 
God's word is a concrete commandment to be recognized in 
the midst of reality. The ethical responsibility is our
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participation in the reality that God structures on 
earch for the service of man. For the last word of 
ethics is that the sinner is finally reconciled with 
grace, and the existence of man with the reality of 
God.
The uniqueness of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics in comparison 
with other systems of ethics is that instead of 
emphasizing the dilemmas and conflicts between the 
ideal and what exists, he emphasizes the will to work 
towards the unity of reconciliation that Christ has 
already achieved, in all walks of life, both natural 
and cultural.
What can and must be said is not what is good once and for all, but the way in which Christ takes form among us here and now, (35)
34) cf. Edmond Grins "Une Morale pas comme les autres: Introduction à 1 ’Ethique de Bonhoeffer", Etudes theor logiques et religieuses, Montpellier, 1965, 3, pp. 192- 208; 1965, 4, pp. 255-276, Quote by A, Dumas : op. cit.,p. 160.
35) Ethics, p. 66.
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III. REALITY OF CHRIST
Bonhoeffer*s Ethics is firmly grounded in Chris- 
tology and orientated to man’s concrete situation in 
the present world. Christ and reality go together in 
both. In other words his Christology is always worldly, 
and his respect and concern for the world is always 
informed by the transcending dimension of his faith in 
Christ. He declares that there is only one ultimate 
reality, and that is the reality in Jesus Christ. In 
the person of Christ the reality of God and the reality 
of the world are united and work together in a polemical 
unity, so that in him there is no possibility of par­
taking in one without the other. Since both divine and 
cosmic reality are in Christ, we should not think in 
terms of two static spheres, such as sacred and secular, 
revelational and rational, but link them in the unity 
of Christ, The whole reality of the world is already 
drawn into Christ and bouhd together in Him/ and the 
movement of history is accepted and becoming accepted 
by God in Christ.
,Whoever professes to believe in the reality of Jesus Christ, as the revelation of God, must in the same breath profess his faith in both ; the reality of God and the reality of the world? for in Christ he. finds God and the world reconciled.And for just this reason the Christian is no longer the man of eternal conflict, but, just as the reality in Christ is one, so he, too, since he shares in this reality in Christ, is himself
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an undivided whole. His worldliness does not divide his from Christ, and his Christianity does not divide him from the world. Belonging wholly to Christ, he stands at the same time wholly in the world. (3 6)
He does not say Christ is identical with reality.
He recognizes and holds in esteem the transcendental 
character of Christ, however, he simply cannot speak 
about the transcending Christ without talking, about 
the world at the same time.
There are, therefore, not two spheres, but only the one sphere of the realization of Christ, in which the reality of God and the reality of the world are united... There are not two spheres, standing side by side, competing with each other and attacking each other’s frontiers. If that were so, this frontier dispute would always be the decisive problem of history. But the whole reality of the world is already drawn in into Christ and bound together in Him, and the movement of history consists solely in divergence and convergence in relation to this centre. (37)
The world is never abandoned but has been given 
its inner nature in Christ, History is not God versus 
the world, certainly not Church and the world. The 
concrete reality of this secular world is not destroyed 
by being outside the total reality of Christ, but com­
pleted and accepted within it.
As mentioned before, the reality in general and 
reality in Christ are not the same. The contrast between 
them are indicated skilfully in his discussion about
36) Ethics, p. 173.
37) op. cit., p. 170
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Jesus and the Pharisees. Bonhoeffer understands the 
Pharisee as an extremely admirable man, for he subor­
dinates his entire life to his knowledge of good and 
evil and is as severe a judge of himself as of his 
neighbour to the honour of God. The Pharisee is the 
man who even humbly gives thanks for this knowledge.
Then for the Pharisee the problem, to which he devotes 
the entire momentum of his life, is this conflict and
the decision necessary to overcome it. This explains
the continuous and unresolvable argument between him 
and Jesus. The Pharisee is preoccupied with an issue 
Jesus has left behind, and Jesus is speaking in terms 
of a reality he either cannot.or will not recognize.
Just as the Pharisees' question and temptation arises from the disunion of the knowledge of good and evil, so, too, Jesus's answer arises from unity with God, with the origin, and from the overcoming of the disunion of man with God. The Pharisees and Jesus are speaking on totally different levels.
(38)
The confrontation is radical. The conflict remains,
but it has itself been transmuted. It is now the con­
flict between differing realities, the one for which 
God and man are reunited, the other for which God and 
man are still separated. For the latter the problem 
is for man to reach God by way of the integrity and 
constancy of his own decisions, for the former the 
challenge, is for man to decide in the light of the
38) Ethics, p. 13
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fact that God has reached him. It is this new reality
that Jesus embodies and seeks to express. This is why
he refuses to be trapped inside the problem of the wrong 
39reality. Jesus seemed not to answer the question of 
the Pharisees, Bonhoeffer claims that this is the root 
of one of the most basic, pronounced, and unavoidable 
elements of the Gospel.
Already in the New Testament there is no single question put by men to Jesus which Jesus answers with an acceptance of the human either- or that every such question implies. (40)
It is the claim of the Christian faith that Christ
reunites man with God. To talk about the confrontation
between Jesus and the Pharisees embodies this claim.
The new reality is not out there somewhere? it is in
the midst of the human struggle with the ethical question.
To speak about the overcoming of the disunion of man
with God will be a meaningless, pious abstraction unless
one sees that this entails abrasive conflict with those
obsessed with the question of good and evil. When one
does see this abrasive confrontation, then the phrase
becomes a pointer, an attempt to indicate the astonishing
possibility that looms up beyond the good^and-evil barrier
It is right that B.A. Reist insists that Bonhoeffer made
clear both the need and the room for the dis-
39) B. A. Reist; The Promise of Bonhoeffer, p. 65.
40) Ethics, p. 14.
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Gussion of the world by stating the uniqueness and
41significance of Jesus Christ.
Now we must think about "Reality in Christ,"
Jesus as Christ cannot be discussed apart from the 
consequences of his coming, so the world as it really 
is cannot be discussed apart from Christ. God and the 
world are not torn asunder but must be viewed together. 
Bonhoeffer recommends man to see the truth with simplicity 
which is combined with wisdom.
It is precisely because he looks only to God, without any sidelong glance at the world, that he is able to look at the reality of the world freely and without prejudice. And that is how . simplicity becomes wisdom. The wise man is the one who sees reality as it is, and who sees into the depths of things. That is why only that man is wise who sees reality in God, (42)
For Bonhoeffer, who is committed to the conspiracy 
against Hitler's demonic power, the depths of things 
is not a mere metaphor nor the formulation. The reality 
has to do with the essential nature of things.
To understand reality is not the same as to know about outward events. It is to perceive the essential nature of things. The best informed man is not neccessarily the wisest. Indeed there is a danger that precisely in the multiplicity of his knowledge he will lose sight of what is essen­tial. But on the other hand knowledge of an apparently trivial detail quite often makes it possible to see into the depths of things. And
41) cf. B. A, Reist: The Promise of Bonhoeffer, p. 65.
42) Ethics, p. 50.
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so the wise man will seek to acquire the best possible knowledge about events, but always without becoming dependent upon this knowledge.To recognize the significant in the factual is wisdom. (43)
The wisdom that is to discern the significant in 
the midst of the factual is a Christological question 
for him. The factual must be given its due, but without 
the Christ it will fall short of the ultimate reality, 
the reality of God. The ultimate importance of the 
Christian ethic, according to Bonhoeffer, is no longer 
that one should become good, or that the condition of 
the world should be made better by one's action, but 
that the reality of God discloses itself everywhere to 
be the ultimate reality. The reality of God can be 
shown by man,,and participation in this ultimate reality 
is the gift of God in Christ to man.
In Christ we are offered the possibility of partaking in the reality of God and in the reality of the world, but not in the one without the other. ... Christian ethics enquires about the realization in our world of this divine and cosmic reality which is given in Christ. (44)
In this connection the section entitled "Christ, 
Reality and Good (Christ, the Church and the World)" 
contains very important materials. Bonhoeffer begins 
with the definition of Christian ethics. The ethical
43) Ethics, p. 50.
44) op. cit., pp.167-168
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question is no longer. "How can one be good?" or "How
can one do good.?", but it is rather "What is the will 
45of God?" It means that the ethical question pre­
supposes a decision with regard to ultimate reality 
that is a decision of faith.
But the problem of ethics at once assumes a new aspect if it becomes apparent that these realities, myself and the world, themselves lie embedded in e quite different ultimate reality, namely, the reality of God, the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer. What is of ultimate importance is now no longer that I should become good, or that the condition of the world should be made better by my action, but that the reality of God should show itself everywhere to be the ultimate reality. (46)
The reality of the world which we encounter is 
always already sustained, accepted and reconciled in 
the reality of God. This is the secret of the reve­
lation of God in the man Jesus Christ. Therefore 
what is offered to man in Christ is the ultimate 
reality in which he has a part to play. What does 
this mean?
Bonhoeffer emphasized that wisdom has to do with 
the recognition of the significant in the factual. It 
is the Christ who is in the midst of the factual that 
is the clue to this significance. This, however, makes 
sense only if the factual itself is taken with the
45) See Ethics, p. 161
46) op. cit., p. 161.
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utmost seriousness. . He was willing to make common 
cause with the positivists and empiricists whose sole 
concern is with things as they are in one very basic 
sense. It is reality that teaches what is good.
Bonhoeffer recognizes that their conception is always .
47"closer to reality" than is any idealistic attempt 
to realize the unreal. However, in saying this, he was 
careful to state the limits of the factual by itself^
It now transpires that the concept of reality which underlies the positivistic ethic is the meretricious concept of the empirically verifiable, which implies denial of the origin of this reality in the ultimate reality, in God. (48)
The Christian ethic speaks in a quite different
sense of the reality which is the origin of good. The
Christian ethic speaks of the reality of God as the
ultimate reality without and within everything that is,
and of the reality of the world as it is, which possesses
reality solely through the reality of God. The place
where the answer is given, both to the question concerning
the reality of God and the reality of the world, is
designated solely and alone by the name of Jesus Christ,
No one can speak either of God or of the world without
speaking of Christ. The conflict between what is
(Seiende) and what should be (Gesolte) is overcome and
47) Ethics, p. 166.
48) op. Cit., p. 166
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reconciled in Christ, in the ultimate reality.
Christian ethics, enquires about the realization in our world of this divine and cosmic reality which is given in Christ. This does not mean that 'our world' is something outside the divine and cosmic reality which is in Christ, or that it is not already part of the world which is sustained, accepted and reconciled in Him. It does not mean that one must still begin by applying some kind of 'principle' to our situation and our time. The enquiry is directed rather towards the way in which the reality in Christ, which for a long time already has comprised us and our world within itself, is taking effect as something now present, and towards the way in which life may be conducted in this reality. Its purpose is, therefore, participation in the reality of God and of the world in Jesus Christ today, and this participation must be such that I never experience the reality of God without the reality of the world or the reality of the world without the reality of God. (49)
Therefore the reality in Christ has to do with what
is in the midst of what exists. The reality must be
visible. Then where and how is this reality to be seen
in fact? Bonhoeffer answers this question by making his
Christology coincide with his understanding of the Church.
50As we have already seen, he develops this thought 
in the chapter entitled as "Ethics as Formation". He 
states that man becomes a real man because God became a 
real man, but it does not mean man becomes God. God 
only changes his form into the form of man, so that man 
may become man in the eyes of God. Man is recreated 
before God in Christ. Man's new form is Christ's form
4^) Ethics, pp. 167-168,
50) See Chapter III, section 1
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itself. Here attention must be paid to this phrase.
It is a mystery, for which there is no expla­nation, that only a part of mankind recognize the form of their Redeemer. The longing of the Incarnate to take form in all men is as yet still unsatisfied. He bore the form of man as a whole, and yet He can take form only in a small band. These are His Church. (51)
Bonhoeffer combines his idea of formation with his 
concept of reality using the Pauline concept of the 
Body of Christ.
The New Testament states the case profoundly and clearly when it calls the Church the Body of Christ. The body is the form. (52)
For him the Church is Christ Himself who has taken
form among men. However, since in Christ's Body man
(der Mensch) and also all mankind are taken up by Christ,
the Church may be called the Body of Christ.
The Church, then, bears the form which is in truth the proper form of all humanity. , The image in which she is formed is the image of man...The Church is nothing but a section of humanity in which Christ has really taken form..... The Church is the man in Christ, incarnate, sentenced and awakened to new life. (53)
For Bonhoeffer the Church must not be religious, 
but ethical. He states his conviction forcefully as 
follows:
In the first instance, therefore, she (Church) has essentially nothing whatever to do with the so-called religious functions of man, but with the whole man in his existence in the world with
51) Ethics, p. 63.
52) op. Cit., pp. 63-64
53) op. Cit., Pi 64.
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all its implications. What matters in the,Church is not religion but the form of Christ, and itstaking form amidst a band of men. . (54)
The Church is not a religious coînimunity of worshippers 
of Christ, Christian ethics starts from the formation of 
the Church in conformity with the form of Christ. There­
fore Christian ethics must be concrete not abstract. He 
advocates a movement towards a concrete ethic. Because 
the important thing is not what is good once and for all,
but the way in which Christ takes form among us here and
now.
The Church's responsibility is not to project sets 
of ethical ideals but proclaim the reality of God's love. 
The representative work of the Church, therefore, is not 
any self-righteously high-principled action, nor is it 
free from the poison of sin; it is relatively sinless 
responsible action participating in the work of Christ.
For the Church to refuse to participate in Christ's 
substitutionary work by responsible action would be to 
refuse to be the Church.
The incarnation of Christ which brings judgement 
and reconciliation illustrates what Bonhoeffer means by 
true secularity.
Just as.in Christ the reality of God entered into the reality of the world, so, too, is that which is Christian to be found only in that which is of the world, the 'Supernatural* only in the
54) Ethics, p. 64.
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natural, the holy only in the profane, and the revelational only in the rational. (55)
The real concept of the secular is, for Bonhoeffer,
that it shall always be seen in the movement of being
accepted and becoming accepted by God in Christ. Though
God and the world are reconciled in the incarnation of
Christ, there is still no identity between the two.
"The reason for this is that reality is first and last
5 6not lifeless? but it is the real man, the incarnate God."
This reality, that is the incarnation of the Word 
of God, determines the behaviour of the Church in the 
world. The Church in bearing witness to its reality 
in Christ finds itself to be foreign to the world. But 
this foreignness is the mission of the Church in the world.
The Church is divided from the world solely by the fact that she affirms in faith the reality of God's acceptance of man, a.reality.which is the property of the whole world. By allowing this reality to take effect within herself, she testi­fies that it is effectual for the whole world,(57)
The resurrection of Christ overcomes our sin and 
death and through this event creation has its new beginning 
Jesus Christ is the living Lord to whom all power is 
given in heaven, and on earth.
All the powers of the world are made subject to Him and must serve Him, each in its own way.The lordship of Jesus Christ is not the rule of
55) Ethics, p. 171.
56) o p c i t . , p. 198.
57) op. cit., p. 178.
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a foreign power; it is the lordship of the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, the lordship of Him through whom and for whom all created beings exist, of Him in whom indeed all created beings alone find their origin,, their goal and their essence.
(58)
Everything is in Him, through Him and for Him.
This is no mere Christianisation of the secular, but
the placing of the secular under the Lordship of Christ.
Therefore Christian ethics begins and.ends in the
Person of Christ. It is grounded in the Word of God
and the Work of Christ and finds its fulfilment in man's
participation in the substitutionary work of Christ
59through the deputyship of being for the other.
The point of departure for Christian ethics is not the reality of one's own self, or the reality of the world; nor is it the reality of standards and values. It is the reality of God as He reveals Himself in Jesus Christ. It is fair to begin by demanding assent to this proposition of anyone who wishes to concern himself with the problem of a Christian ethic. It poses the ultimate and crucial question of the reality which we mean to reckon with in our lives, whether it is to be the reality of the revelational word of God or earthly imperfections, whether it is to be resurrection or death. (60)
58) Ethics, p. 264.
59) P. F. Kohlers "The,Christocentrie Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer", Scottish Journal of Theology,. 1970, vol.23, no. 1, p. 39.
60) Ethics, pp. 162-163.
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IV. . TWO SPHERES
Bonhoeffer’s christo.centric standpoint is most
clearly shown in his discussion on "Thinking in Terms
of Two Spheres." His rejection of two spheres thinking
comes from his christological concept of reality,
"Bonhoeffer is clearly convinced that the incarnation
has restored the whole of reality under one Head and
that in Christ faith has a vision of the whole creation
as it existed before God in the beginning and as it will 
61be at the end." Therefore for Bonhoeffer the rejection 
of two spheres is not a revision of the classical 
Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms but a rejection 
of the traditional thinking of Christian ethics. It is 
one of his definite contentions in the Ethics. He begins 
with this definition.
Since the beginnings of Christian ethics after the times of the New Testament the main underlying conception in ethical thought, and ____ the one which consciously or unconsciously has determined its whole course, has been the conception of a juxtaposition and conflict of two spheres, the one divine, holy, supernatural and Christian, and the other worldly, pfofane, natural and un- Christian. (62)
He disagrees with such a thought in his conviction 
that God became man. He accepted man in Christ and
61) J. Moltmann: "The Lordship of Christ and Human Society" in Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer,
p. 61.
62) Ethics, p.168.
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thereby He reconciled the world of man with God. He in­
sists that the origin of action which accords with reality 
is the incarnate God, Jesus who has accepted, loved, 
condemned and reconciled man and the world. This christ- 
logical vision of the- reconciliation of God and the world 
denies all dualistic systems. According to the thinking 
of conflict of two spheres, "reality as a whole now falls
into two parts, and the concern of ethics is with the
63proper relation of these two parts to each other."
However this effort is in vain, because it turns on 
the false assumption "that there are realities which lie 
outside the reality that is in C h r i s t . H e  explains 
and criticizes the misunderstanding in history.
In the scholastic scheme of things the realm of the natural is made subordinate to the realm of grace; in the pseudo-Lutheran scheme the autonz omy of the orders of this world is proclaimed in opposition to the law of Christ; and in the scheme of the Enthusiasts the congregation of the Elect takes up the struggle with a hostile world for the establishment of God's kingdom on earth. In all these schemes the cause of Christ becomes a partial and provincial matter within the limits of reality. (65)
In all these instances realities are dealt with 
without reference to the reconciliation of God and the 
world in Christ. In every case the unity and wholeness 
of reality thus restored are neglected and not achieved.
63) Ethics, p. 168.
64) op.
65) op.
cit., P. 169.
cit., pp. 168-169.
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Christian ethics, for Bonhoeffer, starts from the one 
reality of the whole reality. This unity is not a unity 
as a matter of principle as in the idealistic systems, 
but of the reconciliation of God and the world in the 
person of Christ.
It consists in Him as the one who acts in the responsibility of deputyship, as the God who for love of man has become man. (66)
. Here the thought that "reality is first and last 
the real man, the incarnate Jesus Christ" must be re­
membered. Christ is the man who bears the reality in 
Himself, Bonhoeffer's thinking is based on such an 
understanding of Jesus Christ,
Jesus Christ does not confront reality as one who is alien to it, but it is He who alone has borne and experienced the essence of the real in His own body, who has spoken from the standpoint' of reality as no man on earth can do, who alone has fallen victim to no ideology, but who is the truly real one, who has borne within Himself and fulfilled the essence of history, and in whom the law of the life of history is embodied. He is the real one, the origin, essence and goal of all that is real, and for that reason He is Himself the Lord and the Law of the real. Consequently the word of Jesus Christ is the interpretation, of His existence, and it is therefore the interpretation of that reality in which history attains to its fulfilment. The words of Jesus are the divine commandment for responsible action in history in so far as this history is the reality of history as it is fulfilled in Christ, the responsibility for man as it is fulfilled in Christ, alone. (67)
66) Ethics, pp. 201-202.
67) op. cit., pp, 199-200.
172
Consequently he can state plainly that Christian
ethics enquires about the realization in our world of
this divine and cosmic reality which is given in Christ.
In other words our problem is participation in the
reality of God and of the world in Jesus Christ today.
With this conviction he insists that the thought
of two spheres results only in the illusion of the
wrong dilemma.
So long as Christ and the world are conceived as two opposing and mutually repellent spheres, man will be left in the following dilemma: he abandons reality as a whole, and places himself in one Or other of the two spheres. He seeks Christ without the world, or he seeks the world without Christ. (68)
In either case he must deceive himself, and if he
tries to stand in both spaces at once he inevitably .
falls into an endless conflict.
The heart of the fallacy of two-spheres thinking
is to regard such pairs as an ultimate static antagonism,
The two spheres of thought set up such static antitheses
as secular and Christian, natural and supernatural,
profane and sacred, rational and revelational. But
Bonhoeffer points out that these opposites have already
united originally in the reality of Christ. They do not
69exist "in themselves" and "on their own account", but
68) Ethics, p. 169.
69) op. cit., p. 170.
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they have their reality nowhere save in Christ. He 
speaks of the real concept of the secular. It will 
always be seen in the movement of being accepted and 
becoming accepted by God in Christ. His original word 
"weltlich" means "worldly" rather than "secular". It 
is different from so-called secularism which is often 
used as a negative connotation, and it has to do with 
the fact that that which is Christian can be found only 
in the world. It was Bonhoeffer*s conviction that as 
Jesus, who is the reality of God, entered into the 
reality of the world in the form of the Christ, so, too, 
is that which is Christian to be found only in that 
which is of the world. And if so the tension between 
Christ, and therefore the Christian, on the one hand, 
and the world, on the other, must be discerned in the 
midst of the world itself. It is the tension between 
the reality of Christ and the reality of the world apart 
from Christ.
As already mentioned, however, Bonhoeffer does not 
identify the Christian with the world, the natural with 
the supernatural and the revelational with the rational. 
The discussion of this relation is one of his most im­
portant contributions to the theological work of the 
present day.
Luther was protesting against a Christianity which was striving for independence and detaching itself from the reality in Christ. He protested with the help of the secular and in the name of a better Christianity. So, too, today, when
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Christianity is employed as a polemical weapon against the secular, this must be. done in the name of a better secularity (Weltiichke'lt) and above all it must not lead back to a static predominance of the spiritual sphere.as an{end: in itself. It is only in this sense, as a polemical unity, that Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms is to be accepted, and it was no doubt in this sense that it was originally intended. (70)
The problem of the "better worldliness"*— perhaps 
a better translation than "better secularity"— is that 
it supplants the question of how two spheres are to be 
related. It means that there is no real possibility of 
being a Christian (Christsein) outside the reality of 
the world and that there is no real worldly (Weltlieh- 
keit) existence outside the reality of Jesus Christ. 
Bonhoeffer's concern is always the living reality. The 
faith in the revelation of the ultimate reality in 
Jesus Christ invalidates two sphere thinking.
Then he picks up the problem of Church and the world, 
He recognizes that the New Testament contains statements 
about the Church as a space. The Church should not be 
reduced to the status of a purely spiritual force, for 
it is essential to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ 
that the Church occupies space within the world. If this 
is not so it cannot be real. Then how to understand this 
space without relapsing into two-sphere thought is a 
problem, and a complicated one.
70) Ethics, pp. 171-172.
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The space of. the Church is not there in order to try ,to deprive the world of a piece of its territory, but precisely in order to prove to the world that it is still the world, the world which is loved by God and reconciled with Him.(71)
However, on the other hand, the New Testament 
declares that this world belongs to the Body of Christ.
It is implicit in the New Testament statement concerning the incarnation of God in Christ that all men are taken up, enclosed and borne within the Body of Christ and that this is just what the congregation of the faithful are to make known to the world by their words and by their lives.(72)
God and the world became one in Christ. Neverthe­
less the difference must not be overlooked.
Although the Church and the world are different from each other, yet there cannot be a static, spatial borderline between them. The question now is how one is to conceive this distinction between Church and world without relapsing into these spatial terms. (73)
The community of the faithful must be, and it must 
have space, or the faith is denied. But there cannot be 
a spatial borderline between it and the world, unless one 
is thinking about two spheres.
He rejects any notion of a static borderline 
between Church and the world. Hé tries tovsolve this 
complicated relation by using the term dynamic frontier.
71) Ethics, p. 174.
72) OpV cit., p. 178.
73) op. cit., p. 178.
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She (the Church) asks for no more space than she needs for the purpose of serving the world by bearing witness to Jesus Christ and to the re­conciliation of the world with God through Him.
(74)
If one wishes to speak, then, of the space or sphere of the Church, one must bear in mind that the confines of this space are at every moment being overrun and broken down by the testimony of the Church to Jesus Christ, And this means that all mistaken thinking in terms of spheres must be excluded, since it is deleterious to the proper understanding of the Church. (75)
It is with the dynamics of this frontier, not with 
mere metaphors, that Bonhoeffer intends to replace the 
two spheres thinking.
In this connection an examination of his thinking 
about State and Church which he dealt with in Part Two 
of the Ethics is helpful to make clearer his under­
standing of this problem.
His basic attitudes may be expressed by saying that 
Church and State are two forms of the kingdom in a kind 
of dialectical relationship with each other.. Each has 
its own distinctive task given to it by God. Neither is 
subject to the other nor master of the other, but both 
are called to serve obediently the God who is the lord 
of both Church and State, as the two forms of the kingdom 
of God, mutually witnessing to each other and limiting
74) Ethics, p. 174.
7 5) op, cit., p. 17 5.
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each other in the life of the world. The Church has two 
basic tasks in the world : . To proclaim the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ, and to remind the state of. its responsi­
bility to preserve order in the world. When the state 
oversteps its proper bounds, the Church must call it once 
again to a recognition of its limits. He maintains this 
conception in his earlier writings.
However, when the Nazi regime was consolidating its 
control over German life and thought, during the middle 
thirties, he did not mention the state as a form of the 
kingdom of God in the world. The reason or background 
for this change is easily understood. Some of the so- 
called German Christians were eager to reconcile the 
Christian faith with the Nazi programme at that time. 
Naturally they were stressing the divinely given authority 
of the state and its independence from the Church, 
Bonhoeffer disagreed with such theological justification 
of Naziism. Naziism with its demonic power has already 
run away beyond the legitimate limitation. So the 
attempt to speak a political word to the State had 
already proved vain.
In the Ethics he reiterates the rejection of both 
other worldliness and this-worldly kingdom building.
He also insists they must neither be mixed together nor 
torn apart. He begins as follows:
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In using the term 'church', and especially in clarifying its relation to thé terms 'govern­ment' and 'state', we have to distinguish between the spiritual office or ministry and the congre­gation or the Christians. The spiritual office is the divinely ordained authority to exercise spiritual dominion by divine right. It does not proceed from the congregation, but from God. A clear distinction must be drawn between the secular and the spiritual authority, but the Christians are, nevertheless, at the same time citizens, and the citizens, whether they be believ­ers or not, are at the same time subject to the claim of Jesus Christ, Consequently the relation^ ship of the spiritual office to the government , , differs from that of the Christians. In order to avoid constant misunderstandings this difference should be kept clearly in view. (7 6) j
In the section "The Basis of Government", two sources !■i
are considered. One is in the nature of man which was j
iadvocated by Aristotle, the other is in the notion of !
sin which was put forward by the Reformers. The former j
insists the state is the supreme consummation of the 
rational character of men, and to serve it is the supreme 
purpose of human life. The latter places the origin of ;
the state as government in the Fall. The government is :
considered as the power to protect man against the chaos j
which is caused by sin, by using the sword which is given ;
by God. .:
Bonhoeffer, however, does not take these theories.
He thinks the basis of government is in Christ, There 
is no other basis than Jesus Christ. It is through Jesus 
Christ and for Jesus Christ that all things are created
76) Ethics. pp. 297-298.
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(John 1:3; I Cor. 8:6; Heb. 1:2), and in particular
"thrones, dominions, principalities and powers" (Col.
1:16). It isi only in Jesus Christ that all things
"consist" (Col, 1:17). And it is He who is "the head
of the Church" (Col. 1:1). It is throughly christo-
centric. Explanations on the relation between Jesus
Christ and government, under seven headings, are given 
77in the Ethics. The derivations from nature and the 
sin of man are consequent on the derivations in terms 
of natural law. The only way to supersede them is the 
derivation of government from Jesus Christ,
He recognizes the divine character of government 
in its being, in its task and in its claim. Govern­
ment is given to us as a reality and as something which 
'is' ((XL 8e oSoai Rom. 13:1). It has its existence in 
Jesus Christ, and through the cross of Christ it is 
reconciled with God, Therefore it is linked with a 
divine commission. The task of government consists 
in serving the dominion of Christ on earth by punish­
ing the wicked and praising the good or "them that 
do well" (I Pet. 2:14). For this task the government 
is required to observe the second table of the Ten 
Commandments, As far as its claim is concerned, 
Bonhoeffer understands that the claim, of government,
77) See Ethics, pp. 301-303.
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which is based on its power and its mission, is the claim 
of God and is binding, upon conscience. The duty of 
obedience is binding on the Christian until a government 
directly compels him to offend against the divine com­
mandment, that is to say, until a government openly denies 
its divine commission and therby forfeits its claim. So. 
when à government violates or exceeds its commission at 
any point, the Christian’s obedience is to be refused 
for conscience's sake, for the Lord's sake.
He understands positively that government has the
divine task of preserving the world, with its institutions
78which are given by God, for the purpose of Christ.
Here his characteristic notion of the divine mandates 
shoule be remembered. Government is not a creator but 
a maintainer of God's creation. For example, marriage 
and labour have their origin in God, and government must 
acknowledge and preserve them.
The connection between Church and government is 
defined in this way. Government is instituted to serve 
Christ, Christ is the Lord of government and at the 
same time the Lord of the Church. Government serves 
Christ, also indirectly the Church, in the exercise of 
its commission to secure an outward justice by the 
power of the sword. Through this service towards Christ,
78) See Ethics, p. 308.
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government is ultimately linked with the Church.
Government does not stand as a second authority 
side by side with the authority of Christ, but its own 
authority is only a form of the authority of Christ.
As a citizen the Christian does not cease to be a 
Christian, but he serves Christ and obeys Christ. On 
the other hand, the Church has the task of summoning 
the whole world to submit to the dominion of Jesus 
Christ. Since she knows that it is in obedience to 
Jesus Christ that the commission of government is pro­
perly executed, she testifies to government as to their 
common Master.
Then the problem has to be considered, whether 
government makes a religious decision, or whether its 
task lies in religious neutrality. The office of 
government must remain independent, of the religious 
decision, but it pertains to the responsibility of it 
to support the practice of religion.
Government will fulfil its obligation under the first commandment by being government in the rightful manner and by discharging its govern­mental responsibility also with respect to the Church. But it does not possess the office of confessing and preaching faith in Jesus Christ.(79)
The Church has political responsibility. He 
distinguishes between the responsibility of the
79) Ethics, p. 313
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spiritual office and the responsibility of each Christian, 
The Church has an office of guardianship to name sin as 
sin and warn people against sin. As far as a political 
responsibility of. the individual Christian is concerned, 
the author insists that because of his faith and his 
charity he is responsible for his own calling and for 
the sphere of his own personal life. Every individual 
must fulfill his office and mission in the polis and 
through it, in the true sense, he serves government with „ 
his responsibility.
The problem of State and Church was, needless to 
say, a very urgent one for himself. He pursued the 
conspiracy against Naziism, and lived in the midst of 
this question. Some people criticize Bonhoeffer on the 
grounds that he overleapt the Christian limitation by 
engaging in a political resistance movement. However, 
it was his conviction that the individual Christian can­
not be made responsible for the action of government, 
and he must not make himself responsible for it, but 
that by responding to his own calling and fulfilling his 
responsibility in faith he can have.an effect in the 
whole of the community.
Thus he concludes the discussion.
Government and Church are connected in such various ways that their relationship cannot be regulated in accordance with any single general principle. ... No constitutional form can as such exactly represent the actual relative closeness and
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remoteness of government and Church. Government and Church are bound by the same Lord and are bound together. , In their task government and Church are separate, but government and Church have the same field of action, man. No single one of these relationships must be isolated so as to provide the basis for a particular con­stitutional form (for example in the sequence state church, free church, national church); the true aim is to provide room within every given form for the relationship which is, in fact, instituted by God and to entrust the further development to the Lord of both gov-‘ ernment and Church. (80)
V. MANDATES
The concepts of mandates is one of the unique and 
important thoughts in the Ethics. As is well known 
Bonhoeffer deals with the idea of the mandates twice.
In chapter five "Christ, Reality and Good", he begins 
with the christological unity of reality. In chapter 
seven "The 'ethical' and the 'Christian' as a Theme", 
he starts with an inquiry into the factors that make 
ethical language possible and the translation of the law 
into concrete action.
It is correct to understand this conception in the 
line of his,searching for a better worldliness, Bonhoeffer 
sought to permeate the whole understanding of the 
structure of life in the world with the same dynamic that
80) Ethics, p. 315
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informed his refusal to think in terms of two spheres.
Thus he developed the concept of mandates,
The world is created through Christ and unto Christ 
whether it knows it or not. The world's relation to 
Christ takes concrete form in a number of divine mandates 
in which certain basic relationships and spheres of life 
are shaped and defined.
The world is relative to Christ, no matter whether it knows it or not. This relativeness of the world to Christ assumes concrete form in certain mandates of God in the world. The Scriptures name four such mandates: labour,marriage, government and the Church. We speak of divine mandates rather than of divine orders because the word mandate refers more clearly to a divinely imposed task rather than to a deter­mination of being. (81)
In the section entitled "The Concept of the Mandate", 
Bonhoeffer examines the traditional concepts such as 
"institution", "estate", and "office". He, however, 
decides to drop these words because of the historical 
misconceptions associated with them. He frankly says,
"for lack of a better word, therefore, we will for the 
time being retain the term 'mandate', but it is still
81) Ethics, p. 179. In the Ethics, p. 252, he sub­stitutes ^culture' for 'labour' . In Letters and Papers from Prison (pp.193ff.), he reflects of how the 'area o freedom (art, education, friendship, play):' is to be brought within the system of the four mandates. He attempts to bring this sphere of reality not under the mandate of 'labour', but under the mandate of 'Church', or alternatively to establish the concept of a fifth mandate. However, Bonhoeffer never speaks of five mandates, but invariably of only four.
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our purpose, by dint of. clarifying the concept itself,
to help to renew and restore the old notion of the
8 2institution, the estate and the office." Here he
is on very traditional ground, and his move beyond the 
limits of his heritage is subtle. However it must be 
noticed that by the choice of the term "mandate" instead 
of "order" he means to indicate their character as divine 
institutions rather than self-determined entities.
By the term 'mandate* we understand the con­crete divine commission which has its foundation in the revelation of Christ and which is evidenced by Scripture; it is the legitimation and warrant for the execution of a definite divine commandment, the conferment of divine authority on an earthly agent. The terra 'mandate' must also be taken to imply the claiming, the seizure and the formation of a definite earthly domain by the divine com­mandment. The bearer of the mandate acts as a deputy in the place of Him who assigns him his commission. (83)
Therefore the mandates are not norms, but rather 
spheres of responsibility. In them the formation of 
Christ is to take place in the sphere of everyday. The 
mandates are not simply something like ordinances for 
life, built into creation as such. They have a genuine 
relation to the event of salvation. In them the way is 
to be prepared for men to come to Christ, and for Christ 
to come to men. The mandates, thus, are aspects of the
82) Ethics, p. 254.
83) op. cit., p. 254.
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mission of Christians to the world and for this reason
viewpoints for a concrete ethic from the perspective of
84the Church of Jesus Christ in this world. The basic 
character of the doctrine of the mandates is Christo- 
centric ,
It is God’s will that there shall be labour, marriage, government and church in the world; and it is His will that all these, each in its own way, shall be through Christ, directed towards Christ, and in Christ. (8 5)
When Bonhoeffer wrote these sentences, the time of 
the Third Reich, there was the controversy over the 
ideological glorification of race and nationality. In 
that controversy the principle of national law was 
invoked to justify and support the claims of the so- 
called German Christian. National law, for them, was 
the most important of all the institutions of creation. 
Against this perversion of the doctrine of the insti­
tutions, he uses the concept of the mandates and presags 
towards the God who lives and commands and who is revealed 
solely in the dominion of Christ. He insists that the 
divine mandates are introduced into the world from above 
as orders of Christ’s reality, that is to say, of the 
reality of the love of God for the world and men which 
is revealed in Jesus Christ.
It is also clear that with this doctrine of mandates
84) H. Ott: Reality and Faith, the Theological Legacy of Dietrich Bdnhdeffer,
85) Ethics, p. 179.
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he seeks to reformulate the Lutheran doctrine of the 
three estates, oeconomicus, politicus, and hierarchicus.
The three ’primary institutions' of social life in Christendom, viz., marriage, the state and the church, or alternatively family and economics, state and church, are founded by God. Even man can see how God has so ordered them that they correspond to nature. For they were created together with man.They provide the sphere where man may serve God in the world. They are what Luther called ’the three primary powers to help us in resisting the devil.’ ... The three institutions to which we have reference are the Church, the state, and the economy. Two of them, it will be noted, are secular powers, viz., the state and the economy. The ’secular state’ in the hierarchical structure of the corpus christianum (in Catholic doctrine) is not left to itself on principle or made subject to the 'clerical estate’ as a mere object of education.On the contrary, their whole life is directly subject to the word of God. (8 6)
Bonhoeffer endeavours to refurbish such a teaching. 
The doctrine of the mandates works better than any the­
ology of orders.
The mandates are dependent solely on the command­
ment of God, and these four mandates are in conjunction, 
in combination, and in opposition with one another.
Each mandate is bounded on two sides; by the eschato- 
logical reign of Christ, so far as its existence and 
function is concerned, and by the other mandates in 
regard to its limits. No single one of them is sufficient 
in itself or can claim to replace all the others.
86) E. Wolf: Peregrinatio, 1954, pp. 232ff. Quoted by J . Moltmann; Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, p. 74.
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87Each mandate is, as. it were, answerable to God alone.
It is the character of the mandates that all men are
subject to all four of the mandates.
He(God) has not merely imposed one of these mandates on each individual, but.. He has imposed all four on all men. This means that there can be no retreating from a 'secular': into a 'spir­itual' sphere. There can be only ; the practice, the learning, of the Christian life under these four mandates of God. (88)
Each individual obeys God in each of the mandates.
Through this the mandates serve "to confront man with
the one and entire reality which is manifested to us
in Jesus Christ. Thus here again all the lines converge
in the reality of the body of Jesus Christ, in which
89God and man became one."
It is the task of the mandates that is the clue 
to their being, not the reverse, and these tasks are 
meaningful only as the commands of God.
Then who are the bearers of the mandates? As the 
commandment comes down from above, the bearers of the 
mandates receive.their commission from God. Therefore 
they become the bearers as deputies of God and repre­
sentatives of God. This vertical relationship plays 
a major role in Bonhoeffer's thinking, not least in
87) See K. Barths Church Dogmatics, IIÏ/4, pp. 29f.
88) Ethics, p. 179,
89) op. cit., p. 183,
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the doctrine of the mandates and of the authorization 
of the bearers of the mandates. They are antitypes of 
the dominion of Christ on earth. This relation is 
explained concretely as follows.
The father acts for the children, working for them, caring for them, interceding, fighting and suffering for them. Thus in a real sense he is their deputy. He is not an isolated individual, but he combined in himself the selves of a number of human beings. (90)
This opens up new applications for those christo­
logical structures of deputyship derived from sanctorum 
communio, namely, social relationship and being for 
others. The concrete acceptance of deputyship and 
responsibility for the neighbour is obedience under the 
divine mandates. That creates those irreversible 
inter-human relationships within the mandates: Christ
and humanity, church and world, father and child, 
government and citizens, man and things. The life of 
obedience within the mandates means being for others 
in discipleship to Christ. The imperative structure 
of the mandates thus rests upon the indicative struc­
ture of deputyship, whether the latter is already ■ 
present or still to be achieved.
The task and basis of the mandates in relation to 
Christ are specifically as follows.
90) Ethics, p. 194.
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Labour. For Bonhoeffer the mandate of labour includes
property, culture, and society. It has a supra-lapsarian
basis in the biblical command 'to dress it and keep it'
(Qen. 2:15). Even after the fall it still has the
mission of participating creatively in "the glorification
91and service of Jesus Christ." Labour deals, with man's 
integration into the creative dominion of God, a creation 
of things, values, and relationships based on the world 
God has created. Of course this is not a creation out 
of nothing, like God's creation, but man can join a 
making of new things on the basis of God's creation.
No man can evade this mandate.
Through the divine mandate of labour there is to come into being a world which, knowingly or not, is waiting for Christ, is designed for Christ, is open to Christ, serves Him and glorifies Him. (92)
However the fact that the bearer of this mandate 
is the race of Cain casts the dark shadow over all 
human labour. Yet for the believer there is an analogy, 
a reminder and foretaste of the original and eschato- 
logical final being in,the world before God. Thus 
labour has a mission in the realm of the penultimate, 
preparing the way for the ultimate, the entrance of 
Christ.
91) Ethics, p. 180
92) op. cit., p. 181.
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Marriage. The mandate of marriage includes both marriage
and family and has the same supra-lapsarian basis. In
marriage, man is integrated into the creative dominion
of God through the procreation and education of children.
"Man enters into the will of the Creator in sharing in the
93process of creation." The believer discerns an analogy
94with the "marriage between Christ and his Church^» 
Marriage and family life provide an eminent example of 
life in deputyship.
Government. The mandate of government presupposes the 
divine mandates of labour and marriage. Government 
itself cannot produce either life or values. The 
government finds its mandates already in the world for 
whose order, protection, and rule it is responsible, 
and is itself dependent upon them. Government serves 
to protect labour in society and culture, and to protect 
marriage and family. Bonhoeffer prefers to speak of 
government rather than of the state, because it expresses 
more clearly its commission from above. Government is 
designed to watch over life and protect it, and is thus 
designed for deputyship.
The relatively best form of government in his opinion
93) Ethics, p. 181.
94) cf. K. Barth: Church Dogmatics, III/4, p. 49.
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Is properly, understood divine right of government. 
According to his understanding Hitler and the power of 
Naziism was the negative example of a leader who came 
to power from below not from above. Any attempt to 
justify government from natural law or preservation 
must be rejected, because government or authority in 
the world is grounded in Christ. Government is not a 
creator, therefore it must never take the initiative 
in affairs of labour, science, culture, or marriage.
It is the task of government to maintain created things 
in their proper order.
By the establishment of law and by the force of the sword the governing authority preserves the world for the reality of Jesus Christ. (95)
It must be noted again that government is independ­
ent from the religious decision. Where it regards itself 
as limited by the other mandates, government respects 
them and fulfills its own task faithfully. The Christian 
is obedient to Christ in his obedience to government. 
Likewise the government fulfills its task in the sphere 
of the penultimate in the service to Christ.
Church. The mandate of the Church is to proclaim the 
revelation of God in Christ who is incarnate, crucified
95) Ethics, p. 182
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and exalted. This mandate "is concerned, therefore, 
with the eternal salvation of the whole world.
This mandate is the task of enabling the reality of 
Jesus Christ to become real and so it extends to all 
mankind and within all the other mandates. The Church 
proclaims reality as it is in.Christ to the world.
The cross of atonement is the setting free for life before God in the midst of the godless world; it is the setting free for life in genuine worldliness. (97)
The reign of Christ thus proclaimed by the Church 
does not mean the lordship of the Church over the natural, 
worldly institutions. Since the Church is also one 
mandate among others, Bonhoeffer differentiates the 
Church's universal proclamation of the Gospel from the 
law of the Church as a social community, and as a public 
body with a life of its own, distinct from secular 
institutions. The Church's proclamation of the word of 
God by the virtue of the mandate dominates and rules 
the entire world. However the Church does not dominate 
the world but serves, thus entirely fulfilling its divine 
mandate. The congregation serves the mandate laid upon 
it in a twofold manner, in the double relationship of 
deputyship.
96) Ethics, p. ,182.
97) op. cit., pp. 262-263
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The Christian congregation.stands at the point at which the whole world ought to be standing; to this extent it serves as deputy for the world and exists for the sake of the world. On the other hand, the world achieves its own fulfilment at the point at which the congregation stands. The earth is the ’new creation’, the ’new creature’, the goal of the ways of God on earth. The congregation stands in this twofold relation of deputyship entirely in the fellowhip and disciplehobd of its Lord, who was Christ precisely in this, that He existed not for His own sake, but whol­ly for the sake of the world. (98)
As already mentioned, the conception of mandates 
should be considered in the light of the derivation of 
the question about a better worldliness. But at the 
same time, it must be understood in relation to the 
comprehension of the commandment of God. The basic 
character of the commandment is not order but permission. 
The commandment of God, first of all, permits us to live 
before God and guides us. The understanding of the com­
mandment is expressed as follows.
The commandment of God becomes the element in which one lives without always being conscious of it, and, thus it implies freedom of movement and of action, freedom from the fear.of decision, freedom from fear to act, it implies certainty, quietude, confidence, balance and peace. I honour my parents, I am.faithful in marriage, I respect the lives and property of others, not because at the frontiers of my life there is a threatening ’thou shalt not’, but because I accept as holy institution of God these realities, parents, mar­riage, life and property, which confront me in the midst and in the fulness of life. (99)
98) ■ Ethics, p. 266.
99) op. cit., p. 247
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These are the fundamental motifs of his thought 
of the divine mandates.
Let us conclude this chapter by looking at the 
critical appreciation of Karl Barth on Bonhoeffer's 
doctrine of the m a n d a t e s . B a r t h  regards Bonhoeffer’s 
doctrine as an important step forwards from the the­
ologies of the order of creation and of natural law, 
and considers it a.more helpful development than the 
thought of Althaus and Brunner. This is because of 
its christological and biblical foundations. He says 
"what is involved in the constancy of ethical events 
must also be learned only from the Word of God if a 
formed reference to it is to the legitimate and meaning­
ful.
However Barth is critical of Bonhoeffer’s particular 
selection (it is too restricted) and of the all-pervasive
hierarchical structure which he gives them. He mentions
• ^  102 these points.
1) The arbitrary selection of the mandates, It 
is not always clear what the Biblical justification 
for them is.
100) K, Barth: Church Dogmatics, IIÏ/4, pp. 21ff.
101) op. cit., p. 22.
102) See J. Moltmann; Two Studies in the Theology ofBonhoeffer, p. 93,
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2) His onesided analysis of them as involving 
"the authority, of some over others" in which any idea 
of the freedom of the inferior vis a vis superior 
personages is conspicuous by its absence.
3) The definition of constants in human relation­
ships as "mandates" which are hardly distinguishable 
from "command". He raises a question as follows.
Is it not the case that the reference to their relationships as such does not necessarily have the character of an imperative, and therefore in the strict sense of a mandate, but that it must become an imperative, a concrete command or mandate, in the power of the divine command itself, in the ethical event? (103)
In the Ethics Bonhoeffer had advanced beyond the 
theory of the order of creation, but he is still some­
what confined within the thought forms of that doctrine. 
On the contrary, the issue at stake for Barth is "that 
which the Word of God tells us at this point we are 
merely referred to certain constant relationships as 
such,"^^^ which does not have the character of an 
imperative.
Bonhoeffer, however, may raise a question like
this. Do not their neighbourly relationships regain
their original function in the light of the world and
105faith as "definite historical forms" of the domains
103) K. Barth: Church Dogmatics, III/4, p. 22.
104) op^ cit., III/4, p. 22.
105) Ethics, p. 245.
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of Christ in the commandment? He writes "the concreteness 
of the divine commandment consists in its historicity; 
it confronts us in a historical f o r m . H e  answers 
the inevitable question, that is, where and in what 
historical form God makes His commandment known, as 
follows.
For the sake of simplicity and clarity, and even at the risk of a direct misunderstanding, we will begin by answering this question in the form of a thesis. God’s commandment, which is mani­fested in Jesus Christ, comes to us in the Church, in the family, in labour and in government. (107)
This is the reason why he uses the concept of the 
"mandates". To demonstrate the structures of christo­
logical unity in reality was his concern. Therefore 
the question is not what these relationships are in 
themselves, but what they have to say and what is to 
be said through them in connection with the ethical 
event of the world.
He realizes the limitations of the doctrine of the 
mandates. For lack of a better word, even at the risk 
of a direct misunderstanding, he uses the term "mandate". 
The discussion sometimes, for example "Vocation as the 
Place of Responsibility" ends in a dilemma. There is 
always the possibility of conflict between concrete
106) Ethics, p. 245.
107) op. cit., p. 245
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historical vocation and the accompanying perception of 
responsibility, on the one hand, and the limits drawn, 
on the other, by the law of God as revealed in the Dec­
alogue, and by the historical forms of the mandates of 
marriage, labour, government and Church.
It is precisely responsible action which will not separate this law.from its Giver.It is only as the Redeemer in Jesus Christ that responsible action will be able to recognize the God who holds the world in order by His law; it will recognize Jesus Christ as the ultimate reality towards which it is responsible, and it is precisely by Him that it will be set free from the law for the responsible deed. (108)
The negative rigidity which was criticised by Barth
might be removed by integrating them into the living
history of God.
It cannot be denied that Bonhoeffer's attitude to
government and authority is rather conservative. The
question by Barth; "Is the notion of the authority of
some over others really more characteristic of the ethical
event than that of the freedom of even the very lowest
109before the very highest?" seems to have an adequacy.
Bonhoef fer, however', seems to have no intention of
sanctioning the status quo in power structures. In
110fact, the mandate corrects and coordinates them.
108) Ethics, p. 229.
109) K. Barths Chhrch Dogmatics, III/4, p. 22
110) cf. Ethics, pp. 255ff,
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He is convinced that the mandates are blessed with 
mission and promise. He is not concerned to demonstrate 
the relationship between the mandates for their own sake, 
He tries to prove the unity of God and the world, and to 
incorporate them into, the dominion of Christ with obedi­
ence in faith. It is correct to say "the mandates lead
him to accept institutions as tasks to be given shape by
111concrete decisions."
The mandates exist only for the sake and purpose of 
Christ. It is the endeavour of Bonhoeffer who lived in 
the midst of the conflict of the world to understand 
christologically the whole reality of the wolrd.
Ill) Ernst Wo.lfj "Trinitarische odef christologische Begruendung des Rechts?" in Recht und Institution, Glaube und ForschUng, 9, (Witten, 1 956), p., 27.By J. Weissbach: Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, p. 14BT
CHAPTER FOUR
EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE OF BONHOEFFER'S 
ETHICS
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Now our task is to evaluate Bonhoeffer's Ethics
and also try to discern its limitations. As Hanfried
Mueller once said at the Bonhoeffer-Tagung in Berlin,
"anyone who has anything to do with Dietrich Bonhoeffer
today realizes again and again the amazing extent to
which he provides answers to questions that only now,
some twenty years later, begin to raise their heads.
He anticipated solutions for problems we are only now
1beginning to recognize as our problems."
The same words could be still used now, some thirty , 
years later. As can be seen repeatedly, though the 
works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer are fragmentary and un­
finished, his heritage is alive in the present time and 
the world of today.
For example, a recent issue of Observer Magazine 
published a special article on Christianity, under the 
title of "Churches in Ferment", and referred to 
Bonhoeffer at length. The author says, "the intellectual 
backbone of non-traditional Christianity has arisen 
largely through the work of such German Protestant theo­
logians as Paul Tillich, Rudolf Bultmann and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer. ... Bonhoeffer is a particularly interesting 
figure. He was probably the first Christian theologian
1) Hanfried Mueller: "Concerning the Reception and Interpretation of Dietrich Bonhoeffer". World Come of Age, ed. by R. G. Smith, p. 182.
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to be martyred at pagan hands since the days of the
primitive church. His influence and reputation seems
2to spread ever wider."
It may be suitable to begin our survey by clarify­
ing the position of Bonhoeffer’s ethics through an 
examination of opposing conceptions. In the old edition 
of the Ethics, the first chapter (which is now the third 
chapter in the newly-arranged edition) began with this 
presupposition; "Rarely perhaps has any generation shown 
so little interest as ours does in any kind of theoretical 
or systematic ethics. The.academic question of a system 
of ethics seems to be of all questions the most super­
fluous .
When he made this critical observation, what kind
4of theoretical or systematic ethics had he in mind?
First of all, the massive Thomistic moral theology 
of Roman Catholicism should be recalled. This ethics 
is rooted in ontology. The activity of the creature 
is the unfolding of its being and participation in the 
creative activity of God. For man, freedom is the 
source of his ethical responsibility, "Moral action
2) Colin Cross; "Churches in Ferment", Observer Magazine,17th November, 1974, p. 34.
3) Ethics, p. 46.
4) This part I owe much to the discussion which G. W, Forell presented in the article of "Realized Faith, the Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer". The Place of Bonhoeffer, pp. 199-212.
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is the personal, reasonable, free action of man (material
5object) measured by: the moral standard (formal object)." 
Man has access to the good life by way. of reason and 
conscience.
Conscience is essentially the judgement of practi­
cal reason concerning the morality of one's own action. 
Though all values are rooted in God there need be no 
explicit understanding of this connection in order to 
perceive the reality and the obligatory character of 
ethics.
The possibility of such (natural-moral good action) derives from everything that has been said as being basic for morality especially from the fact of conscience and free will. (6)
Consequently in Catholic thinking, ethics is an 
improvement through grace of the good moral life essen­
tially possible for all men. Ethics is practicable 
because of the ontological connection between God and 
man. The basic structure of its ethical thought is as 
follows: God is the creator and man the creature, all 
men are created for the good life. The task of moral 
theology is to help reason to be truly reasonable and 
to sharpen the conscience. God gives supernatural
5) Mausbach-Ermecke: Katholische Moraltheologie, Muenster, Aschendorf sche' Ver1agbuchhand1ung , TF59, I, p. 65.
6) op. cit., I, p. 281,
204
grace to those who believe in Him.
7As I have mentioned already, it cannot be 
denied that there were two opposing tendencies among 
the Protestant Churches. The Reformation slogan "sola 
fide" fought against the doctrine of merit which leaves 
a place for human works to attain salvation. Strong 
emphasis on man's salvation by faith alone, only through 
God's grace, has played a very significant role both 
historically and theologically. It is really a redis­
covery of the truth of Gospel. However, when we trace 
the later history of Protestantism, this reformation 
doctrine has been misunderstood and, as a result, there 
has been a certain tendency to neglect man's act, leaving 
open the danger of libertinism and anti-nomianism. At 
the same time, strangely enough, as a re-action against 
this tendency some people have emphasized work for the 
glory of God one-sidedly, leaving open the danger of 
ethical legalism. This confusion creates a separation 
of dogmatics from ethics and at the same time an abstract, 
theoretical, not realistic or concrete character in 
Protestant ethics.
This attitude can be seen in so-called Neo-Protes­
tantism. Its ethical thought resembles Thomistic moral 
theology. For example, one of the typical representatives
7) See Introduction.
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of Neo-Protestantism expresses his opinion as follows,
"As everything has the origin of its being in God and 
no creature can disown the creator, there is no oppo­
sition in kind between natural i.e. this worldly, 
immanent morality as directed by naturalistic and human 
criteria, and, on the other hand, Christian morality 
as determined by the being of God."^
Bonhoeffer fought against this type of ethical 
approach. He does not support abstract ethics because 
it does not give any power to the people who live in 
this difficult situation. He criticizes and rejects 
any kind of abstract ethics, and insists on concrete 
ethics, on the conviction that Christ loves man as he 
is and the world as it is, not an ideal but a real world. 
Therefore he indicates plainly as follows:
Christ teaches no abstract ethics such as must at all costs be put into practice. ...Christ did not, like a moralist, love a theory of good, but He loved the real man. He was not, like a philosopher, interested in the 'univer­sally valid’, but rather in that which is of help to the real and concrete human being. (9)
Again he says.
What can and must be said is not what is good once and for all, but the way in which Christ takes form among us here and now. The attempt to define that which is good once and
8) Georg Wuensch: Theologische Ethik (1925), pp. 122ff, as quoted in Karl Barth: Church D o g m a t i c s II/2, pp. 53 4ff
9) Ethics, p. 65.
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for all has, in the nature of the case, always ended in failure. (1.0)
The reason for this failure is explained directly.
Either the proposition was asserted in such general and formal terms that it retained no significance as regards its contents, or else one tried to include in it and elaborate the whole immense range of conceivable contents, and thus to say in advance what would be good in every single conceivable case; this led to a casuistic system so unmanageble that it could satisfy the demands neither of general validity nor of concreteness. (11)
He excludes the formalism and vagueness of all 
Neo-Protestant ethics and moreover contradicts casuistry 
with its unavoidable tendency to substitute a complicated 
system of avoidance of evil deeds for a simple and 
direct conformity with the Incarnate which is "achieved 
only when the form of Jesus Christ itself works us in 
such a manner that it molds our form in its own likeness 
(Gal. 4:19)
A second system of ethics which Bonhoeffer wished 
to reject is the so-called "pseudo-Lutheran" scheme.
The characteristic of this thinking is based on the 
concept of a juxtaposition. The whole reality is divided 
into two spheres, the one divine, holy, supernatural and 
Christian, and the other worldly, profane, natural and
10) Ethics, p. 66.
11) op. cit., p. 66.
12) op. cit. , p. 61.
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un-Christian. This view becomes dominant in the Middle 
Ages and in the period of after the Reformation, and
its ethical concern is with the proper relation of these
two spheres to each other. Though spatial thinking in
its scholastic form subjects the realm of nature to the
realm of grace, and in its spiritualistic-enthusiastic
form divides the congregation of the elect from the
hostile world, in the "pseudo-Lutheran scheme the
autonomy of the orders of this world is proclaimed in
13opposition to the law of Christ." Here reality in 
Christ and worldly realities are divided, so Christian 
ethics has no right to speak to man in his social and 
cultural involvements. Christian faith and Christian 
ethics have their efficiency only in the spiritual realm 
However man actually lives in this social and cultural 
world and he must act in obedience to their autonomous 
laws.
A typical example of this kind of German Lutheran 
thought can be seen in F. Naumann. He writes as follows
Every one of us is a servant in many realms and in those realms must obey an iron compulsion, a power of logic, which is contained in the situ­ation itself. But wherever we are free from such compulsion and logic, wherever we have the feeling that our path is not determined there is the part of our life where we want to be first of all servants of Christ," (14)
13) Ethics, p. 168
14) F, Naumann; Briefe ueber Religion, as quoted in George W. Forell, The Place of Bonhoeffer, p. 202,
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Bonhoeffer criticizes such an ethic as indifferent 
and unconcerned with regard to worldly institutions and 
conditions. It is suitable to refer to his article 
which comes as Part Two in the Ethics.
The liberal theologians, especially Troeltsch and Naumann, treated the original gospel as a 'purely religious' power which encompasses the individual man in his outlook but is at the same time indifferent and unconcerned with regard to worldly institutions and conditions. (15)
Needless to say this criticism should be understood
from the context of his insistence on non-religious
Christianity. For him "purely religious" matter has no
power for the people. The main purpose of that article,
however, is to discuss and criticize Otto Dilschneider's
position. Bonhoeffer quotes the formulation which
Dilschneider gives at the beginning of his book,
"Protestant ethics is concerned with man's personality
and with this personality alone. All the other things
of this world remain untouched by this Protestant ethos.
The things of the world do not enter ethically into
the zone of the demands of ethical imperatives."^^
Against this position he insists that the real
question is whether it is the Church's sole task to
practice love and charity within the given worldly
institutions or whether the church is charged with a
15) Ethics, p. 287.
16) Otto Dilschneider: Die evangelische Tat, p. 87.
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mission towards the given worldly orders themselves, 
a mission of correction and improvement, a mission to 
work towards a new worldly order? Then Bonhoeffer 
rejects this position categorically because the 
isolation of the person from the world of things is 
idealistic and not Christian, and also warns that it 
is in danger of falling to antinomianism.
He realizes that it is quite difficult to break 
the spell of this thinking in terms of two spheres.' 
Nevertheless it is in profound contradiction to the 
thought of the Bible and to the thought of the Refor­
mation. The pseudo-Lutheran approach falls in a 
dilemma, that is, man abandons reality as a whole, 
and places himself in one or other of the two spheres, 
or else man tries to stand in both spheres at once.
They think that this is the only form of Christian 
existence which is in accord with reality.
However he denies such thinking. He insists 
that there are not two realities, but only one reality. 
Those who are in Christ stand at once in both the 
reality of God and the reality of the world.
The unity of the reality of God and of the world, which has been accomplished in Christ, is repeated, or, more exactly, is realized, ever afresh in the life of men. And yet what is Christian is not identical with what is of the world. The natural is not identical with the supernatural or the revelational with the rational. But between the two there is in each case a unity which derives solely from
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the reality of Christ, that is to say solely from faith in this ultimate reality. This unity is seen in the way in which the secular and the Christian elements prevent one another from assuming any kind of static independence in their mutual relations. They adopt a polemi­cal attitude towards each other and bear witness precisely in this to their shared reality and to their unity in the reality which is in Christ.(17)
Thirdly the ethics of Karl Barth should be considered. 
There is no doubt that Bonhoeffer was much influenced by 
and learned much from Barth. Some scholars even inter­
pret Bonhoeffer's ethics as a variation of Barthian 
Christocracy.  ^^
The ethical position of Karl Barth is seen in this 
definition,
It is the Christian doctrine of God, or, more exactly, the knowledge of the electing grace of God in Jesus Christ, which decides the nature and aim of theological ethics, of ethics as an element of church dogmatics. (19)
On this basis, he refuses all attempts which are 
built on a general human ethics or a philosophical 
ethics, and insists on laying the foundation on the 
word of God.
The goodness of human action consists in the goodness with which God acts towards man. But God deals with man through His Word. (20)
17) Ethics, p. 171.
18) See Juergen Moltmann; "Herschaft Christi und soziale Wirklichkeit nach Dietrich. Bonhoeff er " , Theologische Existenz Heute, N.F. 71, Muenich, 1959.
19) Karl Barth: Church Dogmatics, II/2, p. 543.
20) op. cit., p. 546.
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Man does good in so far as his action is Christian. A Christian is one who knows that God has accepted him in Jesus Christ, that a decision has been made concerning him in Jesus Christ as the eternal Word of God, and that he has been called into covenant with Him by Jesus Christ as the Word of God spoken in time. (21)
In the section entitled "The Problem of Special
Ethics", Barth positively evaluates Bonhoeffer’s
ethical thinking. "To this question of the constancy
of the divine command and human action Dietrich
Bonhoeffer gives another and more helpful answer which
is both more original in relation to theological
tradition and also more carefully formulated in sub-
^  ,,22 stance.
Bonhoeffer considers the mandates as the place 
where the God of Jesus Christ secured obedience to 
Himself. In other words, for him, the mandates are 
nothing but the concrete place of faith and obedience, 
where a particular sphere on earth is claimed, taken 
possession of, and moulded by the divine command, and 
it is removed from the dialectic of law and Gospel.
Therefore the mandate is the place where the 
Christian works out the obedience of faith in this 
concrete world. At this point Bonhoeffer comes very 
close to Barth,
21) Karl Barth: Church Dogmatics, II/2, p. 547
22) op, cit., III/4, p. 21.
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It is right to say that the concrete application 
of Barthian ethics has probably received its most
famous formulation in Christliche Gemeinde uhd Buerger 
23Gemeinde. Barth insists that the State must be
regarded "as an allegory (Gleichnis), as a correspondence
and an analogue to the Kingdom of God which the Church
24preaches and believes in," Therefore the criterion 
for ethical action in the state (or in any other
ethical decision) is its contribution to the clarifi­
cation of the Lordship of Christ over the whole.
In that book he even illustrates the criteria
for the State from the Gospel, For example, he
insists that since Christ came to seek and save the
lost, the Church will insist on the State’s special 
responsibility for the weaker members of society.
"The Church must stand for social justice in the 
political sphere. And in choosing between the various 
socialistic possibilities (social-liberalism? co~ 
operativism? syndicalism? free trade? moderate or 
radical Marxism?) it will always choose the movement 
from which it can expect the greatest measure of 
social justice (leaving all other considerations on 
one side)."^^ Again he says that since it is the fellow-
23) G. W. Forell: The Place of Bonhoeffer, p. 204.
24) K, Barths Community,' State and Church, p. 169.
25) op. cit., p. 173.
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ship of those who live in one faith under one Lord on 
the basis of one Baptism:)., "the Church must and will 
stand for the equality of the freedom and responsi­
bility of all adult citizens, in spite of its sober
insight into the variety of human needs, abilities and 
26tasks." It is also seen in this kind of claim, "The
Church knows God's anger and judgement, but it also
knows that his anger lasts but for a moment whereas
His mercy is for eternity." For this reason it will
support violent political solutions only when they
are for the moment the ultimate and only possibility
available. "The perfection of the Father in heaven,
who does not cease to be the heavenly Judge, demands
the earthly perfection of a peace policy which really
27does extend to the limits of the humanly possible." 
Barth tries to mould the state according to the allegory 
or the structure of the kingdom of God.
At this point Bonhoeffer departs from Barth. For 
Bonhoeffer does not think out the ethical task of the 
state from an exegetical analysis of the biblical asser­
tions concerning the kingdom of God and their analogical 
application to the state. Rather he insists that the 
basis of the state or the government is in the service
26) K. Barths Community, State and Church, p. 173.
27) op. cit., p. 178.
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of Jesus Christ.
The much-discussed question of what con­stitutes this goodness or outward justice which government is charged with promoting is easily resolved if one keeps in view the derivation of government from Jesus Christ. This good can not in any case be in conflict with Jesus Christ. Good consists in allowance being made in every action of government for the ultimate purpose, namely, the service of Jesus Christ. (28)
He thinks the raison d'etre of the state is to be 
found in a divine commission. The ultimate purpose of 
the state is to fulfill the commission which is en­
trusted to it by God, In the chapter entitled "Christ, 
Reality and Good", he mentions.
Good is not the correspondence between a criterion which is placed at our disposal by nature or grace and whatever entity I may designate as reality. Good is reality itself, reality seen and recognized in God. (29)
As has been mentioned repeatedly, for Bonhoeffer 
"the problem of Christian ethics is the realization 
among God's creatures of the revelational reality of 
God in C h r i s t . I n  pursuit of the task of the 
realization (Wirklichwerden), he urges that we notice 
the distinction between the "ultimate" and the "penulti­
mate" (Die letzten und die vorletzten Dinge). Man 
is justified by grace and faith alone. This is the
28) Ethics, p,. 305.
29) op. cit., p. 165.
30) op. cit., p . 163.
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ultimate word and it remains in every respect the 
final word. Thus we must speak of the "penultimate" 
in the relation to the ultimate, because this ultimate 
reaches those who live their lives in the realm of the 
things before the last. In other words,, he insists 
that we speak of the penultimate for the sake of the 
ultimate. Speaking of the penultimate means to deal 
with the living faith which justifies a life and to 
ask about the penultimate in the lives of Christians,
It is his conviction that by remaining deliberately 
in the penultimate, one can perhaps point all the 
more genuinely to the ultimate, which God will speak, 
though indeed even then through a human mouth, in His 
own time.
It may be appropriate to summarize this way,
Barth's theology and his christocentric ethics are, 
according to Bonhoeffer, the most hopeful sign of a 
break away from the religious or abstract interpretation 
of the world and the Christian faith. The world is 
not understood in this theology from the point of view 
of its own needs and lackings but solely from the 
view point of God's revelation,' He calls the God of 
Jesus Christ into the lists against religion, pneuma 
against sarx.
Bonhoeffer, however, fears that Barth operated 
too hastily with the ultimate in order to make it 
supply the criteria for ethical action. He suggests
21 6
that Barth was too dominated in a negative way by 
liberal theology and perhaps as reaction against it 
slipped into a "positivism of revelation". His em­
phasis on dogma and revelation almost made of them a 
new Law for the believer which remained irrelevant for 
the secular man in everyday situations. He gave no 
concrete guidance, either in dogmatics or in ethics, 
on the non-religious interpretation of theological 
concepts. Further, Bonhoeffer criticizes Barth's 
approach in "the Outline for a Book" as tending to 
encourage us to entrench ourselves behind the faith
of the Church and evade the honest question, what is
31our real and personal belief?
On the other hand, for Barth, the ethic of 
Bonhoeffer is somewhat arbitrary. He says "would it 
not be advisable, then, to begin with the more cautious 
question what we have to learn from God's Word con­
cerning this constancy rather than rushing on to the 
rigid assertion of human relationships arranged in
a definite order, and the hasty assertion of their
32imperative character?"
Fourthly, the ethics of existentialism must be
31) cf. Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 382.
32) Barth: Church Dogmatics, III/4, p. 22.
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taken into consideration. This type of ethics could
be characterized as the call to authentic selfhood.
For example, Paul Tillich says:
Is there a word from the Lord? And perhaps an answer has been received. It was a voice out of the depth of our situation, elevating our concrete problems into an ultimate perspective. In doing so, it probably has devaluated some factors determining our decision and has stressed others. Qr it has left the balance of possi­bilities unchanged, but has given us the courage to make a decision with all the risks of a decision, including error, failure, guilt. (3 3)
He also stresses that the Lord wants human beings
to decide for themselves. Another example is seen in
Schubert Ogden's statement: "Man is a genuinely free
and responsible being, and therefore his salvation is
something that, coram deo, he himself has to decide
34by his understanding of his existence." Both Tillich 
and Ogden are writing after Bonhoeffer's death, but 
the general point can be considered in relation to his 
work.
From the stand point of existentialism, Christian
ethics is "built around the courageous overcoming of
the anxieties of fate and death, of emptiness and
35meaninglessness of guilt and condemnation," In
33) P. Tillich: The New Being, pp. 118f.
34) S. Ogden: Christ Without Myth, p . 136.
35) G. W. Forell: The Place of Bonhoeffer, p. 209
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other words it is seen that anxiety is the clue to the 
understanding of man and the task of ethics is to find 
the way to overcome anxiety through courage. Needless to 
say the influence of Kierkegaard and his existentialist 
disciples is notable in this type of ethics. In some 
sense, therefore, existentialist ethics leads people 
to existential analysis of the human situation first 
and only then the gospel of the new life in Christ is 
declared,
Bonhoeffer, however, does not accept this order, 
because it is his conviction that there is no way to 
the ultimate from the penultimate, but only from the 
ultimate to the penultimate, even though they are closely 
connected in his thinking. This position is clearly 
seen in this quotation.
The event of the justification of a sinner is something final. This was meant in the strictsense of the word. God's compassion on a sinner must and can be heard only as God's final word? for otherwise it is not heard at all.This word implies the complete breaking off of everything that precedes it, of everything that is before the last; it is therefore never the natural or necessary end of the way which has been pursued so far, but it is rather the total condemnation and invalidation of this way. It is God's own free word, which is subject to no compulsion;-for this reason it is the irrever­sible final word, an. ultimate reality. (3 6)
In the letters from the prison, Bonhoeffer classifies 
the existentialist philosophers and the psychotherapists
36) Ethics, pp. 100-101.
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9-S secularized offshoots of Christian theology, and he
37names them as "secularized methodism".
He rejected this approach because it affected 
only a small number of intellectuals and degenerates.
He criticized this approach because it is pointless, 
ignoble and unchristian. It is pointless to attempt 
to put a grown-up man back into adolescence. It is 
ignoble to attempt to exploit man's weakness for 
purposes that are alien to him and to which he has 
not freely assented. Furthermore, it is unchristian 
to confuse Christ with one particular stage in man's 
religiousness, i.e. with a human law.
He defines his position as follows.
When Jesus blessed sinners, they were real sinners, but Jesus did not make everyone a sinner first. He called them away from their sin, not into their sin. ... .Never'did he question a man's health, vigour, or happiness, regarded in them­selves, or regard them as evil fruits; else why should he heal the sick and restore strength to the weak? Jesus claims for himself and the Kingdom of God the whole of human life in all its manifestations. (38)
The word of the justifying grace of God never departs from its position as the final word; it never yields itself simply as a result that has been achieved, a result that might just as well be set at the beginning as at the end.The way from the penultimate to the ultimate can never be dispensed with. The word remains
37) Letters and Papers from Prison, p . 326.
38) op. cit., pp. 341-342,
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irreversibly the last; for otherwise it would be reduced to the quality of what is calculable, a merchandise, and would thereby be robbed of its divine character. Grace would be venal and cheap. It would not be a gift. (39)
Here we must move on to examine what is the kernel
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics.
As we have seen repeatedly. Ethics is a gathering 
of fragments for what Bonhoeffer regarded as his central 
contribution to theological thought, written over a 
number of years. It is not necessary, however, to 
over-stress their fragmentariness, though it is true 
that they can reasonably be regarded as four fresh 
starts. There is a real cohesion between these frag­
ments through grappling with a fundamental problem.
It seems to me that following sentences show the 
fundamental position of his ethical thinking.
But the problem of ethics at once assumes a new aspect if it becomes apparent that these realities, myself and the world, themselves lie embedded in a quite different ultimate reality, namely, the reality of God, the Creator, Recon­ciler and Redeemer. What is of ultimate importance is now no longer that I should become good, or that the condition of the world should be made better by my action, but that the reality of God should show itself everywhere to be the ultimate reality. Where there is faith in God as the ultimate reality, all concern with ethics will have as its starting-point that God shows Himself to be good, even if this involves the risk that I myself and the world are not good but thoroughly
39) Ethics, pp. 102-103.
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bad. ... Any enquiry about one's own goodness, or the goodness of the world, is now impossible unless enquiry has first been made about the goodness of God. For without God what meaning could there be in a goodness of man and a good­ness of the world? But God as the ultimate reality is no other than He who shows forth, manifests and reveals Himself, that is to say,God in Jesus Chrsit, and from this it follows that the question of good can find its answer only in Christ. (40)
Bonhoeffer, therefore, plainly claims that the
problem of Christian ethics is not that man should
become good, but "the realization among God's creatures
of the revelational reality of God in Christ, just as
the problem of dogmatics is the truth of the revela-
41tional reality of God in Christ."
Consequently, Bonhoeffer's Ethics manifests the 
depth of his christocentric theology. Every theme 
has at its very heart the action of God in the incar­
nation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
His work of substitutionary atonement and reconciliation
42becomes the basis for man's ethical responsibility.
Thus Bonhoeffer asserts:
The place which in all other ethics is occupied by the antithesis of 'should be’ and 'is', idea and accomplishment, motive and per­formance, is occupied in Christian ethics by the relation of reality and realization, past and present, history and event (faith), or, to
40) Ethics, pp. 161-162.
41) op. cit., p. 163.
42) cf. R, F. Kohler: "The Christocentric Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer” , Scottish Journal of Theology, 1970, vol. 23, no, 1, p. 27.
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replace the equivocal concept by the unambiguous name, the relation of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The question of good becomes the question of participation in the divine reality which is revealed in Christ. (43)'
In this way he tried to overcome the Kantian
separation of *is' and ’ought*, that is the separation
of the world from God, by using the Hegelian concept of
’becoming’ and yet not reducing it to a self-realisation
for the immanent world-spirit. The act of revelation
participates in the historical reality of the world
thus creating the reality of the new man in Christ,
It is this reality which is both the norm and the
ground of living. Ethics, then, is not wishful thinking
44but concrete realization.
Therefore the place of reality lies in the midst
of history as divine miracle.
Christ is the Mediator of creation and therefore
the centre of all.
All created things are through and for Christ and exist only in Christ (Col. 1:16). This means that there is nothing, neither persons nor things, which stands outside the relation to Christ.Indeed it is only in relation to Christ that created things have their being. This is true not only of man but also of the state, economy, science, nature, etc, (46)
43) Ethics, p. 163.
44) cf. A. Dumas: Dietrich. Bonhoeffer, Theologian of Reality, pp. 141-142.
45) Ethics, p. 51.
46) op. cit., p. 288.
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Everything is under the rule of Christ, everything 
finds its reality in Him. Ethics for Bonhoeffer, there­
fore, has its source in the encounter with Christ, the 
Incarnate, the Crucified, the Risen One.
Because Christ is the Incarnate, it is man’s right
and duty that he should be man. The incarnation allows
47"the world to be what it really is before God," He
rejected the quest for the superman and insisted on
being a real man.
The real man is at liberty to be his Creator’s creature. To be conformed with the Incarnate is to have the right to be the man one really is.
(48)
Because Christ is the Crucified, conformation to
Him means being a man sentenced by God. In his daily
life man carries with him God’s sentence of death, the
necessity of dying before God for the sake of sin. In
other words, everyday man dies the death of a sinner.
He cannot raise himself up above any other man or set himself before him as a model, for he knows himself to be the greatest of all sinners. He can excuse the sin of another, but never his own. He bears all the suffering imposed on him, in the knowledge that it serves to enable him to die with his own will and to accept God’s judge­ment upon him. (49)
47) Ethics, p. 263.
48) op. cit., p. 62.
49) op. cit., p. 62.
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Because Christ is the Risen One, conformation to 
Him means to be a new man before God. Through the 
resurrection of Christ sin and death are overcome, and 
creation has its new beginning. Jesus Christ is the 
living Lord to whom all power is given in heaven and 
on earth.
All the powers of the world are made subject to Him and must serve Him, each in its own way.The lordship of Jesus Christ is not the rule of a foreign power? it is the lordship of the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer, the lordship of Him through whom and for whom all created beings exist, of Him in whom indeed all created beings alone find their origin, their goal and their essence.(50)
Bonhoeffer, therefore, says in the midst of death 
man is in life. In the midst of sin he is righteous.
In the midst of the old he is new. Man lives because 
Christ lives, and lives in Christ alone. This new life 
of man, however, is ’hidden with Christ in God’ (Col.3:3)
The new man lives in the world like any other man. Often there is little to distinguish him from the rest. Nor does he attach importance to distinguishing himself, but only to distinguish­ing Christ for the sake of. his brethren,Treansfigured though he is in the form of the Risen One, here he bears only the sign of the cross and the judgement. (51)
On the basis of this christocentric point of view, 
Bonhoeffer claims that the task of ethics, is not to 
launch appeals to overcome the divorce between ideal
50) Ethics, p. 264.
51) op. Cit., p. 63
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and real, but to describe God's concrete commandment in
the midst of reality.
Once this affirmation of an ethic based on God's
presence in reality has been proposed, there remains
the difficult task of finding ways to recognize God's
presence in the midst of a world that was no longer
the reality first given in creation, and not yet the
reality re-given in reconciliation, but the ambiguous
and contorted everyday world where good and evil exist 
52side by side.
According A, Dumas, Bonhoeffer makes at least three
attempts to describe how this can be done.
First, the doctrine of the four mandates: "The
world is relative to Christ, no matter whether it knows
it or not. This relativeness of the world to Christ
assumes concrete form in certain mandates of God in the
world. The Scriptures name four such mandates: labour,
53marriage, government and the Church." The mandates
are vocations from God which take the concrete form of 
earthly demands that have the force of divine command­
ments. Bonhoeffer has chosen the term mandate in order 
that the concrete forms of ethical action may be seen as 
responsibility to God's commandment over and against 
self-determination, "The divine mandates are dependent
52) cf. A. Dumas: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Theologian of Reality, p. 156.
53) Ethics, p. 179.
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solely on the one commandment of God as it is revealed
in Jesus Christ. They are introduced into the world
from above as orders or 'institutions' of the reality
of Christ, that is to say, of the reality of the love
of God for the world and for men which is revealed in 
54Jesus Christ."
The divine mandates, therefore, express the ethics
of an ontology of reality based on Christology. They
manifest Christ existing in the world in the form of
community and commandment.
They are clearly an attempt to clarify the Lutheran
doctrine of the 'orders of creation' and the statutes,
personalizing them by their continuing relationship to
God who is in control of them, and unifying them against
55the heteronomy of the different 'realms'.
But even though the doctrine of the mandates had 
been drafted last, in 1943, it remained too closely 
allied to a theological heritage that was not moving 
in the direction Bonhoeffer sought, namely towards a 
reality re-united by the christological realization of 
God within it. In the letter of 23rd January, 1944,
54) Ethics, pp. 254-255.
55) cf. J. Moltmann: "The Lordship of Christ and Human Society" in J, Moltmann and J. Weissbach; Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, pp. 19-94.
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Bonhoeffer told of the failure of this way of dividing 
things, which gave so much authority to certain human 
realities that it ran the risk of destroying freedom
56in the name of obedience to those divinized demands.
Second, the structures of responsible life. 
Bonhoeffer explains the structure of responsible life 
as follows: (a) correspondence with reality, which
the incarnation makes effective? (b) responsibility for 
others, which is most fully expressed in deputyship as 
Jesus binds himself fully to the destiny of humanity, 
and to things as well in so far as the world of things 
is directed towards mankind? (c) the acceptance of guilt, 
which means that when Jesus acts responsibly he becomes 
guilty although without sin? and finally? (d) freedom, 
understood not as autonomy preserved in the Kantian 
sense, but as responsibility that is assumed without 
any reservations whatever, so that the contorted every­
day world can once again become a truly unified reality. 
Freedom is the surrender of oneself and all that one
does to God, a submission that is the opposite of
57resignation and the achievement of resistance.
Responsible life is life in correspondence with 
reality (Wirklichkeitgemasshelt). Bonhoeffer insists
56) A, Dumas: Dietrich Bbnhoeffer, Theologian of Reality, p. 157.
57) op. Cit., p. 158.
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that responsibility does not mean the illusion that one
has some ethical principle at one's disposal which one
can "put into effect fanatically, overcoming all the
resistance which is offered to it by r e a l i t y . F o r
the responsible man the given situation is not simply
the material on which he is to impress his idea or
his programme by force, but this situation is itself
drawn into the action and shares in giving form to 
59the deed. This does not, however, mean so-called
Realpolitik. He explains as follows;
The true meaning of correspondence with reality lies neither in this servility towards the factual nor yet in a principle of opposition to the factual, a principle of revolt against the factual in the name of some higher reality. Both extremes alike are very far removed from the essence of the matter. In action which is genuinely in accordance with reality there is an indissoluble link between the acknowledgement and the contradiction of the factual. The reason for this is that reality is first and last not lifeless; but it is the real man, the incarnate God. (60)
Action which is in accordance with Christ is in 
accordance with reality, because it allows the world 
to be the world. This does not mean a view of the 
autonomy of various areas of life but rather a vision 
of the simplicity of life, as reconciled by Christ.
58) Ethics, p. 197.
59) op. cit., p. 197
60) op. cit., p. 198
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The world remains the world because it is the world which is loved, condemned and reconciled in Christ. No man has the mission to overleap the world and to make it into the kingdom of God, Nor, on the other hand, does this give support to that pious indolence which abandons the wicked world to its fate and seeks only to rescue its own virtue. Man is appointed to the concrete and therefore limited responsibility which knows the world as being created, loved, condemned and reconcilied by God and which acts within the world in accordance with this knowledge. (61)
Third, the relationship between the ultimate and
the penultimate. This attempt seems to be the most
fruitful of all, for here Bonhoeffer tackles the vast
problem of the relationship between natural life and
the life of faith, which the christological emphasis
on the structures of responsible life virtually ignores,
and which the doctrine of the mandates hardens too 
62arbitarily.
According to Bethge's examination, a problem of 
the ultimate and the penultimate was considered in 
Ettel between the end of November 1940 and the middle 
of February 1941. And it represents the most complete 
section of the work for the Ethics.
Catholic theology usually deals with the penultimate 
(e.g. natural and culture) in the light of the ultimate 
(the supernatural) which perfects it, while in Protestant
61) Ethics, p. 202
62) cf. A. Dumass Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Theology ofReality, p. 158.
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theology righteousness by faith alone is too much 
emphasized and as a result the ultimate (grace)' 
frequently repudiates the penultimate as insignificant 
or even sinful. Bonhoeffer, however, with an approach 
quite original in ethical theory, begins with the 
ultimate, which undergirds and safeguards the penultimate, 
just as the New Testament and the Gospel of the crucifixion 
and the resurrection send us back to the Old Testament 
and to life here on earth. The last word, the ultimate 
word, which is justification, turns the believer towards 
the penultimate, which is natural life and the whole 
cultural enterprise, since the God of grace commands 
us not to look for him on the edges but to meet him in 
the middle of the world. "The Christian life means 
neither a destruction nor a sanctioning of the penulti­
mate. In Christ the reality of God meets the reality 
of the world and allows us to share in this real encounter. 
It is an encounter beyond all radicalism and beyond all 
compromise. Christian life is participation in the 
encounter of Christ with the world.
The ultimate does not destroy the penultimate, 
which is always the pietistic temptation of Protestant­
ism, nor does the ultimate simply follow along after 
the penultimate, which is always the naturalistic
63) Ethics, p. 110
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temptation of Catholicism. The ultimate precedes the 
penultimate and gives it direction. The ultimate is 
not found at the edge of the world, but in its centre 
as a way of structuring the penultimate.
Bonhoeffer insists on the necessity of recovering 
the attention to the natural on the basis of the gospel.
He says:
The concept of the natural, must, therefore, be recovered on the basis of the gospel. We speak of the natural, as distinct from the creaturely, in order to take into account the fact of the Fall; and we speak of the natural rather than of the sinful so that we may include in it the creaturely. The natural is that which, after the Fall, is directed towards the coming of Christ. The unnatural is that which, after the Fall, closes its doors against the coming of Christ There is indeed only a relative difference between that which is directed towards Christ and that which closes its doors to Christ; for the natural does not compel the coming of Christ, and the un­natural does not render it impossible. In both cases the real coming is an event of grace. And it is only through the coming of Christ that the natural is confirmed in its character as a penul­timate, and that the unnatural is exposed once and for all as destruction of the penultimate.Thus, even in the sight of Christ, there is a distinction between the natural and the unnatural, a distinction which cannot be obliterated without doing grave harm. (64)
Now we must make clear what Bonhoeffer's Ethics 
can contribute to the theological discussion in the 
second half of the twentieth century.
In this chapter our survey was begun to clarify 
the position of Bonhoeffer's ethics through an exami-
64) Ethics, pp. 120-121
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nation of opposing conceptions. We must make clear, 
first of all, that his criticism of the ethical systems 
of his time remains relevant. Thomistic-ontological 
ethics, pseudo-Lutheran spatial ethics, Barthian christoc- 
racy , and Christian existentialism have eloquent 
advocates today. But Bonhoeffer's critique has also 
been widely accepted.
Now our task is to discern whether Bonhoeffer 
suggests a positive direction which Christian ethics 
ought to follow in order to fulfill its mission in our 
world?
The clue to Bonhoeffer is the Christocentric focus 
of his thought, that is, his constant reference to 
Jesus Christ, who is at once the Incarnate, the Cruci­
fied, and the Risen One.
It is necessary to free oneself from the way of thinking which sets out from human problems and which asks for solutions on this basis. Such thinking is unbiblical. The way of Jesus Christ, and therefore the way of all Christian thinking, leads not from the world to God but from God to the world. ... The Church's word to the world can be no other than God's word to the world.This word is Jesus Christ and salvation in His name. It is in Jesus Christ that God's relation to the world is defined. We know of no relation of God to the world other than through Jesus Christ, For the Church too, therefore, there is no relation to the world other than through Jesus Christ.In other words, the proper relation of the Church to the world cannot be deduced from natural law or rational law or from universal human rights, but only from the gospel of Jesus Christ. (65)
65) Ethics, pp. 320-321
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For Bonhoeffer the question of "who is Christ for 
us today" was his lifelong theme. It seems to me that 
in his study of ethics, Bonhoeffer moves from the primary 
question of "who Christ is" to the one of "how Christ 
takes form among us here and now."^^ By making this 
shift, however, he is not trying to limit the impor­
tance of the primary question of who Christ is. When 
he takes up the problem of "how" Christ is among us, 
he does so without weakening the ground of revelation 
in Jesus Christ. It is a very important point that, 
in Bonhoeffer, this 'how' does not destroy the integrity 
of Christ even when dealing with the institutions of 
this world, for all institutions, rightly understood in 
the light of the question 'who', are seen to flow from 
Christ and be fulfilled in Christ.
On the basis of this conviction, Bonhoeffer insists 
that the commandment which comes from God in Jesus Christ 
has already been fulfilled in the Person of Jesus Christ 
through His substitutionary work. There is no power in 
history or nature or ourselves, outside the Person of 
Christ, which can accomplish this work on behalf of man. 
For Bonhoeffer ethics is always grounded in the Word of 
God and the work of Christ and finds its fulfilment in 
man's participation in the substitutionary work of Christ 
through the deputyship of being for the other.
66) Ethics, p. 66
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Thereby Bonhoeffer shows the direction of his 
ethics as follows.
The point of departure for Christian ethics is not the reality of one's own self, or the reality of the world; nor is it the reality of standards and values. It is the reality of God as He reveals Himself in Jesus Christ, It is fair to begin by demanding assent to this pro­position of anyone who wishes to concern himself with the problem of a Christian ethic. It poses the ultimate and crucial question of the reality which we mean to reckon with in our lives, whether it is to be the reality of the revelational word of God or earthly imperfections, whether it is to be resurrection or death. (67)
Let us now turn our attention to his understanding 
of the Church and the world. Bonhoeffer has quite 
simply and clearly called the church to new obedience 
to the commandment of Jesus Christ. On the basis of a 
sound evangelical theology, he has not been afraid to 
speak of good works. Bonhoeffer recommends that the 
community that is established by the hearing of the 
Word of God must pattern its life after Christ's own 
life and thus be transformed into his image. It is 
not enough for the church to have a proper dogmatics or 
a deep hermeneutic or a venerable liturgy -- Bonhoeffer, 
or course, does not deny their importance —  but there 
must be obedience. This will take place in two areas: 
first, in the church's interior life as a community of 
faith, and second, in the life of the members of the
67) Ethics, pp. 162-163.
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church who are scattered in this secular world.
In the final period of his theology Bonhoeffer 
was breaking fresh ground in his concept of 'worldly' 
Christianity, and it is here that he can help the 
church to a new understanding of the relation between 
God and the world. Ultimately this understanding will 
be one of Bonhoeffer's greatest contributions, and it 
is possible that his thought will lead to a significant 
revolution in the understanding of the Christian faith. 
He insists that we should never know God as an idea, 
but only in and through our concrete encounter with 
others in our life in this world. God is not to be 
known except in human form, as man existing for others, 
and the sole ground for his omnipotence, omniscience, 
and omnipresence is his freedom from self, maintained 
to the point of death.
Bonhoeffer's theology is one of commitment and 
involvement,^^ To be a real Chrsitian, for Bonhoeffer, 
means to be committed to and involved in a way of life 
in the world, and this is God's own way, which he has 
revealed in Jesus Christ. This precludes any spectator 
attitude towards the world and any prescriptive and 
perceptual approach to the ministry. The church, there­
fore, must learn afresh that God's primary concern is
68) cf, J. Godsey: The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,p. 281 .
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with this world. She must be ready to act responsibly 
for mankind, even to the renunciation of many of her 
cherished ideas and traditions. By participating in 
the being of Jesus as one whose only concern is for 
others, the Church has a new life in the world. The 
Church must learn to live the gospel and not just 
preach it, for only its example will empower its words. 
The Church must be the instrument of proclaiming 
God's word; however beyond that the Protestant Church 
has to regain its own peculiar life as an end in itself, 
Bonhoeffer insists at the end of his unfinished 
Ethics :
The danger of the Reformation, on the other hand, lies in the fact that it devotes its whole attention to the mandate of the proclamation of the word and, consequently, almost entirely neg­lects the proper domain and function of the Church as an end in herself, and this consists precisely in her existence for the sake of the world. One need only call to mind the liturgical poverty and uncertainty of our present-day Protestant services, the feebleness of our ecclesiastical organization and law, the almost complete absence of any genuine ecclesiastical discipline, and the inability of most Protestants even to understand the significance of such disciplinary practices as spiritual exercises, asceticism, meditation and Contemplation. One need only consider the general uncertainty about the special functions of the clergy, or the startlingly confused or presumptuous attitude of countless Protestant Christians towards those Christians who refuse to take oaths, those Christians who refuse to perform military service, etc., and one cannot help per­ceiving at once where the Protestant Church is at fault. Exclusive interest in the divine mandate of proclamation, and, together with this, interest in the Church's mission in the world, has resulted in failure to perceive the inner connexion between this mission and the Church's internal functions.
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This failure has necessarily detracted from the power, the abundance and the fulness of the pro­clamation itself, because the proclamation finds no fertile soil. . In terms of parable, the commis­sion of proclamation has been implanted in the congregation like the corn-seed in the field; if the soil has not been prepared the seed withers away and loses its own inherent fruitfulness,(69)
Bonhoeffer makes the proper distinction of Law 
and Gospel in a new manner uniquely appropriate to 
our situation. As we mentioned before, Bonhoeffer 
insists that there are not two spheres, but only the 
one sphere of the realization of Christ, in which the 
reality of God and the reality of the world are united, 
"Just as in Christ the reality of God entered into 
the reality of the world, so, too, is that which is 
Christian to be found only in that which is of the 
world, the 'supernatural' only in the natural, the 
holy only in the profane, and the revelational only in 
the r a t i o n a l . B u t  Bonhoeffer continued by saying 
that "what is Christian is not identical with what is 
of the world. The natural is not identical with the 
supernatural or the revelational with the rational.
But between the two there is in each case a unity 
which derives solely from the reality of Christ, that
69) Ethics, p. 267.
70) op. cit., p. 171,
238
7 1is to say solely from faith in this ultimate reality." 
Bonhoeffer indicates not a static but a polemical unity 
of the secular and the Christian and thus bears witness 
to their common reality, their unity in the reality 
in Christ. He support Luther's position in a strict 
sense.
Luther, was protesting against a Christianity which was striving for independence and detaching itself from the reality in Christ. He protested with the help of the secular and in the name of a better Christianity. So, too, today, when Christi­anity is employed as a polemical weapon against the secular, this must be done in the name of a better secularity and above all it must not lead back to a static predominance of the spiritual sphere as an end in itself. (72)
Only as a polemical unity can Luther's doctrine 
of the two kingdoms be accepted, and Bonhoeffer was 
convinced that it was so intended. Thus the proclamation 
of the Law must not be allowed to deteriorate into 
legalism, and the proclamation of the Gospel must not 
deteriorate into purely religious speech separated from 
the worldly existence of man.
He insists that "this false antithesis of moraliz­
ing and religious themes must be replaced by the true
73distinction and connexion between the law and gospel."
71) Ethics, p. 171.
72) op. cit,, p. 171.
73) op. cit., p. 283,
239
"Thus ultimately it is not the preacher but God alone 
who distinguishes between the law and the Gospel.
To modern man it is the problem of religion 
which has taken the place of the problem of the Law . 
as illustrated in Paul's letters by the controversy 
about circumcision, Paul fought against the legalism 
of the Jews. Luther also was engaged in the same 
effort in his attack against salvation by works, which 
threatened to undo the church in the sixteenth century. 
Bonhoeffer explains his apprehensions in his letter.
"The Pauline question whether circumcision is a con­
dition of justification seems to me in present-day 
terms to be whether religion is a condition of salvation.
75Freedom from circumcision is also freedom from religion."
For him, religion is a space on the border of 
human existence reserved for God. He claims that reli­
gious people speak of God when human perception is 
(often just from laziness) at an end, or human resources 
fail. Bonhoeffer rejects the idea of a God who fills the 
gaps. He objects to the use of God as a Deus ex machina. 
This he did in all his theological work, and this is 
the concern of his Ethics as an ethics of the cross.
An ethics of the cross, for Bonhoeffer, is an ethics
74) Ethics, p. 280
7 5) Letters and Papers from' Prison, p. 281
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which distinguishes Law and Gospel. He makes 
distinctions between the penultimate and the ultimate, 
Law and Gospel, the world and God: and yet he knows
that there are not two realities but only one, and that 
is the reality of God, which has become manifest in 
Christ in the reality of the world. As one who knows 
the difference between Law and Gospel and the unity of 
the one God who gives reality to both, Bonhoeffer 
stands in the same line as Paul and Luther. But by 
seeing God's claim in the context of a world come of 
age in which men have to live as if there were no God, 
Bonhoeffer addressed the task in a fresh way opening 
up the possibility of stating the ethics of the cross 
for our age with precision and passion.
As Godsey indicates truly, "the most impressive 
thing about Dietrich Bonhoeffer is the way in which his 
own life provides the commentary on his theology. He 
lived close to God and out of the depth of involvement 
and he learned the secret of freedom"^^
Now we must deal with a very difficult and delicate 
problem, that is the problem of his deep involvement in 
a movement ot assassinate Hitler. Through this investi­
gation, it seems to me that both the contributions and 
the limitations of Bonhoeffer's Ethics will be brought
76) Godsey; The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 281
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to light.
There are not a few people among Christians, 
especially Church figures in West Germany since the 
War, who have interpreted Bonhoeffer's involvement 
in the resistance as a purely political decision, 
based on political motives. Consequently they refuse 
to call Bonhoeffer a "Atartyr " of the present day in 
the original sense of the New Testament Greek word 
"martus", meaning the "witness" to Christ. No one 
who knows Bonhoeffer well can agree with such a posi­
tion. He was beyond and before all else a pastor, a 
minister of the Word of God, He saw in the erratic 
temper of his nation a dilemma which was, at root, 
moral? and he could not, for all that his theological 
and traditional background discouraged him, ignore 
his responsibility. In this sense, we believe, 
Bonhoeffer will be remembered as a great martyr who 
died for the witness of Christian faith in this century.
Bonhoeffer, however, clearly took the position of 
non-violence in the early years. We can confirm it by 
looking at his devotion to Mahatma Gandhi. Bonhoeffer 
was very much interested in Gandhi and had a long­
standing idea of going to India. Although he was already 
interested in Gandhi's personality and work in his 
student years at Tuebingen, his fascination for India 
and Gandhi grew more and more as the years went by.
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He attempted to go to India three times altogether,
in 1928, 1931 and 1934. At that time, such an idea
was regarded as thoroughly eccentric. Having heard
of Bonhoeffer's intention in 1936, even Karl Barth
wrote: "Strange news that you intend to go to India
so as to learn some kind of spiritual technique from
Gandhi or some other holy man and that you expect
77great things of its application in the West."
For Bonhoeffer it was a sincerely and urgently 
motivated idea. From London he wrote to his grand­
mother in May 1934:
Before I tie myself down anywhere for good,I am thinking again of going to India. I have given a good deal of thought lately to Indian questions and believe that there is quite a lot to be learnt there. Sometimes it even seems to me that there is more Christianity in their 'paganism' than in the whole of our Reich Church. Of course, Christianity did come from the East originally, but it has been so Westernized and so permeated by civilized thought that, as we can now see, it is almost lost to us... I might go to Rabindranath Tagore's university. But I'd much rather go to Gandhi and already have some very good introductions from close friends of his I might be able to stay there for six months or more as a guest... I shall go in the winter.(78)
It is obvious that one motivations of his strong 
desire to see Gandhi was to learn his method of non­
violent resistance, which Gandhi himself experimented
77) Gesammelte Schriften, Band II, p. 288
78) op. cit., Band II, p. 182.
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with along the lines of the Sermon on the Mount. That 
was why Bonhoeffer emphasized so much the Sermon on 
the Mount at his own "ashram", the Preacher's Seminary, 
which he finally chose to go to instead of the Mahatma's 
ashram.
To be sure, Bonhoeffer's preoccupation with the
Sermon on the Mount arose not in relation to Gandhi
alone. It was deeply related to his own spiritual
growth and experience, the inner revolution by which
"the theologian becomes a Christian" to use Eberhard
79Bethge's phrase. After he made up his mind to take 
up the post of director of the Preacher's Seminary, 
he wrote in January 1935, to his brothers
The restoration of the Church must surely come from a new kind of monasticism, having nothing in common with the old -but a life of uncompromising adherence to the Sermon on the Mount in the following of Christ, I believe the time has come to gather men together for this. (80)
Six months later he began this task at Finkwenwalde, 
from which his great book Nachfolge (The Cost of Pis- 
cipleship) had appeared. As is well known, much of 
this book is cast in the form of an exposition of the 
Sermon on the Mount. Throughout the whole, book, the 
influence of Gandhian non-violence is quite clear.
79) E. Bethge: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, pp. 153-156.
80) Gesammelte Schriften, Band III, p. 25.
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For example, Bonhoeffer said in his comment on "Blessed 
are the peacemakers":
The followers of Jesus have been called to peace. ... But now they are told that they must not only have peace but make it. And to that end they renounce all violence and tumult, (81)
On "Love your enemies".;
The preceding commandment had spoken only of the passive endurance of evil; here Jesus goes further and bids us not only to bear with evil and the evil person patiently, not only to refrain from treating him as he treats us, but actively to engage in heart-felt love toward' him. (82)
In the summer of 1934, when he attended the Youth 
Conference at Fano, a Swede asked him "What would you 
do, sir, if war broke out?" His reply was, "I pray
that God will give me the strength not to take up
arms."^^ In his Nachfolge which was published at the 
end of 1937, he wrote:
The brother's life is a divine ordinance, and God alone has power over life and death.There is no place for the murderer among the people of God. The judgement he passes on others falls on the murderer himself. In this context 'brother' means more than 'fellow-Christian': for the follower of Jesus there can be no limitas to who is his neighbour, except as his Lorddecides. He is forbidden to commit murder under pain of divine judgement. (84)
As widely known, through the kind offices of
Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Lehmann Bonhoeffer was in-
81) The Cost of Discipleship, p. 102,
82) op. cit-..,- p. 133.
83) E. Bethge: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 314.
84) The Cost of PiscipleShip, pp. 115-116.
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vited to the United, States of America. With Niebuhr's 
formal invitation, Hitler's government granted 
Bonhoeffer leave "for at least the next two or three 
years." On 7th June, 1939, he set sail from South­
hampton, leaving behind him a continent already tense 
with expectation of the coming explosion. However, 
only ten days after his arrival, Bonhoeffer wrote to 
Reinhold Niebuhr from the country house of the 
President of Union Theological Seminary:
Sitting here in Dr, Coffin's garden, I have had the time to think and to pray about my situ­ation and that of my nation and to have God's will for me clarified, I have come to the conclusion that I have made a mistake in coming to America. I must live through this difficult period of our national history with the Christian people of Germany. I shall have no right to participate in the reconstruction of Christian life in GCrmany after the war if I do not share the trials of this time with my people. My brothers in the Confessing Synod wanted me to go. They may have been right in urging me to do so; but I was wrong in going, Süch a decision each man must make for himself. Christians in Germany will face the terrible alternative of either willing the defeat of their nation in order that Christian civilization may survive, or willing the victory of their nation and thereby destroying our civilization. I know which of these alternatives I must choose; but I cannot make that choice in security. (85)
Bonhoeffer knew what a return to Germany would 
entail: a stunted ministry, a sure prison term for
refusing enlistment, and possibly death. His decision 
to return to Germany, therefore, marked his commitment
85) Bonhoeffer: The Way to Freedom, p. 244
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to the German future, a commitment which would lead, 
eventually, to the attempt on Hitler's life and to 
Bonhoeffer's own death. It may be right to say with 
William Kuhns that "he (Bonhoeffer) had a vague idea 
what lay ahead —  an underground ministry, the elemental 
struggle to survive as a conscientious Christian through 
the upheaval of the War, But at this point he hardly 
anticipated the defiant resistance activity or the 
fate it would bring. Bonhoeffer felt only the instinc­
tive assurance that he belonged in Germany.
He arrived in Germany in late July, 1939 and on 1st 
September, German troops invaded Poland The decision 
to enter resistance work was a slow one, dictated as 
much by Bonhoeffer's growing disillusionment with per­
sonal pacifism as by the events and men with which he 
became involved. Hitler's aggressive arm was sweeping 
Europe, and ultimate victory seemed imminent. At an 
ecumenical meeting in 1941 in Geneva, he admitted,
"I pray for the defeat of my fatherland. Only through
a defeat can we atone for the terrible crimes which
87have been committed against Europe and the world,"
The situation required him not only to pray but also 
to join the resistance.
86) W. Kuhns: In Pursuit of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 109
87) T. Prittie: Germans against Hitler, p. 124.
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It was in 1940 when his "double life" began, name­
ly the pastor’s engagement in the political underground 
movement. In the spring of 1942, Bonhoeffer went to 
Norway as an emissary with Helmuth von Moltke. It was 
reported of their discussion during that journey that 
while Moltke refused to take part in removing Hitler 
by violence, Bonhoeffer pleaded the need for assassi­
nation, Later, after the arrest, he told his fellow- 
prisoner that it was his duty, as a pastor, not only 
to comfort the victims of the man who drove in a busy 
street like a maniac, but also to try to stop him. 
Bonhoeffer remained, in all his resistance work, a 
theologian and a pastor.
As a matter of fact, Bonhoeffer had thought of the
possibility of such action already in the early 1930s.
In his speech on "The Church and the Jewish Question"
delivered in April 1933, he spoke of three possible
tasks of the Church. The first is to ask the State
whether its action is legitimate political action;
the second is service on behalf of the victims of
political action; and the third is "not only to bind
up the victims beneath, the wheel, but also to put a
8 8spoke in that wheel." The third task is direct 
political action by the Church, to be taken only when 
the State ceases to function as a State with law and
88) Gesainmeite Schriften, Band IE, p. 48.
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order. In other words, the third task is the extra­
ordinary action to be taken in a "boundary situation" 
(Grenzfall). When Bonhoeffer decided to take part in 
the conspiratorial assassination of Hitler, he judged 
the situation of Nazi Germany to be nothing but a 
"boundary situation." He believed that it was his 
responsibility and task as a Christian and'a pastor 
to remove that situation even by violence. Such a view 
of responsibility is clearly seen in his manuscript of 
Ethics written between 1940 and 1943 during which he 
was engaged in the plot. As an example, he wrote 
in the section "the Acceptance of Guilt":
From what has just been said it emerges that the structure of responsible action includes both readiness to accept guilt and freedom.When we once more turn our attention to the origin of all responsibility it becomes clear to us what we are to understand by acceptance of guilt. Jesus is not concerned with the proclama­tion and realization of new ethical ideals; He is not concerned with Himself being good (Matt. 19: 17); He is concerned solely with love for the real man. ... As one who acts responsibly in the his­torical existence of men Jesus becomes guilty. It must be emphasized that it is solely His love which makes Him incur guilt. ... Jesus took upon Himself the guilt of all men, and for that reason every man who acts responsibly becomes guilty. If any man tries to escape guilt in responsibility he detaches himself from the ultimate reality of human existence, and what is more he cuts himself off from the redeeming mystery of Christ's bear­ing guilt without sin and he has no share in the divine justification which lies upon this event..., Through Jesus Christ it becomes an essential part of responsible action that the man who is without sin loves selflessly and for that reason incurs guilt.. (8 9)
89) Ethics, p. 209-210,
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Because of his love and responsibility for those
who became the victims of Hitler, Bonhoeffer dared to
incur guilt. Further more, because of an abnormal
"boundary situation," he decided to take extraordinary
action, namely violence,
Bonhoeffer had considered a lengthy and elaborate
work on Christian ethics since the closing of Finken-
walde in 1937. However, he was not able to devote time
to it until 1940, He wrote most of the work over the
next three years in various places: at his parents'
home in Berlin; in the Benedictine Abbey of Ettal in
Upper Bavaria, where he lived for several months as a
V-man (a civilian employee of the Military Intelligence)
working in Muenich; and at the summer estate of a friend,
Frau Ruth von Kleist-Retzow, in Pomerania. When he
began writing, the conviction grew that Ethics was the
beginning of his real life work in the short time that
remained to him. In the letter to Bethge from the Tegel
prison on 15th December, 1943, he wrote "I thin^ I
really have my life more or less behind me now and
that all that would remain for me to do would be to
90finish my Ethics."
90) Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 163
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It is apparent why Bonhoeffer would consider this
his major work —  or the beginning of his real life 
work. No previous works are marked with the daring, 
almost rash originality of the Ethics? none are ambiti­
ous in the mature and consciously theological way this 
work is. The understanding of Church and world which 
Bonhoeffer seeks in the work proceeds with a full 
awareness of Christ's presence in the Church, and of 
His formative action upon the members of the Church.
Yet Bonhoeffer, as before, could not illuminate the 
overpowering action of Christ upon the world without
providing a profound understanding of the world's
■ 4- 91own ex1 s tenc e .
The effect is a delicate tension, throughout the 
Ethics, between the supernatural and the natural, or 
between the ultimate and the penultimate. Within this 
tension he is able to come to grips with what is funda­
mentally a new understanding of the Church—  no longer 
in terms of a static pattern, or even a theologically 
defined "nature," but of an existential mission.
The Church is nothing but a section of humanity in which Christ has really taken form.What we have here is utterly and completely the form of Jesus Christ and not some other form side by side with Him. The Church is the man in Christ, incarnate, sentenced and awakened to new life.
91) cf. W. Kuhns: In Pursuit of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,p. 117.
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In the first instance, therefore, she has essen­tially nothing whatever to do with the so-called religious functions of man, but with the whole man in his existence in the world with all its implications. (92)
Such a radical orientation towards the Church in 
terms of the mission to the world does not stop there; 
Bonhoeffer continues to erect upon this Church-world 
doctrine his notion of ethics, one highly geared to 
"conformation" into Christ, and highly relative in its 
expression in different situations in the world. In 
as much as there is a basic ethical principle, the con­
clusive moral demand is for conscious responsibility, 
not naively to one's own "Christian calling," which 
begs the question, but to the world, where Christ car­
ried out His responsibility.
It must be admitted that the structural develop­
ment of these steps is hardly clear in the present, 
incomplete volume of Bonhoeffer's Ethics.
Bonhoeffer*s book did not progress chapter by chapter in accordance with a fixed and unalter­able plan, Each one grew gradually by the coalescence : of; numerous separate studies of the subject until it formed a whole. The titles and the arrangement of the book were subject to constant change in the course of this process.
(93)
92) Ethics, p. 64,
93) Bethge: "Preface to Ethics" in Ethics, p. 12
252
The gap between the Ethics Bonhoeffer intended 
and the fragmented work he has left behind is no doubt 
a great one. In the present Ethics, four stages of 
development are present, with each stage illuminating 
a new probing and a new foothold; clearly Bonhoeffer 
was working towards a realization he never made, except 
sketchily in the letters from the prison. It is appro­
priate, unfortunately, that Bethge defines Bonhoeffer*s 
Ethics as "an absolute fragment".
Nevertheless the Ethics remains with little doubt 
Bonhoeffer's most substantial and perhaps most theologi­
cally significant work, "If no carefully etched 
pattern controls the book, an inner unity rises out of 
Bonhoeffer*s gripping consciousness of a kernel idea
94and his awareness of its impact on all Christian life.* 
Because of this inner unity Bonhoeffer's Ethics is still 
a worthy guiding star for us today.
94) W* Kuhns; In Pursuit of Dietrich Bonhoeffer,p. 119.'
CHAPTER FIVE
BONHOEFFER'S IMPORTANCE FOR 
THE CHURCH IN JAPAN
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As I have already mentioned, the name of Dietrich
Bonhoeffer has been famous in Japan since the beginning
of the I9 60*s. In those days the selected works of
Bonhoeffer which consist of nine volumes were issued in
a Japanese translation. This publication, needless to
say, has expedited the wide interest in him among
ministers, theologians and laymen. The first appearance
of his name in our country goes way back to October,
11950 and selected translations from his Letters and 
Papers from Prison had begun to appear in a periodical 
in 1955.^
Bonhoeffer himself, however, had shown his concern 
for the church in Japan a long time ago. In 1940, he 
wrote these comments about Japan in his Ethics.
It is only in the Christian west that it is possible to speak of a historical heritage. Certainly there are also traditions in Asia and they are much older than ours, but they share in the timelessness of Asiatic existence, and even in Japan, where the western way of existence has been most fully accepted, history still retains a mythological character. The first article of the present-day (1940) Japanese constitution prescribes belief in the descent of the Emperor or Tenno from the sun-god . The concept of historical inheritance, which is linked with the consciousness of temporality .and opposed to all mythologization, is possible only where thought is consciously or unconsciously governed by the entry of God into history at à definite place and a definite point of time, that is to say.
1) In a small monthly magazine Kyodai (Brother), no, 16, October, 1950.
2) FUkUin to Sekai (Gospel and World), January, 1955- Dec ember, 1955.
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by the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ. (3)
At that time he simply mentioned that the Japanese 
consitution requires the nation to worship the Emperor. 
Bonhoeffer, however, clearly criticized the church in 
Japan in his study on the Ten Commandments which was 
written in Tegel prison in 1944.
The majority of Christians in Japan have recently declared that participation in the state emperor cult is permitted. In all decisions of this nature the following points are to be con­sidered: (1) When participation in such acts ofthe state is demanded, is it clearly a matter of the worship of other gods? If it is, then refusal is the clear obligation of Christians. (2) If there is doubt about whether it is a religious or a political act, then the decision will depend on whether by a Christian's participation in it, the church of Christ and the world are offended, that is, if by participation at least the appearance of a denial of Jesus Christ is given. If this is not the case according to the common judgement of the Christians, then nothing stands in the way of participation. But if it is the case, then here also participation will have to be refused. (4)
After the Second World War we Christians in Japan
found that we had to give our approval to this criticism
of Bonhoeffer. As the result, in some sense, a study on
Bonhoeffer in Japan must work back to the inner substance
of this understanding and practice. And it is our task,
therefore, to answer to his challenge.
3) Ethics, p. 69.
4) J. Godsey: Preface to Bonhoeffer, pp. 58-59
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Since the beginning of the 1960's, not only the 
translation of Bonhoeffer*s works but also a large 
number of articles or theses on Bonhoeffer which intend 
to introduce his thought and life or interpret his 
theological thinking have been published. The sub­
stantial arguments were discussed and fundamental 
research was developed. Unfortunately, however, most 
of this work is partial and makes clear only a part of
Bonhoeffer’s thought and action. Among such tendencies,
5the publication of "Fukujuh to Teikoh eno Michi" (The 
Way to Obedience and Resistance) written by Heita Mori 
in 19 64 is worthy of being noted. This is the only 
Japanese literature which is listed in the worldwide 
comprehensive bibliography on Bonhoeffer by Ernst Feil, 
at the end of his book "Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers", 
1971 .
This biographical study on Bonhoeffer appeared 
three years before the publication of Eberhard Bethge's 
voluminous work of over a thousand pages titled "Eine 
Biographie Dietrich Bonhoeffers : Theologe, Christ, 
Zeitgenosse" (1967, Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München), . It 
is said that this work is an epochmaking one among 
Japanese researches which were treading the path of 
fragmentary interpretation of and introduction to 
Bonhoeffer,
5) Heita Moris' Fukujuh to Teikoh eno Michi, 1964, p.349
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Thenceforwards many substantial studies have 
appeared in Germany and other European countries, 
including: J» Godsey: The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
(Diss. Basel, 1958); J. A. Phillips: The Form of Christ 
in the World (1964); H. Ott: Wirk1ichkeit und GTaube.
Erster Band: Zum TheOlogischen Erbe Dietrich Bonhoeffers
Ethik bei Dietrich(1966); J. Weissbach: Christologie und _____ ________
Bonhoeffer (1966); E . Bethge; Eine Biographie Dietrich 
Bonhoeffers ; Theologe, Christ, Zeitgenosse (1 967);
R, G. Smith ed.: World Come of Age (1967); A. Dumas:
Une theologie de la realité: Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1968)
R. Mayer: Christuswirklichkeit (1969); E. Feil: Theologie 
Dietrich Bonhoeffers (1971); T, R. Peters; Die Praesenz 
des Politisches in der Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers 
(1976).
In Japan, however, a contribution which surpasses 
Heita Mori is still awaited. Moreover, unfortunately, 
it cannot be denied that there are still certain tenden­
cies to risk using Bonhoeffer carelessly without an 
earnest effort to get a fundamental understanding or 
to distort his thinking, which leads to many misleading 
notions about him circulating among the Japanese.
A careful research into Bonhoeffer's thought is therefore 
still of value. At the end of 1978, the Bonhoeffer 
Committee of Japan which is connected with Internationales 
Bonhoeffer-Kommittee was organized. The time of trans-
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lation and introduction is over. There is now an urgent 
need to accumulate sound researches and make a wider and 
deeper study in our country.
Such research must start from an understanding of 
the different ways in which Bonhoeffer‘s theological 
thinking has been received in Japan,
The first has concentration on Bonhoeffer as a 
politically committed Christian. As mentioned above, 
"Fukujuh to Teikoh eno Michi" (The Way to Obedience and 
Resistance) written by Mori is a monumental work among 
studies on Bonhoeffer in Japan. It makes clear the 
meaning of Bonhoeffer's theology and practice in a 
political and social situation of that time. It also 
describes impressively enough how Bonhoeffer had lived 
and died as a member of the conspiracy in the dark age 
of the Hitler regime. Mori describes his purpose and 
intention in writing in a postscript:
While inquiring into Bonhoeffer's life and struggle, the problem of the responsibility of thechurches in Japan towards politics, especially the problem of the Christian peace movement in Japan was ever present in my mind. Today, allChristians in Japan are severely challenged about their own ecclesiastical and political attitudes.It is my earnest desire that this book will do something to answer this severe question. (6)
It is clear that the matter of primary concern at 
that time was how Christians should build up the church
6) H. Mori: Fukujuh to Teikoh eno Michi, p. 3 49. The translation is mine.
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and participate in political affairs. They paid much 
attention to Bonhoeffer as a martyr against the Nazis 
when many Japanese Christian, with a few exceptions, 
took an equivocal attitude towards the militaristic 
government during the Second World War. With a deep 
feeling of repentance, Bonhoeffer's thought and life 
was widely accepted. In connection with this tendency, 
severe criticism was directed at the leaders of the 
Church of Christ in Japan during the war time.
It could be said that since Christianity has been 
a minority power in Japan, Christians have been anxious 
to live without any serious mistakes. In the past 
Christianity worked mainly in the limited field of 
personal piety.
Now, however, a cry for reform of the church arose 
and social concerns were promoted in the Christian world. 
Such a new trend was brought to fruition in a "Confession 
of Responsibility During the Second World War" which was
issued on Easter Sunday 26th March, 1967 in the name of
the moderator Masahisa Suzuki with the approval of the 
executive committee of the Church of Christ in Japan.
This confession corresponds to the Stuttgart Confession 
of Guilt (Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis) which was issued 
at the time of the establishment of the Evangelical 
Church in Germany (E, K. D.) in October, 1945, At this
point, it must be noted that all the signers of the
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Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis, including Dr M. Niemoeller, 
were members of the Confessing Church and resisters 
against Hitler's Nazi regime. In other words, the German 
church began her activities in the post war days by 
confessing her guilt and errors, even though some members 
had fought against Hitler's tyranny and some of them had 
been imprisoned for that reason.
However, the church in Japan, in spite of her compro­
mising attitude towards the militaristic absolute 
government in war time, could not draw a definite line 
between pre-war and post-war. For the churches made a 
desperate effort to increase the numbers in their congre­
gations, taking advantage of the so-called Christian boom 
in post-war period. It was more than twenty years later 
that the church in Japan awakened to her failures.
Nevertheless, the proclamation of this Confession of 
Responsibility could be counted as one of the most 
effective event in the post-war history of the United 
Church of Christ in Japan, The whole text of the Confes­
sion is as follows:
The 25th Anniversary of the establishment of the United Church of Christ in Japan (Kyodan) was celebrated during the 14th General Assembly of the Kyodan held in October, 1966, at Osaka, Japan. Now, we are faced with the serious task of building the Kyodan. In order to express our sense of res­ponsibility which the Kyodan has toward Japan and the world we prayerfully take as our theme "OUR CHURCH-TOMORROW".At this time we are reminded of the mistakes committed in the name of the Kyodan during World
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War II. Therefore, we seek the mercy of our Lord and the forgiveness of our fellow men.At the time of the founding of the Kyodan the Japanese Government then under pressure asked that all religious bodies foe brought together and that they cooperate with the national policy to bring the war to a victorious end.Since the time that the Gospel was first pre­sented in the early part of the Meiji Era, Japanese Christians had desired to establish one evangelical Church in Japan, by the merging of denominations. Therefore, they entered into the Union and the Kyodan was established taking advantage of an order of the government.Concerning this founding and the continued existence of the Kyodan we recognize, with deep fear and gratitude, that, even in our failures and errors, the Providence of God, "The Lord of History," was at work.The Church, as "the light of the world" and as "the salt of the earth," should not have aligned itself with the militaristic purpose of the govern­ment. Rather on the basis of our love for her, and by the standard of our Christian conscience, we should have more correctly criticized the policies of our mother land. However, we made a statement at home and abroad in the name of the Kyodan that we approved of and supported the war, and we prayed for victory.Indeed, as our nation committed errors we, as a Church, sinned with her. We neglected to perform our mission as a "watchman". Now, with deep pain in our heart we confess this sin, seeking the for­giveness of our Lord, and from the churches and our brothers and sisters of the world, and in particular of Asian countries, and from the people of our own country.More than 20 years have passed since the war, and we are filled with anxiety, for our mother land seems unable to decide the course that we should follow; we are concerned lest she move in an un­desirable direction due to the many pressures of today's turbulent problems. At this moment so that the Kyodan can correctly accomplish its mission in Japan and the world we seek God's help and guidance. In this way we look forward to tomorrow with humble determination.
MASAHISA SUZUKI Moderator
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The contents of this Confession undoubtedly 
reminds us of Bonhoeffer's "The Confession of Guilt" 
in the Ethics, part of which reads as follows:
The Church confesses that she has not pro­claimed often and clearly enough her message of the one God who has revealed Himself for all times in Jesus Christ and who suffers no other gods beside Himself. She confesses her timidity, her evasiveness, her dangerous concessions. She has often been untrue to her office of guardianship and to her office of comfort. And through this she has often denied to the outcast and to the despised the compassion which she owes them. She was silent when she should have cried out because the blood of the innocent was crying aloud to heaven. She has failed to speak the right word in the right way and, at the right time. She has not resisted to the uttermost the apostasy of faith, and she has brought upon herself the guilt of the godlessness of the masses.
... By her own silence she has rendered herself guilty of the decline in responsible action, in bravery in the defence of a cause, and in willingness to suffer for what is known to be right. She bears the guilt of the defection of the governing authority from Christ. (7)
According to Bethge's investigation, this part,
which is the second part of four fresh starts of his
ethical thinking, was written in autumn 1940 on the
estate at Klein-Kroessin ( K i e c k o w ) I t  means that
Bonhoeffer wrote this passage on the confession of the
guilt of the Church when Hitler had achieved his most
surprising victory over France and his popularity in
Germany was at its height. It was his insight that the
7) Ethics, pp. 92-94.
8) E. Betghe: "Preface to the Rearranged Sixth German Edition", Ethics, pp. xii-xiii.
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Church can become the real Church only through formation 
in His likeness (Gieichgestaltung) by bearing and confes­
sing the guilt of the world in the midst of this historical 
worId.
It might not be unreasonable to recognize Bonhoeffer’s 
influence upon the ’Confession of Responsibility During 
the Second World War'. Indeed, it would be better to say 
that Bonhoeffer's life and thought, which have had wide 
influence among Japanese Christians, induced the people 
to awaken to their failures in war time and guided them 
to the confession.
The announcement of the Confession, however, created 
a sensation among the churches in Japan. It was welcomed 
by those who depart from a parallelism of church and 
society and intend to assume the social responsibility 
of a Christian who lives in this world on the one hand, 
and it was opposed by those who defend the evangelical 
tradition and devote themselves to church activities on 
the other hand. For fear of a schism of Kyodan, a com­
mittee of five members was organized which tried to 
settle the situation. As the result, the focus of the 
matter became ambiguous and the real question was with­
drawn from sincere consideration.
The second type of reception of Bonhoeffer is seen 
in the trend towards interpretation from the standpoint 
of secularization.
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Bonhoeffer's name was often quoted as a theologian 
who defended the movement of modernization or secular­
ization. While the first group took a warm interest in 
how Bonhoeffer carried through his fight against Nazism, 
the second group showed their concern to learn how 
Bonhoeffer's theology answers to the question of how we 
should understand the Gospel and preaching for this 
modernized age.
We can find one example in this statement.
Modernization rather means a non-religious way of living. Because in the modern society, the claim is to assert oneself with religious authority or to maintain the relative as the absolute.The German theologian Bonhoeffer, who was exe­cuted because of his engagement in the resistance movement against the Nazis, wrote in his letters from prison as follows: "To be a Christian doesnot mean to be religious in a particular way, to make something of oneself (a sinner, a penitent, or a saint) on the basis of some method or other, but to be a man —  not a type of man, but the man that Christ creates in us." (Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 361)Modernization could be supported by such a man who is not above nor under the man. (9)
, Bonhoeffer's idea of "the world come of age", of 
"non-religious interpretation", was used as a powerful 
weapon to proclaim the Gospel to the secular modern 
society. His understanding of the worldliness of Chris­
tianity was used to soften the feeling of estrangement 
of modern people towards religion. But it could be said 
here also that Bonhoeffer's theological thinking was 
understood only from the point of methodological concern
9) Y. Kumazawa: Asu no Shingaku to Kyokai (Theology and Church Tomorrow), p. 45. The translation is mine
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The theology of Bonhoeffer, needless to say, is 
closely connected with the situation of the world.
It has been produced from his actual life in history.
It is not abstract but concrete. However', his theology 
should not be understood simply as one which defends 
the so-called secularization of the world.
In 1930 Bonhoeffer went to New York to study at 
Union Theological Seminary. During a stay in the United 
States of only nine months he had an "encounter", so to 
speak, with the.Black Church. Since a Black friend at 
Union, whose name was Frank Fisher, took him to visit 
the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem, almost every 
Sunday he attended that church and became a regular worker 
in the Sunday school and the various club activities of 
the church. It was and is still now a rather rare case 
that a foreign student should participate regularly in 
a Black church's life and activity. That was, however, 
what Bonhoeffer had done. One of the reasons why he 
went to the Black church may be his critical view of 
the white churches.
One may hear sermons in New York about almost any subject; only one is never or very seldom heard; namely the Gospel of Jesus Christ, of the cross, of sin and forgiveness, of death and life.(10)
10) Gesammelte Schriften. Band I, pp. 94f. Quoted from Y. Furuya; "Bonhoeffer and King", Humanities, 1973, p. 3.
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This might be one reason why he called the church 
in America "Protestantism without Reformation".
Bonhoeffer found a great joy in the Black church. IThis personal contact with the Negroes was ifor me one of the most pleasing and significant jevent of my America visit, |First of all, I heard the Gospel preached in jthe Negro church. Here one could truly hear about |sin and grace, love to God and final hope spoken |in a Christian way. (11)
Bonhoeffer called the Black church the only "Pro­
letarian Church" in the United States and had a deep !
concern about the Negro problem, j
He had an interest in the proletariat even before 
his coming to the United States. He wrote in his disser- •
tation (1927), which was published under the title of 
"Sanctorum Communio" (1930), as follows:
On my view it cannot be gainsaid that the ;future and the hope for our 'bourgeois’ church |lies in a renewal of its life-blood, which is only possible if the church succeeds in winning the proletariat. If the church does not see this, :then it will spurn a moment of the most serious jdecision. (12)
Since he had already such a view on the church and 
the proletariat from the beginning of his career as a j
theologian, he became immediately interested in the 
Black church in the United States and could identify
11) Gesammelte Schriften. Band I, p. 97.
12) Sanctorum Communio, p. 275.
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himself with it. Paul Lehmann, his best American 
friend, recalled later.
What was so impressive was the way in which he pursued the understanding of the problem to its minutest detail through books and countless visits to Harlem, through participation in Negro youth work, but even more through sa remarkable kind of identity with the Negro community, so that he was received there as though he had never been an outsider at all. (13)
Having returned to Germany, and while he was lectur­
ing at Berlin University, he worked for and lived with 
proletarian boys in Wedding, the most deprived district 
in Berlin. Although the ministry he sought in the over­
crowded slums of east Berlin did not materialize, he was 
ready to go there instead of to the university. His 
desire for working with the proletariat was genuine and 
lasted even in prison.
It is true that Bonhoeffer understood the modernized 
world positively and wished to live in and for that 
world.
Here, the discussion of 'the ultimate and the 
penultimate' should be remembered. For Bonhoeffer 'the 
ultimate' and 'the penultimate' are inseparable. He 
insists ;
For the sake of the ultimate, the penultimate must be preserved. Any arbitrary destruction of the penultimate will do serious injury to the
13) P. Lehmann: B. B.& Ci talk, 13th March, 1960. Quoted by E, Bethge: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, p. 114.
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ultimate. If, for example, a human life is deprived of the conditions which are proper to it, then the justification of such a life by grace and faith, if it is not rendered impossible, is at least serious­ly impeded. (14)
The penultimate is, therefore, not unimportant but 
must be regarded as necessary. He himself positively 
engaged in the penultimate things. It does not, however, 
mean that he affirms the secular world without due con­
sideration. In this context these statements which are 
found in his report of his second visit to America en­
titled "Protestantism without Reformation" written in 
August, 1939, must be noted.
The freedom of the church is not where it has possibilities, but only where the Gospel really and in its own power makes room for itself on earth, even and precisely when no such possibilities are offered to it. The essential freedom of the church is not a gift of the world to the church, but the freedom of the Word of God itself to gain a hearing. Freedom of the church is not an unbounded number of possibilities: it only exists where a 'must', a necessity, on occasion compels it against all possi­bilities. The praise of freedom as the possibility for existence given by the world to the church can stem precisely from an agreement entered upon with this world in which the true freedom of the Word of God is surrendered. Thus it can happen that a church which boasts of its freedom as a possibility offered to it by the world slips back into the world to a special degree, that a church which is free in this way becomes secularised more quickly than a church which does not possess freedom as possibility. (15)
14) Ethics, p. 111.
15) No Rusty Swords, p. 100.
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In other words, whether a church is really free or 
not depends upon whether the Word of God is actually 
preached or not. So he went on to say;
Whether the churches of God are really free can only be decided by the actual preaching of the Word of God. Only where this word can be preached concretely, in the midst of historical reality, in judgement, command, forgiveness of sinners and liberation from all human institutions is there freedom of the church. But where thanks for in­stitutional freedom must be rendered by the sacri­fice of freedom of preaching, the church is in chains, even if it believes itself to be free.(16)
Bonhoeffer’s idea of a ’world come of age’ or ’non­
religious interpretation’ should be understood theologi­
cally and not methodologically or politically. 
Consequently we cannot deny that Bonhoeffer has not been 
understood properly in the church of Japan.
The third type of reception can be seen in rather 
conservative attitudes. The most popular book among 
Bonhoeffer’s works in Japan is "Life Together" (Gemein- 
sames Leben, 1939). Four different translations have 
already been published. This shows that his theology is 
introduced and read as the theology of the formation of 
the church in some sense.
Through his whole life, Bonhoeffer certainly intend­
ed to work for the formation of the church. . From the
16) No Rusty Swords, p. 101,
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beginning his theological concerns were directed to the 
problem of the church. His first two works. Sanctorum 
Communio and Akt und Sein, revolve around the concept 
of the church. He was a minister just as much as a 
theologian.
Unfortunately, however, it has been understood by 
the third group that his thinking stands out in sharp 
contrast to that accepted by the second group. This 
means that his theology has been accepted as extremely 
internal. Christianity is placed only in the sphere of 
the personal, the inner and the private. The concern 
is mainly for the self-preservation of the church.
This is merely an instance:
The Christian church can fulfil her essential service to the world by concentrating on carrying through what an Arkandisziplin aims at. (17)
In Bonhoeffer’s thinking, the ideas of the worldli­
ness of Christianity and of the Arkandisziplin (a secret 
discipline), both hold an important position. Bonhoeffer 
connects this notion o^ an Ar kandis z ip1in which would 
preserve the mysteries of the Christian faith from pro­
fanation with his thoughts about the ultimate and the 
penultimate. In contrast to the visible, worldly life 
of the Christian in the realm of the "things before the 
last", there must be a hidden, disciplined life of
17) T, Katoh: FUkuinshugi Kyokai Kei'sei no Kadai (The Task of the FormatToh of % e  EvangelTdaT CEurch)",' p. 24 Translation is mine.
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devotion and prayer that is grounded in belief in the 
"last things". These form the dialectical relations of 
Christian existence, the worldly life always requiring 
the nourishment of the secret discipline and the Arkan­
disziplin always sending a man back into the secular 
worId.
This dialectical relation has not functioned suf­
ficiently, and the ultimate concern has been emphasized 
onesidedly in this group. As the result the notion of 
an ArkandiszipTin could not be understood in a way 
which meets with Bonhoeffer's primary intention, and 
was used simply as a type of church asceticism.
In Bonhoeffer the second and third type should 
supplement each other, however their relation was accepted 
as coexistent or opposite in Japanese church. The first 
reason why this parallelism has taken place in this 
country can be seen in the fact that the task of the 
church in Japan which was shown in the first type and 
was presented by Bonhoeffer himself was not taken up as 
a problem seriously in both the second and the third 
type.
The second reason can be seen in a tendency to treat 
Bonhoeffer's theology as an answer and not as a question. 
The church in Japan should be mutually faced with the 
problem or task of the church in company with him.
However, she has changed the question which Bonhoeffer
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raised to an answer of her own, through interpreting 
his theology as a leading mark of the manner in which 
the Japanese church can overcome the failure of the 
church in prewar times, or the church can proclaim the 
Gospel to modern world, and the church can grow up in 
these days. As the result the dialectical relation was 
lost sight of, and the church remained only in the 
realm of the religious world.
Recently, even some distorted criticism or some 
kind of an agitation for the exclusion of Bonhoeffer's 
theology has appeared in Japan. Those who take the 
critical position against Bonhoeffer call his idea of 
"non-religionisation" so to speak, in question. They 
insist that the church should assume the form of religion 
and it is her aim not to pursue the way of non-religion- 
isation but the way of real religionisation. And they 
regard the thought of "the church for others" or "non- 
religionisation", which they insist that those are the 
representative ideas of his theology, as rather dangerous. 
They are afraid of whether he has replaced the theology 
of redemption by one of social liberation. One of the 
typical examples of this type of criticism could be 
seen in the following sentences^
Non-religionisation of Christianity changes its vertical relation to God to a horizontal re­lation to the neighbours. As long as the vertical relation is kept, the so-called religious realm comes into existence. Bonhoeffer, however, has
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dissolved this religious realm by changing the vertical relation to the horizontal one. He has changed the relation to God into the relation to the neighbours. (18)
However, this does not do justice to Bonhoeffer's 
intention. It is not his idea but the idea of the so- 
called theology of liberalism. So we may say that it 
is unfair to criticize him in such a way. He insisted 
that the divided realms of the horizontal and the vertical 
are in truth inseparable and must remain so. It is true 
that Bethge, his good friend, defends him saying?
Bonhoeffer never induced anyone to adapt himself to the false spirit of the age, the Zeitgeist. What Bonhoeffer has left us is rich because he teaches us to keep a balance in think­ing, in teaching and in acting so that doing the just thing keeps prayers from destruction and vice versa. (19)
In this connection, it might be right to examine 
his motif by quoting his original sentence. The idea 
of a non-religious world or a non-religious interpre­
tation appeared in his later years. He wrote a letter 
in May, 1944 from Tegel prison to Renate and Eberhard 
Bethge when they baptized their first child who was 
Bonhoeffer’s godson. This text is entitled "Thoughts 
on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Ruediger 
Bethge". The concluding section reads as follows:
18) T. Satoh? Shuhkyoh no Soshitsu to Kaifuku (On the Forfeiture of Religion and its Reconstruction), p. 183 Translation is mine.
19) E. Bethge: Prayer and Righteous Action, p. 26,
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Today you will be baptized a Christian, All those great ancient words of the Christian procla­mation will be spoken over you, and the command of Jesus Christ to baptize will be carried out on you, without your knowing anything about it. But we are once again being driven right back to the beginnings of our understanding. Reconciliation and redemption, regeneration and the Holy Spirit, love of our enemies, cross and resurrection, life in Christ and Christian discipleship —  all these things are so difficult and so remote that we hardly venture any more to speak of them. In the traditional words and acts we suspect that there may be something quite new and revolutionary, though we cannot as yet grasp or express it. That is our own fault. Our church, which has been fighting in these years only for its self-preser­vation, as though that were an end in itself, is incapable of taking the word of reconciliation and redemption to mankind and the world. Our earlier words are therefore bound to lose their force and cease, and our being Christians today will be limited to two things: prayer and right­eous action among men. All Christian thinking, speaking, and organizing must be born anew out of this prayer and action. By the time you have grown up, the church's form will have changed greatly. We are not yet out of the melting-pot, and any attempt to help the church prematurely to a new expansion of its organization will merely delay its conversion and purification. It is not for us to prophesy the day (though the day will come) when men will once more be called so to utter the word of God that the world will be changed and renewed by it. It will be a new language, perhaps quite non-religious, but liberating and redeeming —  as was Jesus' language? it will shock people and yet overcome them by its power? it will be the language of a new righteousness and truth, proclaim­ing God's peace with men and the coming of his kingdom. 'They shall fear and tremble because of all the good and all the prosperity I provide for it' (Jer. 33:9). Till then the Christian cause will be a silent and hidden affair, but there will be those who pray and do right and wait for God's own time. May you be one of them, and may it be said of you one day, 'The path of the righteous is like the light of dawn, which shines brighter and brighter till full day* (Prov. 4:18) (20)
20) Letters and Papers from Prison, pp. 299-300.
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We also find these phrases which have been quoted 
again and again:
When we speak of God in a "non-religious' way, we must speak of him in such a way that the godless­ness of the world is not in some way concealed, but rather revealed, and thus exposed to an unexpected light. The world that has come of age is more god­less. and perhaps for that very reason nearer to God, than the world before its coming of age. (21)
It is Bonhoeffer's intention to unite the vertical 
and the horizontal firmly together. We should not mis­
understand Bonhoeffer by imagining that in the realization 
of his worldly interpretation there would no longer be 
any community gathered for worship, so that the Word, 
the Sacrament and the community could be simply replaced 
by caritas. What he criticizes is an attitude of the 
church that is carried away for its self-preservation, 
as though that is an end itself, because such a church 
cannot say the word of reconciliation and redemption to 
mankind and the world.
On that conviction he insisted that our being 
Christians today will be limited to two things: praying 
and doing the just thing among men on the one hand,and 
on the other hand that Christians are called to proclaim 
the Word of God by a new language that is quite non­
religious, but liberating and redeeming *—  as was Jesus's 
language; it will shock people and yet overcome them by
21) Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 3 62,
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its power. In him, praying and doing the just thing 
interpret and correct each other. Prayer protects 
righteous action from being subordinated to this world, 
and righteous action protects prayer from being simply 
an escape to a self-satisfied inner world. It reminds 
us of his famous word written in The Cost of Disciple­
ship; "Only he who believes is obedient, and only he 
who is obedient believes". This tension must be con­
sidered in order to understand Bonhoeffer"s thought 
and life correctly.
For him the most important thing is the presence of 
Christ, not how to show him to the world. In order to 
let the actual relationship to Christ be present, asking 
the question of "Who is Christ for us today?" must not 
be forgotten. This is where we have statements about 
silence and invisibility, about the way in which the 
just man prays and acts, and about the difference between 
the ultimate and the penultimate. (22)
Bonhoeffer once confessed "what is bothering me
incessantly is the question what Christianity really
23is, or indeed who Christ really is, for us today?"
The question "who is Christ" is the key to understanding
22) E, Bethge: Bonhoeffer, p. 784,
23) Letters and Papers from Prison, p. 279
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Bonhoeffer's theology. Every problem must be thought 
through and interpreted starting from this question.
It seems to me that there has been a certain tendency 
to give too much attention to Bonhoeffer asking 'how' 
questions —  Wie Frage, so to speak, especially in the 
church in Japan. It is important, however, to keep our 
eyes upon 'who' questions —  Wer Frage, in company with 
Bonhoeffer, and to live as a Christian in the world here 
and now. Because from questioning who Christ really is, 
we could find a new relation to God and the neighbours. 
The separation of faith and act or Gospel and law would 
be overcome. A true reception of Bonhoeffer could be 
started actually from this point.
We must now turn to undertake a survey of the legacy 
of Bonhoeffer's Ethics and seek the way which the church 
in Japan should take in the future.
Since the sixteenth century Reformation, we have 
always seen some kind of separation between faith and 
act or God's grace and man's behaviour in the Protestant 
Church, It is a phenomenon unfortunately spread all 
over the world.
In Germany it could not be denied that this tendency 
has been influenced by Luther's doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms, the kingdom of the church, which is ruled by 
the preached word of God, and the kingdom of the world, 
which is ruled by the sword: the realm of the spiritual
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office and the realm of secular government. The corpus 
christianum is resolved into its true constituents, the 
corpus christi and the world. In His Church Christ 
rules not by the sword but solely with His word.
In Japan, Protestant Christianity has a history of 
over one hundred years. Almost twenty years have passed 
since the centennial celebration of the beginning of 
Protestant missions in Japan. Nevertheless, the number 
of Christians was and is still very small, less than 
one percent of the whole population. The fact that the 
Christians of this country have been always a minority 
group produces an attitude of self-preservation. The 
church in Japan has been obliged to remain in the realm 
of the spiritual and internal affairs and to make the 
utmost efforts to preserve and enlarge herself. It is 
true that she has had an increasing interest in social 
problems since the Second World War. The church has begun 
to shoulder her social responsibilities and many Christians 
have been aware of the necessity of their openness to 
the world. In the nineteen sixties and seventies the 
church of Japan has been faced with many difficult 
problems. One of the most severe troubles was the 
antagonism between so-called evangelical group and the 
social group. As I have mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper^^a careful investigation is in order, as an
24) See Introduction,
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attempt to throw some light on these problems. This is 
always of great importance to the church everywhere, 
but especially relevant in view of the situation of the 
church in Japan, What can we learn from Bonhoeffer?
Following up the line of Bonhoeffer's ethical 
thinking, we cannot but fully realize the realism or 
concreteness of his thought.
It is difficult to deny the great importance of 
his thoughts for the modern world in spite of their 
fragmentary form. This might be partly due to the 
fascinating directness of his language. And also his 
theology was conceived not in a study, on a study desk, 
in safety, but in the midst of doing good and praying 
in the time of crisis, in that uninterpreted incognito, 
in that acceptance of the reduction of his existence as 
a minister of religion.
It seems to me that Bethge has understood Bonhoeffer*s 
intention correctly in his discussion on freedom when 
he writes as follows :
In practice this concept of freedom meant that Bonhoeffer would no longer make the claim for the universality of Christian faith, nor assert the priority of being Christian over being German, Nor would his concern be. a theology and ethic for all the world. This freedom now meant the particularity of being voluntarily bound into unreserved partnership with his own country as it ran headlong into destruction; it meant solidarity with his own class as its members either desper-. ately fought for survival by cooperating with evil or prepared its downfall by underground action; it meant solidarity with his church, silent and
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guilt-laden, an unwitting accomplice of unspeakable crimes. (25)
Bonhoeffer*s ethics is really an ethics for Chris­
tians in his particular world, grounded in a faith in 
the given presence of Christ. The integrity of his 
relations to the realities around him is a major signif­
icance of his ethic. In that sense, it seems to me that 
we can call his ethic a "Christocentric theologically 
responsible ethic".
It has long been maintained in discussion that only 
the Christian as an individual led by his personal con­
science can decide in politics, whereas neither the 
Christians as a group nor the church are able to do so. 
The church can do no more than respect the individual 
member's own decision. The minister's task, in the 
field of politics, would be to sharpen the conscience 
of the congregation. However, if this principle were 
strictly followed, the church could say nothing but 
admonish each member to be conscientious.
The church's course of so-called neutrality was 
disquieting for Bonhoeffer already in 1932, before 
National Socialism came to power. He demanded that 
the church should proclaim the word concretely and 
venture to speak up for truth when truth.tends to be 
forgotten. In a letter of 25th December, 1932, he
25) E. Bethge: "Freedom and Obedience in Dietrich Bonhoeffer", Prayer and Righteous Action, pp. 61-62
281
complains that "our church today is unable to speak the 
concrete commandment"?^ The word which is Christ who 
is present in the church is concrete enough to be heard 
not only by individuals but also by the congregation and 
even by a people as commanding with certainty.
It is his thinking that we live in a reality which 
is different from the ideology of individualism. He 
insisted that we should search for God's commandment in 
our life in history.
God makes His commandment heard in a definite historical form. We cannot now escape the question where and in what historical form God makes His commandment known. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, and even at the risk of a direct misunderstanding, we will begin by answering this question in the form of a thesis. God's commandment, which is manifested in Jesus Christ, comes to us in the Church, in the family, in labour and in government. (27)
In this context, we must take up the problem of 
what does 'history' mean and how do the life of an 
individual and history affect each other? In the 
dicision of Bonhoeffer to return to Germany from the 
United States in 1939 we can find the form of his con­
viction. Needless to say, it was very dangerous not 
to stay in the United States when war was imminent in 
Europe. Returning to Germany meant almost a suicidal
26) GesammeTte Schriften, Band I, pp. 63f
27) Ethics, p. 245,
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act. Considering the rights and duties of an individual, 
his decision cannot be justified. Bonhoeffer, however, 
was convinced that he ought to participate in the destiny 
and guilt of his people. Therefore he made up his mind 
to live where he belonged, through the course of events 
both during the war and, hopefully, afterwards when the 
time would have come for a new beginning. Solidarity 
means for the Christian to stand in for the others’ 
guilt and liabilities. The church asks for God's will 
to be done. Therefore he insisted the church must take 
the risk to speak of the word concretely, and that not 
to do so will mean guilt. As has been mentioned previ­
ously, in 1940, when Hitler was at the summit of his 
power, Bonhoeffer wrote a confession of guilt including 
the church's offence against the Jews.
The Church confesses that she has witnessed the lawless application of brutal force, the physical and spiritual suffering of countless innocent people, oppression, hatred and murder, and that she has not raised her voice on behalf of the victims and has not found ways to hasten to their aid. She is guilty of the deaths of the weakest and most defenceless brothers of Jesus Christ. (28)
It is clear that he was thinking of the problem of 
the Jews in these comments. However, the Stuttgart 
Confession of 1945 did not mention the Holocaust, so to
28) Ethics, p. 93
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speak, as if nobody had seen this biggest violation of 
the dignity of mankind in German history. The Stutt­
gart Confession must be judged as an actual historical 
event which produced a powerful influence on the churches 
not only in Germany but also in all parts of the world.
On the other hand, Bonhoeffer's confession in his Ethics 
did not receive any living response from an individual 
or from the church. However, the Stuttgart Confession 
was followed by restoration of the status quo ante, 
while Bonhoeffer’s confession led to action for the 
future.
Bonhoeffer understood history as a theological, 
especially a christological, concept. History is the 
reality in which Jesus Christ bound himself to humankind, 
accepting their guilt. Consequently, whoever lives in 
history as a human being is meant to live in relation 
with others. Hereupon the problem of responsibility 
becomes our issue, because responsibility is realized 
when we become aware of being connected with others.
It is difficult to find answers on many issues which 
haunt us today in Bonhoeffer's fragmentary and unfinished 
Ethics. For example he did not take up the problems of 
human liberties, human rights or human sciences. We 
could not say he was an ardent or experienced democrat. 
However, Bonhoeffer certainly bequeathed to us some pro­
found paragraphs on the foundations and direction for
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the inner unity of the mature and responsible Christian 
who lives and acts in manifold levels of involvement.
He showed the Christian the dynamic this- worldliness of Christ’s humanity, judgement and renewal. As one is drawn into the form of Christ, one is always in the process of being judged, renewed and humanized; the incompatible contra­dictions of Christian existence become a living, united reality: freedom and commitment; theauthority of Christ’s commands and the autonomy of free, personal decision; being directed from without and being liberated to mature self- realization. (29)
For Bonhoeffer then, it is the task of Christian 
ethics to show the "structures of responsible life".
The idea of "responsibility" becomes the centre where 
all Bonhoeffer’s ethical efforts finally focussed.
In the section entitled "The Structure of Respon­
sible Life", he maintains as follows:
Obedience without freedom is slavery; freedom without obedience is arbitrary Self-will, Obedience restrains freedom; and freedom ennobles obedience. Obedience binds the creature to the Creator, and freedom enables the creature to stand before the Creator as one who is made in His image. Obedience shows man that he must allow himself to be told what is good and what God requires of him (Micah 6:8); and liberty enables him to do good himself...
In responsibility both obedience and freedom are realized. Responsibility implies tension between obedience and freedom. There would be no more responsibility if either were made independent of the other. Responsible action is subject to obligation, and yet it is creative. ...
29) E. Bethge: "Freedom and Obedience in Dietrich Bonhoeffer", Prayer and Righteous Action, p. 66,
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The man of responsibility stands between obligation and freedom; he must dare to act under obligation and in freedom; yet he finds his jus­tification neither in his obligation nor in his freedom but solely in Him who has. put him in this (humanly impossible) situation and who requires this deed of him. The responsible man delivers up himself and his deed to God. (30)
For Bonhoeffer, therefore, it is equally absurd if
freedom means an absolute autonomy on the one hand and
obedience means an absolute heteronomy on the other
hand. These two absolutes lead to self-destruction as
Bonhoeffer himself experienced at that time. If freedom
and obedience are only abstract and isolated principles,
they are irrelevant to living, speaking and responding
people in their historical context and structures.
Bethge presumes that about the time when Bonhoeffer began
to write a chapter on "The Structure of Responsible Life",
he arrived at the highlight of this ethics of responsi- 
3 1bility.
In this chapter he sets out his conviction that 
when the person is confronted by the challenges of an 
extraordinary situation, he cannot hide behind legality.
He may and must decide completely on his own, confessing 
at the same time that valid law is broken by. the neces^ 
sary risk. An ethics of responsibility is unable
30) Ethics, pp. 220-221.
31) See E, Bethge: An gegebenen Ort. Au'fsaetze und Reden 1970-1979, pp. 63-82.
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to promise that a certain decision will be completely 
right. One is never sure beforehand, or on principle.
In responsible action, the wish to know for sure what 
ought to be done is abandoned. Responsibility means, 
for Bonhoeffer, to risk taking decisions and to depend 
firmly on grace.
His ethics of responsibility is, therefore, simul­
taneously christological and highly descriptive of his 
own conspiratorial participation. He begins this chapter 
with these words :
The structure of responsible life is con­ditioned by two factors; life is bound to man and to God and a man's own life is free. It is the fact that life is bound to man and to God which sets life in the freedom of a man's own life. Without this bond and without this freedom there is no responsibility. Only when it has become selfless in this obligation does a life stand in the freedom of a man's truly own life and action, (32)
Responsible action should not be confused with arbi­
trary action. Bonhoeffer was deeply conscious that there 
will be severe judgement on all we do. We must try as 
hard as possible to find out the best possible option.
Our conscience warns us not to get entangled in guilt, 
Bonhoeffer then develops the four basis elements 
of responsible life in this chapter. They look like 
the characteristics of 'man come of age' which he de­
scribed in his Letters and Papers from Prison. The
32) Ethics, p. 194.
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four elements are (1) deputyship, (2) correspondence 
with reality, (3) the acceptance of guilt, (4) the 
venture of concrete decision, with its element of risk. 
Bethge explains the contents as follows;
The mature person,no longer (1) evades what he has to do for others, nor does he (2) dream about concrete conditions, prices and ethical validities of success or failure? (3) he does not hide from his broken and guilt-laden past, but is free to accept this and to accept the claims of the present and the future; and (4) he does not wait for an unattainable certainty before he acts. All this constitutes his mature freedom and commitment which comes to life in responsibility. (33)
His motif could be expressed by using Paul's famous 
words in Galatians chapter five.
Christ set us free, to be free men. Stand firm, then, and refuse to be tied to the yoke of slavery again.You, my friends, were called to be free man; only do not turn your freedom into licence for your lower nature, but servants to one another in love. (NEB)
Bonhoeffer was precisely the one who lived both 
free from and free for. He was free from everything 
and at the same time free to be bounded for others.
He was a free believer and a lover of the commandment.
He lived in freedom and commitment and thus lived as 
a bearer of responsibility.
This seminal chapter of the Ethics also, like other 
chapters, remained unfinished. The last paragraph,
33) E. Bethge: "Freedom and Obedience in Dietrich Bonhoeffer", Prayer and Righteous Action. p. 68.
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however, ends in impressive description and it contains 
Bonhoeffer's unintentional autobiography about his last 
years.
Whether an action arises from responsibility or from cynicism is shown only by whether or not the objective guilt of the violation of the law is recognized and acknowledged, and by whether or not, precisely in this violation, the law is hallowed. It is in this way that the will of God is hallowed in the deed which arises from freedom. But since this is a deed which arises from freedom, man is not torn asunder in deadly conflict, but in certainty and in unity with himself he can dare to hallow the law truly even by breaking it, (34)
The life and death of thiS twentieth-century martyr
points out the task which is given to the Church not
only of Germany but of Japan and of the whole world
today. At the same time, he calls every Christian to
deep repentance, to faith in God's promise, and to the
steps towards responsible life.
When the history of the Japanese Church, which has
but recently entered its second century of mission, is
set in the perspective of the twenty centuries of world
Christian history, it becomes clear that the Japanese
Church is still in her pioneer period. She is required
to serve the historical world with a pioneer spirit.
She should not pour all her energies into maintaining
herself,and establishing a small, in-grown, selftsatisfied
clique. The Church becomes the real Church only when
34) Ethics, p. 229
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she is bound to God and man, and dedicates herself to 
the Gospel and the others. The Japanese church, in 
spite of her small number, must be a creative minority, 
like a mustard-seed (Mt, 13:31).
Repeating various trials and errors, the church / 
in Japan is now aiming at the renewal of herself. It 
seems to me that we can see some flash of hope in the 
recent activities in the church. For example, the United 
Church of Christ in Japan (Kyodan) ,' which is the main 
body among the Protestant churches, organized three 
special committees recently.
The Japan-Korea Relations Committee has helped 
raise the consciousness of the denial of basic human 
rights not only in Korea, but in other Asian countries 
as well. They took the lead in a joint Symposium on 
Human Rights and Japan's Involvement in Asia which con­
sidered the church's role in this whole area of concern, 
both in Japan and abroad.
The Committee on the Buraku Discrimination Issue 
has gained the General Assembly's approval for the 
establishment of a centre to strengthen the movement 
towards buraku liberation, which is one of the most com­
plicated social problems in Japan, concerning the liberation 
of the discriminated against and outcast communities, 
and also involvement with other human rights issues in 
Japan.
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The Committee on the Yasukuni Shrine Issue has 
entered a new phase in which attempts to nationalize 
the shrine are now centring on a grassroots movement 
led by the same forces seeking the revival of 
militarism and the Emperor system. Christians are 
taking the lead in opposing these forces.
As Bonhoeffer incessantly asked the question 
"Who is Christ for us today?", the Church in Japan 
should live and serve Him wrestling with the funda­
mental question "Who is Christ for us today in the 
historical situation of Japan?"
It might be appropriate to quote the remarks of 
Eberhard Bethge, who is the best friend, the most 
suitable introducer and the pre-eminent successor of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, as the concluding words of this 
survey.
Hitler was only one of our problems. What had made him possible, is the really fundamental issue. And this issue is not one that has simply disappeared.  ^ It remains with us always. That is why we need to remember, figures like Bonhoeffer. (35)
35) E. Bethge; "The Legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer", Prayer and Righteous Action, p. 43.
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